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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY - STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL PUTTUCK, an individual and 
PAUL PUTTUCK dba, BREAK-
THROUGH CONSTRUCTION, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. ] 
PETER GENDRON, WILLIAM 
GENDRON,and Does 3 thru 5,inclusive, ; 
Defendants. 
) COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES 
) and JURY DEMAND 
» civil NO.: oi-oroon^ 
\ JUDGE: BRUCE LUBECK 
COMES NOW Plaintiffs and allege that: 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND: 
I) At all relevant times, Plaintiff Paul Puttuck was a resident of Park City, Summit County, 
Utah all within the jurisdiction of this judicial district. 
2) At all relevant times, Plaintiff Puttuck was, the sole owner of PlamtifFBreakthrough 
Construction, and at all relevant times, it was a duly licensed Park City, Summit County, 
Utah business. 
3} Plaintiffs are informed and believe and based upon such information and beliefs allege that; 
Defendant Peter Gendron is now, and at all relevant times wasf a resident of Gilbert, 
Arizona, 
4) Plaintiffs are informed and believe and based upon such information and beliefs allege that* 
Washington. 
5) .JO:S Dejtenca' i- ; tnrcugn .-. •Jr.c;«5ive are persons or enthies who identities are presently 
uiikiiown and who « w
 v^4vved to have acted or failed to act in some way to have caused, or to have 
participated in, the perjury and/or obstruction of justice and/or other tortuous misconduct a$ 
r* mphinod of her/tp .And that r-trough ^Kb m .^-Y'-s: .. • rl-.:v .^  •* ;.;•, h , ^K*m. diu-rtlv caused 
Plaintiffs some/or all of the damages alleged. So soon as the identities of these Doe defendants and 
ihe capa^ilv in winch * K.
 ; uct^i "-: «':ti'*ti ''-* :xf n e .*•;"• ;/:•:-; /-s<r •: -:: *1a; v. c ^ M^^vcrei1.. 
Plaintiffs will amend this Complaint setting forth their identities and intentional and/or negligent 
capacities. 
M i*\usuam to U. C. A- Section 73-3-4, this court has subject matter jurisdiction of these 
ns in that the amount in controversy exceeds the sum of 520,000 exclusive of interests and 
7) This Court is the proper court for personal jurisdiction because: 
• Defendants Peter and William Gendron committed their misconduct in Salt Lake and 
Park City, Summit County, Utah, all within the jurisdictional boundaries of this judicial 
district; 
* Defendants Peter and William Gendron comnv -\\ • -. ubceL-* ,a m two V^v.uits 
that were in this same judicial district court; 
• " damages Plaintiffs' suffered occurred in Park City, Summit County, Utah, 
..;. .vithin the jurisdictional boundaries of this judicial district; and because, 
• When Defendant Peter and William Gendron engaged in their misconduct, they he!-; 
were then subject U; the jurisdiction cf this same judicial district court due to the two 
lawsuits underlying this lawsuit in which they were both named defendants. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
S T A T E M E N T of FACTS: 
8) On or about 02/24/99, Plaintiffs sued Defendants Gendron and others for breach of 
contract bad faith breach of contract and for fraud, deceit and misrepresentation in the construction 
of a Park City, Deer Valley residential home building project [the Deer Valley project]. 
9) Defendants answered the Complaint and asserted there under a $500,000 counter claim 
against Plaintiffs. 
10) Subsequent discovery revealed that Defendant PETER Gendron [hereinafter Defendant 
PETER] was the sole source behind the allegations of the counter claims and the $500,000 snecial 
damages as alleged. 
11) Defendants* counter claims forced Plaintiff to spend considerable monies in the defense of 
these counter claims. 
12} During the discovery of this lawsuit Defendant PETER testified that during the period of 
to 03/98 through 02/23/00, Plaintiffs* substandard work and general overall negligence costs the 
Defendants some $500,000 in mismanagement costs, costs ovemins, costs in construction delays 
and construction repair and rework costs, etc* on the Deef Valley project. 
Defendant William Gendron [hereinafter Defendant WILLIAM] was present when Defendant 
PETER testified about the counter-claim. 
13) Eventually, this lawsuit settled in the Plaintiffs' favor, 
14) Later on or about 12/27/02, a John Hale and Hale * s company, Chans Construction, a Park 
City residential home construction company that worked this same Deer Valley project as the 
instant Plaintiffs sued Defendants Goidron and others alleging breach of contract, bad faith breach 
of contract, and fraud and deceit. 
15) Defendants answered this Complaint and asserted there under a counter-claimed against the 
Plaintiffs Chans and Hale and a third party Defendant Mcintosh for $500,000. 
16) Subsequent discovery revealed that Defendant PETER was the sole source behind the 
allegations of this counter claims and the $500,000 special damage claim, 
17) During the discovery of this lawsuit, at his deposition, Defendant PETER testified 
that Hale, Charts and Mcintosh mismanaged the Deer Valley Project, did substandard work and that 
this and their general overall negligence costs the Defendants some $500,000 in mismanagement 
costs, costs overruns, costs in construction delays and construction repair and rework costs, eta on 
the Deer Valley project. He testified these costs were suffered from 01/07/99 to 08/20/00* 
18) At the trial of the Charis-Gendron lawsuit, Defendant Gendron testified about the counter 
claims in conformity with his deposition testimony. 
19) Under oath, on different occasions Defendant PETER testified that the $500,000 loss 
asserted in the defendants' counter-claims were due to the Plaintiffs' negligence and 
mismanagement etc. Likewise, under oath on other occasions, Defendant PETER testified that the 
defendants suffered this very same loss due to Hale, Chans and Mcintosh* s negligence and 
mismanagement, etc. Defendant PETER's $500,000 counter claims against the Plaintiffs and then 
against Hale, Chads and Mcintosh substantially covered the same time frame. 
20) Plaintiffs are informed and believe and based upon such information and beliefs allege that 
at all relevant times, Defendant WTLLIAM was aware of Defendant PETERss deposition and trial 
testimony as concerns the counter claims. 
21) This case was tried and a jury assessed damages against both Plaintiffs and Defendants. The 
jury assessed monetary damages against Plaintiffs under the Defendants counter-claims. 
22) During the discovery in both lawsuits, Defendants testimony revealed that Defendant 
WILLIAM was the person in overall charge of the construction of the Deer Valley Project 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION; 
Wrongful Use of Civil Proceedings 
23) Comes now Plaintiffs and here incorporate by reference each of the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 1 through 22, inclusive of this Complaint as if same were set forth here at length. 
24) When Plaintiff sued Defendants Gendron and others in the earlier lawsuit, defendants, 
directly through Defendant PETER, falsely counter-claimed against Plaintiffs for $500,000. Again, 
directly through Defendant PETER, these same defendants continued to wrongMIy maintain their 
false claims against Plaintiffs, Such intentional misconduct was legally improper and totally lacked 
any justifiable basis for instituting and maintaining these counter-claims against Plaintiffs. 
25) Moreover, defendants prosecuted such false counter-claims to intimidate Plaintiffs and to 
injury the Plaintiffs* business reputation. Defendants did not prosecute said counter claims to try to 
secure a proper adjudication of the Plaintiffs* initial claims against them, 
26) Notwithstanding the defendants* prosecution and continued prosecution of the false counter-
claims, Plaintiff prevailed against defendants with the defendants paying Plaintiffs monies and 
Plaintiff paying nothing on the false counter-claims* 
* * * * * * * * * 
27) Due to the Defendants* wrongftil use of the civil processes through their false counter claims 
against Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs have suffered financial Josses in the money they were forced to pay 
their counsel to defend these spurious claims and additionally, for the costs associated with the loss 
of use of these monies. 
28) Plaintiffs assert that the Defendants Gendrons" wrongful use of the civil processes against 
them warrants the imposition of a punitive damage award because the Defendants* actions clearly 
manifest their willful and malicious conduct. Further, said misconduct evidences the Defendants* 
full knowledge of, and reckless indifference toward, and disregard of, the Plaintiffs* legitimate legal 
rights under their initial lawsuit claims. Plaintiffs believe this punitive damage award will be 
according to their trial proofs and the jury's discretion. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION: 
Civil Perjury-
29) Comes now Plaintiffs and here incorporate by reference each of the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 1 through 22, inclusive of this Complaint as if same were set forth here at length. 
30) During the prosecution of the defendants' counter-claims against Plaintiffs, Defendant 
PETER, while under oath* testified falsely about said counter-claims. At this time, Defendant 
PETER knew he was testifying falsely but continued to do so intentionally. At this time Defendant 
WILLIAM knew Defendant PETER was testifying falsely 
31) Defendant WILLIAM had ample opportunities to discredit or disavow Defendant PETER's 
false testimony but he failed and refused to do so. Due to his silence Plaintiffs assert he ratified and 
acquiesced in the false testimony and approved of Defendant PETER* s false testimony 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs believe that Defendant WILLIAM is liable for all of the damages PlaintifFs 
suffered due to the Defendant PETER's civil perjury. 
32) Due to the Defendant PETER'S perjury in the civil counter claims against them, Plaintiffs 
have suffered financial losses in the money they were forced to pay their counsel to defend these 
spurious claims and additionally for the costs associated with the loss of use of these monies, These 
damages will be according to Plaintiffs* trial proofs. 
33) Plaintiffs assert that the Defendants Gcndrons* civil perjury warrants the imposition of a 
punitive damage award because their actions clearly manifest their willful and malicious 
misconduct. Furthcrs said perjury evidences the Defendant Gendrpns* full knowledge of, and 
reckless indifference toward, and disregard of, the Plaintiffs* legitimate legal rights under their 
initial lawsuit claims. Plaintiffs believe this punitive damage award will be according to their trial 
proofs and juryfs discretion, 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION: 
Obstruction of Justice-
34) Comes now Plaintiffs and here incorporate by reference each of the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 1 through 22, inclusive of this Complaint as if same were set forth here at length, 
35) Both in his deposition and at trial in the Charis v, Gendron lawsuit, Defendant PETER 
testified under oath that the mismanagement of third party Defendant Mcintosh and Counterclaim 
Defendants Hale and Charis was the reason he and the other defendants in that lawsuit suffered a 
$500,000 loss on the Deer Valley Project. Defendant PETER alleged that Joss was due to 
mismanagement costs, costs overruns, construction delay costs, construction repair and re-work 
costs. 
36) In the earlier, Puttuck v, Gendron lawsuit. Defendant PETER testified that these costs were 
the very same $500,000 in costs that Defendants suffered because of Plaintiffs Puttuck and 
Breakthrough's mismanagement. Defendant PETER's false testimony in the Puttuck v. Gendron 
lawsuit obstructed the justice Plaintiffs sought in that lawsuit. 
37) At the time Defendant PETER testified falsely, Defendant WILLIAM was present. At this 
time and at all subsequent times, though he had ample opportunities to do so, Defendant WILLIAM 
never disavowed or rejected this false testimony. Accordingly, Plaintiffs assert Defendant 
WILLIAM knowingly adopted and ratified the false testimony and accordingly, is liable to 
Plaintiffs for ail of the damages Plaintiffs suffered, 
38) Plaintiffs arc informed and believe and based upon such mfomiatton and beliefs allege that 
Defendant PETER testified falsely and Defendant WILLIAM approved of said false testimony to 
hinder the prosecution of Plaintiffs* claims and to intimidate Plaintiffs. Defendant Gendrons$ false 
testimony helped prevent the prosecution of that lawsuit on its merits and it provided false 
information both on the authenticity of counter-claims themselves and on the underlying financial 
losses defendants asserted they suffered because of the Plaintiffs* mismanagement, both of which 
were material issues under that lawsuit. 
39) Due to the Defendants Gendrons* obstruction of justice tactics in testifying falsely under 
oath, Plaintiffs have suffered financial losses in the money they were forced to pay their counsel to 
defend these spurious claims and additionally, for the costs associated with the loss of use of these 
monies. These damages will be according to Plaintiffs1 trial proofs. 
40) Plaintiffs assert that the Defendants Gcndrons* obstruction of justice tactics warrants the 
imposition of a punitive damage award because the Defendant's actions clearly manifest their 
willful and malicious misconduct. Further, said misconduct evidences the Defendants* full 
knowledge of, and reckless indifference toward, and disregard of, the Plaintiffs* legitimate legal 
tights under their lawsuit claims- Plaintiffs believe this punitive damage award will be according to 
their trial proofs and jury's discretion* 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION; 
Abuseof Process-
41) Comes now Plaintiffs and here incorporate by reference each of the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 1 through 22f inclusive of this Complaint as if same were set forth here at length. 
42) When Defendant PETER testified falsely and when Dcfendau^WlLLIAM annroved of the 
false testimony, they used the 6ivii process against Plaintiffs primarily to accomplish a purpose for 
which it was not designed. The civil process system is not designed to prosecute false claim 
supported bj! perjured/testimony. And given that Defendant PETER testified falsely in both 
depositions, and at tnal, and that Defendant WILLIAM approved of the false testimony Defendant 
PETER testified falsely and knowingly and thus, with malice. Given Defendant WILLIAM'S 
failure and refusal to disavow the false testimony foil well always knowing said testimony was 
false, his conduct manifested his knowing approval and ratification of the false testimony. Thus he 
acted with malice and is folly liable to Plaintiffs for the damages they suffered. 
43) When this earlier [Puttuck n. Gendron] lawsuit resolved, it resolved in Plaintiffs' favor in 
that Defendants paid Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs paid nothing on the false counter claims. 
44) Due to the Defendants Gendrons' abuse of the civil law process, Plaintiffe have suffered 
financial losses in the money they were forced to pay their counsel to defend these spurious claims 
and additionally, for the costs associated with the loss of use of those monies. Those damages will 
be according to Plaintiffs* trial proofs. 
45} Plaintiffs assert that the Defendants5 abuse of the civil law process warrants the imposition 
of a punitive damage award because the Defendants* actions clearly manifest their willful and 
malicious misconduct Further, said misconduct evidences the Defendants> full knowledge of, and 
reckless indifference toward, and disregard of, the Plaintiffs* legitimate legal rights under their 
lawsuit claims. Plaintiffs believe this punitive damage award will be according to their trial proofs 
and the jury's discretion, 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION-
Civil Conspiracy 
46) Comes now Plaintiffs and here incorporate by reference each of the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 1 through 45, inclusive of this Complaint as if same were set forth here at length, 
47) Plaintiffs arc informed and believe and based upon such information and beliefs allege that 
because Defendant PETER testified falsely on multiple occasions and that Defendant WILLIAM, 
having failed and refused to disavow or reject this false testimony fefter having multiple 
opportunities to do so, Plaintiffs believe Defendants conspired between themselves: 1- to 
wrongfully use the civil processes, 1- to commit perjury, 3- to obstruct justice, and, 4* to abuse the 
civil processes. 
48) Due to the Defendants Gendtoos* conspiracy against Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs have suffered 
financial losses in the money they were forced to pay their counsel to defend this conspiracy and the 
false claims and additionally, for the costs associated with the loss of use of these monies. These 
damages will be according to Plaintiffs* trial proofs, 
49) Plaintiffs assert that the Defendants' civil conspiracy warrants the imposition of a punitive 
damage award because the Defendants* actions clearly manifest their wilIM and malicious 
misconduct. Further, said misconduct evidences the Defendants" full knowledge of, and reckless 
indifference toward, and disregard of, the Plaintiffs* rights under the lawsuit claims. Plaintiffs 
believe this punitive damage award will be according to their trial proofs and the jury's discretion. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF: 
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing allegations, Plaintiffs pray for a judgment against 
Defendants, and each of them, for money damages as will be proven at trial, as follows: 
• For all die costs and attorney's fees, Plaintiffs paid their counsel in defense of 
Defendant's false counter claims asserted in the earlier Putruck v. Gendron lawsuit. 
• Reasonable monies as punitive damages for the Defendants' fraud and deceit, malicious 
prosecution, perjury, obstruction of justice, abuse of the dyilwjcesses and for civil 
conspiracy; 
• AH attorney's fees incurred in prosecuting the Plaintiffs* claims in this lawsuit 
• Interest at the legal rate on all monies due Plaintiffs from the date such monies 
were due or paid to Defendant's actual payment; 
• All other relief this Court deems just, fair and warranted. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
Dated: 09, March, 2007 
3URY DEMAND-
PLAINTIFFS PEMANft A JURY TO DETRBMWE TJ MS AND CLAIM. VALUES, 
Dated: 09, March, 2007 
FAY, Esq. 
Plaintiffs1 Address: 
c/oJ.F.FAY 
Gregory & Swapp 
2975 West Executive Parkway 
Lehi, UT 84043 
Corop 
SCOTT C. WELLING, 3420 
Attorney for Defendants 
2064 Prospector Avenue, Suite 203 
P.O. Box 680715 
Park City, Utah 84068-0715 
Telephone: (435) 649-8406 
Facsimile: (435) 649-8412 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL PUTTUCK, an individual and ) 
PAUL PUTTUCK dba, BREAK- ) 
THROUGH CONSTRUCTION, ) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
) OF MOTION TO DISMISS 
Plaintiffs, ) 
vs. ) 
) Civil No. 07-0500114 
PETER GENDRON, WILLIAM ) 
GENDRON, and Does 1 thru 5, inclusive, ) Judge: Bruce Lubeck 
Defendant. ) 
Defendants Peter Gendron and William Gendron, by and through counsel, submit the 
following Memorandum in Support of their Motion to Dismiss plaintiffs' complaint and all 
causes of action therein in their entirety. 
INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges five causes of action stated as "Wrongful Use of Civil 
Proceedings" (First Cause), "Civil Perjury" (Second Cause), "Obstruction of Justice" (Third 
Cause), "Abuse of Process" (Fourth Cause), and "Civil Conspiracy" (Fifth Cause), all arising 
from the parties' association as contractor and developer of a "spec" house project in Park City, 
Utah during one year of the construction of that log home. Defendants move to dismiss each 
and every claim: (*') pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ut. R. Civ. Proa, upon grounds that plaintiffs 
have either failed to state a cause of action or that no cause of action is recognized by Utah law 
for such purported wrongdoing; and (ii) as no longer actionable, being time-barred pursuant to 
Sec. 78-12-25(3) U.C.A.; and (Hi) due to the liability shield afforded officers and directors of a 
corporation. 
ARGUMENT 
"A Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss admits the facts alleged in the Complaint, but 
challenges the plaintiffs' right to relief based on those facts." (St. Benedict's Develop. Co. v. St. 
Benedict's Hosp. UT 1991, 811 P2d 194, 196.) Consequently, defendants incorporate by 
reference plaintiffs' facts as alleged. However, even when viewed in a light most favorable to 
plaintiffs, the facts alleged in each of the claims discussed below fail to state a claim under Utah 
law. 
In addition, defendants assert that all five causes of action are barred by the limitations of 
78-12-25(3) U.C.A., as the last actions necessary to complete all these claims had occurred, and 
all damages purportedly ensuing therefrom were liquidated, by June 5, 2000, which is more than 
fours years later than the filing of this action, on March 12, 2007. 
Further, that plaintiffs' claims against defendants Peter Gendron and William Gendron in 
their individual capacities are of no avail, as they were acting at all material times in their 
capacity as officers and/or directors of the corporate entity, LRG, Inc., which acted as the 
developer of subject project and the party which contracted with plaintiffs in that endeavor. 
Accordingly, defendants move the court for an order dismissing the First, Second, Third, 
Fourth and Fifth causes of action under plaintiffs' Complaint. 
2 
I. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM OR NO CAUSE OF ACTION EXISTS. 
A. THE OUTCOME OF THE PRIOR ACTION DOES NOT QUALIFY AS A 
FAVORABLE TERMINATION TO SUPPORT A CLAIM FOR 
WRONGFUL USE OF CIVIL PROCEEDINGS. 
The most recent decisions of the Utah Appellate Courts concerning the tort of wrongful 
use of civil proceedings, a.k.a. malicious prosecution, occurred in the Court of Appeals' and 
Supreme Court's respective decisions in the matter of Hatch v. Davis, 2004 UT App 378, 102 
P.3d 774; 2006 UT 44, 147 P.3d 383. In the lower appellate court decision, the Court of Appeals 
enunciated the elements of the tort as (a) a litigant acting without probable cause and primarily 
for a purpose other than that of securing the proper adjudication of the claim in which the 
proceedings are based, and (b) except when ex parte, where that proceeding was terminated in 
favor of the person against whom it was brought. Id. at 1(22. The Court of Appeals affirmed the 
dismissal of plaintiffs' wrongful use of civil proceedings claim, holding that the second element 
was not met where the prior proceeding initiated by defendant had been dismissed on procedural 
grounds, i.e., lack of jurisdiction. The Court held that the termination in the prior prosecution 
must reflect on the merits of the underlying action, and that a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction 
not only is not on the merits, it is unreflective of the merits. Hatch v. Davis, <|23, citing Gilbert 
v. Ince, 1999 UT 65 f l9 , 981 P.2d 841 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 674 (1997)); 
and Lackner v. LaCroix, (1979) 25 Cal 3rd 474, 602 P.2d 393. 
Plaintiffs here acknowledge that the prior proceeding between some of the present 
parties, Paid Puttuck and Breakthrough Construction vs. Peter Gendronf LRG, Inc., Gendron 
Lim and Company and Kenneth Mcintosh ("Puttuck I") was dismissed pursuant to settlement 
stipulation. See: Plaintiffs' "Complaint for Damages and Jury Demand" ("Plaintiffs' 
3 
Complaint" or "Puttuck IF'), 1113, 26; Stipulated Motion and Order for Dismissal in Puttuck I 
attached as Exhibit A. Plaintiffs assert having received a settlement in Puttuck I, but do not 
identify the allocation of those funds, if any, toward the particular claims plaintiffs raised in that 
action. Although plaintiffs brand the counterclaims in Puttuck I as false, and counterclaimants' 
conduct in maintaining the same against him "legally improper and totally lack any justifiable 
basis," it is unclear whether that settlement compensated plaintiffs for those attorney fees 
incurred in resisting the wrongful counterclaim, which are the damages plaintiffs seek in Puttuck 
II. 
Thus, it cannot be said that the termination of Puttuck I in any way reflected on the 
merits, or lack of merit as it were, of the counterclaim in that action. Although Utah's courts 
have apparently not spoken to the subject, decisions of California's appellate courts subsequent 
to the Lackner v. LaCroix decision cited favorably in Hatch v. Davis are clear that "for 
termination to be favorable, it must reflect the opinion of someone, either the trial court or the 
prosecuting party, that the action lacked merit or if pursued would result in a decision in favor of 
the defendant." NMSBPCSLDHB v. Chavez, 2005 CA App Dist 6, [^50, Rana v. Singh. 2004 CA 
App Dist 6 (voluntary dismissal reflects ambiguously on the merits, leaving open the question of 
plaintiffs innocence of the prior allegations). 
The reasons for disqualifying a settlement from the definition of "favorable termination" 
are obvious: "It would be sad day indeed if a litigant and his or her attorney could not dismiss an 
action to avoid further fees and costs simply because they were fearful such a dismissal would 
result in a [subsequent] malicious prosecution action." Rana v. Singh, supra., citing Oprian v. 
Goldrich Kest & Assoc, 1990 CA App 3d 337, 345. 
4 
It is clear then that the dismissal of Puttuck I pursuant to settlement does not constitute 
the favorable termination of the prior proceeding necessary to sustain a claim for wrongful use of 
civil proceedings. Therefore, plaintiffs' First Cause of Action should be dismissed. 
B. THERE IS NO CIVIL RIGHT OF ACTION FOR PERJURY OR 
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE UNDER UTAH LAW. 
All plaintiffs' causes of action, including the Second Cause (Civil Perjury) and Third 
Cause (Obstruction of Justice) are based entirely upon the claim that defendant Peter Gendron 
wrongfully initiated a $500,000 counterclaim against plaintiffs in Puttuck I and falsely testified 
at deposition that plaintiff caused such damages by his mismanagement during his tenure as 
general contractor. See: Complaint 1)1(10, 12, 24 and 30. Plaintiffs' "proof that these 
accusations were false is purportedly established by the fact that defendants sued other 
contractors (Hale and Mcintosh) for the "same" damages, and were successful in doing so. By 
plaintiffs' theory, the favorable award in Hale vs. Gendron1 both vindicates plaintiffs' innocence 
of any mismanagement and proves that defendants' allegations in Puttuck I were willful 
misrepresentations! 
This ex post facto "proof of wrongful intent is the only fact alleged by plaintiffs in 
establishing their allegation that Peter Gendron testified falsely in Puttuck I. One would think 
that if plaintiffs felt so strongly that they were falsely accused in Puttuck I, they would have 
asserted claims for frivolous litigation, sanctions, attorney fees or contempt in that proceeding, 
or a separate one after the dismissal of Puttuck I.2 
1
 That case, John Hale and Charts Construction v. Peter Gendron, William Gendron, Hank Lang and LRG, Inc. 
('7/a/e v. Gendron ") was tried to a jury before this court in June, 2006. 
" If timely filed see: Argument, Section II. 
5 
However, now, as then, plaintiffs' claims for civil perjury and obstruction of justice 
would have been for naught regardless of the falsity of Mr. Gendron's deposition testimony, as it 
is quite clear that Utah does not recognize private right of action for those wrongs. Winter v. 
Northwest Pipeline Corp., 1991 UT, 820 P.2d 916; Cline v. State, 2005 UT App 498, 142 P.3d, 
127. In Cline v. State, plaintiff sued a state agency and investigator inter alia for perjury and 
obstruction of justice in connection with a child abuse case. The Utah Court of Appeals, noting 
there is no known legal principle whereby the enactment of a criminal sanction operates to 
provide a private right of action, found it determinative of the question that the legislature had 
not seen fit to create a private right of action for perjury or obstruction of justice, and thus 
refused to create one, notwithstanding the existence of criminal sanctions for the very same 
behavior. Cline v. State of Utah, 1f29, citing Youren v. Tintic Sch. DisL, 2004 UT App 33, f4, 86 
P.3d 70, 71; Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 1974 UT, 529 P.2d 806, 808; Broadbent v. Board of 
Educ., 1996 UT App, 910 P.2d 1274, 1278. 
Plaintiffs' remedies for Peter Gendron's purported false testimony and baseless 
counterclaim were properly raised in Puttuck I by way of application for sanctions per Rule 11 
Ut. R. Civ. Proc, motion for contempt, attorney fees, or any of the many remedies available for 
abuse of a litigant's obligation to make allegations and testify in a good faith effort at compliance 
with the truth. There being no such civil causes of action recognized by Utah law, plaintiffs' 
Second and Third Causes of Action should be dismissed. 
C. PLAINTIFFS' ALLEGATIONS FAIL TO ESTABLISH THE ELEMENTS 
OF, OR MEET THE STANDARD OF PROOF FOR, CIVIL CONSPIRACY. 
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To prove civil conspiracy, the proponent must show: (1) a combination of two or more 
persons, (2) an object to be accomplished, (3) a meeting of the minds on the object or a course of 
action, (4) one or more unlawful, overt acts, and (5) damages as a proximate result thereof 
Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 1987 UT App, 746 P.2d 785; 15 C.J.S. Conspiracy 1fljl, 2. 
Further, the proponent must present clear and convincing evidence to carry his burden of proof 
on a charge of civil conspiracy. Crane Co. v. Dahle, 1978 UT, 576 P.2d 870, 872. Likewise, the 
statement of that claim must allege with particularly sufficient facts to manifest that the 
proponent's case is based upon that higher level of evidentiary weight. Mackey v. Cannon, 2000 
UT App 36, 996 P.2d 1081. In order to survive a motion to dismiss, "[t]he relevant surrounding 
facts must be set forth with sufficient particularity to show what facts are claimed to constitute 
such charges." Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966, 971 (UT 1982). 
In the Fourth Cause of Action, plaintiffs allege that when Peter Gendron testified falsely 
under oath at deposition, William Gendron "refused to disavow or reject" that perjured testimony 
thus acting in concert with his brother to carry out the various wrongs plead in plaintiffs' First 
through Fourth Causes of Action. See: Complaint, %A1. 
As to the unlawful or overt act requirement, the allegations must point to an action that is 
outside a litigant's right to assert any claim he might have against another party, if supported by 
probable cause. There is no assertion in plaintiffs' Complaint, other than the gratuitous use of 
the adjective "falsely," that Peter Gendron's testimony that plaintiffs had caused substantial 
damage by their mismanagement was anything other than a statement of belief. There is no 
specification of facts as to why it was perjured testimony when spoken. The fact that this 
mismanagement claim was later dismissed by defendants without recompense is at best only 
circumstantial evidence of Gendrons' wrongful intent and most limited in weight even if proven. 
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Undeniably, it is a legitimate aspect of a litigant's defense to assert defenses or a 
counterclaim for purposes of dissuading the plaintiffs from further prosecution of the case, or to 
move the dispute toward settlement. A litigant is not to be held accountable for conspiracy or 
abuse of the system if there is some credible basis to the allegations made. Probable cause is "[a] 
suspicion founded upon circumstances sufficiently strong to warrant a reasonable person in the 
belief that the charge is true." Nicholson v. Lucas, (1994) 21 CA App, 1657, 1665. It is legally 
tenable claims for relief that the law seeks to protect, not "true charges." Sheldon Appel Co. v. 
Albert & Oliker, 1989 CA, 47 CA.3d 863, 872. 
It is also self evident that whether there is probable cause for the claim is certainly not to 
be determined by whether the proponent prevailed on the claim at trial, nor that the damages 
recovered in a favorable outcome were approximate to that alleged in the counterclaim. If it 
were otherwise, each and every time a litigant failed to establish a claim at trial or didn't recover 
damages in the amount plead, a suit for civil conspiracy would surely follow ad infinitum. 
Plaintiffs attempt to prove that the counterclaim in Puttuck I, as well as Peter Gendron's 
deposition testimony, were falsely uttered by the fact that his company, LRG, Inc., also alleged 
mismanagement and damages of $500,000 in Hale v. Gendron. Other than the similarity of 
damage amounts alleged in the counterclaims of that action and Puttuck I, there is no allegation 
nor fact averred in plaintiffs' Complaint here that would dispel the equally logical conclusion 
that defendants felt that both Puttuck, and subsequently Mcintosh and Hale, contributed to the 
LRG's losses on the project.3 
Plaintiffs' Complaint also suffers from the absence of any factual allegation of specific 
events, statements, monetary amounts or other details that Peter Gendron purportedly lied about. 
It was LRG's position at trial in Hale v. Gendron that the project lost approximately $500,000, of which the jury 
awarded combined breach of contract damages against Mcintosh and Hale of $123,750. 
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This failure to specify the spurious statements strongly indicates that plaintiffs' do not have clear 
and convincing evidence there were any willfully false facts, as opposed to opinions, expressed 
by Peter Gendron. 
As proof of defendants' duplicity, plaintiffs allege that defendants attributed losses to 
Puttuck's mismanagement during the time that Hale was serving as general contractor, i.e., after 
Puttuck had been dismissed from the job. See: Complaint f 19. However, it is equally plausible 
that Peter Gendron's testimony was simply to assert that to that point in time, i.e. the date of his 
deposition on February 23 and 24, 2000, the consequences of Puttuck's breach were continuing 
to that very day. It just as likely that by the time Hale v. Gendron was being litigated, even 
hindsight would show that the consequences of mismanagement by Puttuck, Mcintosh and Hale 
overlapped and were not easily distinguishable. 
If the unlawful or overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was Peter Gendron's perjured 
testimony, plaintiffs must establish the elements of that (criminal) offense, to wit: (1) false 
testimony given under oath, (2) regarding a material matter, (3) with willful intent to provide 
false testimony, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake or faulty memory. Flemming v. 
Simper, 2007 UT App 102, 574 Utah Adv. Rep. 10; United States v. Medina-Estrada, 1996 10th 
Cir., 81 F.3d. 981, 987. In Flemming v. Simper, the perjury charge went to defendant doctor's 
estimation of how many of his patients received a certain supplemental procedure following 
surgery, an estimation that proved inaccurate. Upholding the trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs' 
claim because perjury was not established by clear and convincing evidence, the Utah Appellate 
Court did not find any evidence of a willful intent, merely that defendant had provided an 
estimation of the number of the procedures, "which, by its nature, is an approximation, a rough 
determination of a figure, not an exact assertion/' Id. at ][24. In United States v. Ellis, 1997 4th 
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Circ., 121 Fed 3rd 908, the court held that a witness did not commit perjury when she 
overestimated her brother's height. "[I]n the absence of conclusive proof that the witness 
actually knew how tall her brother was, the conflict between her testimony and the other 
evidence presented at trial proves only that she was mistaken, not that she lied." Id. at 927. 
Here, plaintiffs present no facts that could support a finding that Mr. Gendron actually 
knew the damage amount was lower, but grossly inflated it, or that he knew those losses were 
attributable only to the mismanagement of Mcintosh or Hale. 
It is clear from plaintiffs' allegations that defendant William Gendron's culpability is 
indirect, derived entirely from his association in LRG's business affairs and litigation matters, 
because plaintiff admits he was not the source of the counterclaim's false allegations, nor did he 
voice any such false testimony under oath. See: Complaint fflflO, 20, 31, 37 and 42. However, 
it is not sufficient to hold a corporate officer liable for the fraudulent acts of another in the 
company, even if he knew of them; there must be ratification of, or participation in, the misdeed. 
There is no allegation that William Gendron directed his brother to make false representations, 
nor is there any allegation that William personally participated in suborning Peter Gendron's 
testimony, only that he should have "disavowed" it.4 See: Complaint 1HJ31, 37. However, 
plaintiffs fail to establish any duty on the part of William Gendron to do so, or by what means he 
should go about it. 
Generally, silence in the absence of a duty to speak does not of itself constitute fraud. 
Russell/Packard Development Inc. v. Carson, 2003 UT App 316, ^66, 78 P.3d 616, citing 37 CJS 
Fraud §18 (1997). Plaintiffs allege that William Gendron "approved" of that false testimony, 
but offer no factual context for this affirmative act. See: Complaint 1J38. If, as plaintiffs allege, 
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Peter Gendron was the sole source of the false allegations of the counterclaim against plaintiff, 
and likewise was the only one who perjured himself, how can it be discerned from the 
Complaint, by averment to clear and convincing evidence, that William Gendron acted in concert 
with his brother? Likewise, how may conspiracy be inferred from the circumstantial evidence 
alleged by plaintiff, as it is just as plausible that William Gendron did not "reject" his brother's 
deposition testimony in Puttuck I, or during the course of proceedings in Hale v. Gendron, 
because he believed the estimation of damages to be reasonably accurate. 
Plaintiffs' clear and convincing evidence burden in setting out his conspiracy case at the 
pleading stage is met only if it shows that the circumstances are consistent only with the 
existence of a conspiracy. Evidence is insufficient if it discloses acts just as consistent with the 
lawful purpose as with an unlawful one. Dill v. Rader, 1978 OK, 583 P.2d 499, citing Accurate 
Products, Inc. v. Snow, 1965 WA, 408 P.2d 1, 7. Plaintiffs have thus failed to carry their burden 
of alleging clear and convincing facts to the effect that it could not have been anything other than 
a conspiracy or wrongful ulterior motive on William Gendron's part. 
As plaintiffs do not allege any affirmative act by William Gendron in formulating the 
wrongful counterclaim or suborning perjured deposition testimony by his brother, plaintiffs have 
asserted nothing more than speculation and conjecture that he did so, which are insufficient to 
establish a meeting of the minds on the purported wrongful course of action. Israel Pagan 
Estate v. Cannon, 1987 UT, 70 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 at 32, citing Dill v. Rader, 1978 OK, 583 P.2d 
496, 499. When the proved or admitted facts are consistent with any reasonable theory of good 
faith and honest intent they should so be construed. 37 CJS Fraud § 115 (1943). 
William Gendron was never named as a party in Puttuck I, nor was he subpoenaed to testify at any deposition, nor 
subjected to discovery in that case. Thus it is immaterial that he attended Peter Gendron's deposition, as he had no 
duty, or right, to interject concerning his brother's testimony 
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[W]here subsequent acts are relied upon to establish the formation of a 
conspiracy, they must clearly indicate the prior collusive combination and 
fraudulent purpose and must warrant the conclusion that the subsequent acts were 
done in furtherance of the unlawful combination and in pursuance of the 
fraudulent scheme. Disconnected circumstances, any one of which, or all of 
which, are just as consistent with a lawful purpose as with an unlawful 
undertaking, are insufficient to establish a conspiracy. 
Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, supra., citing Dill v. Rader, 1978 OK, 583 P.2d 499, quoting 
Ballantine v. Cummings, 1908 PA, 70 A. 546, 547. 
Thus, it cannot be said, even viewing plaintiffs' allegations as true, that the bare 
allegation that Peter Gendron lied at deposition, or that William Gendron's failed to repudiate 
those lies, or the disconnected fact that damages for mismanagement were also asserted against a 
subsequent contractor, even remotely approaches the clear, convincing and coherent pattern of 
facts that plaintiffs must allege to establish his conspiracy theory against William and Peter 
Gendron. 
D. PLAINTIFFS' ABUSE OF PROCESS CLAIM FAILS TO STATE FACTS 
NECESSARY TO SATISFY THE ELEMENTS OF THAT TORT. 
After a period of some confusion and uncertainty, Utah's appellate courts have 
definitively set out the elements of an abuse of process claim, to wit: (1) an ulterior motive; and 
(2) a willful act in use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceedings. Hatch 
v. Davis, 2004 UT App 378,1(30; see also: William Prosser Law of Torts § 121 at 857. 
In the Fourth Cause, plaintiffs fail to even mention, let alone allege facts that would 
support a finding of wrongful ulterior motive on defendants' part. There is no allegation in 
plaintiffs' Fourth Cause, nor the paragraphs incorporated therein, that identify any purpose 
besides seeking recompense for Puttuck's mismanagement of his duties as general contractor. 
While there is an (unreferenced) allegation elsewhere in the Complaint that defendants sought to 
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injure plaintiffs' business reputation, there is no averment to support that theory. See: Complaint 
f25. Certainly alleging that Puttuck breached his contract is not actionable, per the litigation 
privilege. Where are the allegations of supporting facts that defendants harbored this malevolent 
objective? 
The fundamental reason for requiring evidence of improper ulterior purpose is that the 
successful accomplishment thereof may fall outside the jurisdiction of the court to redress. This, 
as "[t]he usual case of abuse of process is one of some form of extortion, using the process to put 
pressure upon the other to compel him to pay a different debt or to take some other action or 
refrain from it." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 682, cmt. b (1977). In Kool v. Lee, 134 P 906, 
909 (1913), defendant's willful act was to have plaintiff arrested and jailed over unrelated event 
for the ulterior purpose of constructively evicting plaintiff from the residence pursuant to an 
underlying rental dispute. See also: Templeton Feed & Grain v, Ralston-Purina Co., 446 P.2d 
152 (CA 1968); (defendant used legal process to seize turkeys during the Thanksgiving season in 
order to force plaintiff to pay an unrelated debt, the willful act being defendant's payment 
demands communicated immediately after seizure of the turkey, such demands not integral to the 
proceeding, but collaborating the perverse character of the seizure action). 
When the perverse motive may be addressed and remedied in the initial proceeding itself, 
there is no concealed agenda that cannot be punished. The first element of abuse of process is 
established when "in the eyes of the law sufficient grounds exist to believe that the complaining 
party may be exposed to injury that may not reasonably be redressed through the imposition of 
sanctions or like measures within the litigation form itself" Hatch v. Davis, 2006 U. S., 558 
Utah Adv. Rep. 25 [^40. "The tort of abuse of process exists to provide a remedy for actions 
taken pursuant to the court's process but external to the lawsuit, which the Court cannot control. 
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It is not implicated by actions taken in the Court which the Court can control." McLaren v. 
Bolden, 2003 CA App Dist 2 [^50, citing Adams v. Superior O., 2 CA App 4th 521, 530. "An 
action will only be deemed ulterior for purposes of satisfying the first element of abuse of 
process if it was filed merely as a means of a compelling an act on the part of the plaintiff which 
the trial court could not order, because outside the purview of the trial court in the present 
litigation." Bell v. Bell, 67044 (1995 OH App Dist 8). 
Plaintiffs identify the improper or corroborative act as being the initiation of a baseless 
counterclaim. However, it matters not that the case against plaintiffs in Puttuck I was weak. In 
an action for abuse of process, "[i]it is not necessary to show either malice or warrant or probable 
cause, nor that the proceeding had terminated, and it is immaterial whether such proceeding was 
baseless or not." Kool v. Leey supra.; cited in Hatch v. David, supra. 1f33; other citations omitted 
[emphasis added].5 
Here, plaintiffs claim that defendant Peter Gendron gave false testimony in support of the 
$500,000 counterclaim in Puttuck I. Gendron's falsehoods, if any there were, were evident to 
plaintiffs at the time, and could have been the subject of a variety of sanctions, contempt, or a 
criminal prosecution for perjury, as well supplemental claim for abuse of process, had plaintiffs 
chosen to vindicate their offended sensibilities. This they did not do, however, deciding to settle 
the case and accept payment from defendants and their insurer, in satisfaction of plaintiffs' 
breach of contract claim and mechanic's lien claims. See: Puttuck I Complaint, attached as 
Exhibit "B'\ 
II. ALL OF PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS. 
5
 Were it otherwise, an abuse of process claim would be lodged as a matter of good practice each time an opponent 
Mlcd to prove the full extent of damages alleged or dismissed such claim without any recovery of same. 
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Under Article II of Chapter 12 of Title 78, Utah Code Ann., there is no mention of the 
torts of wrongful use of civil proceedings, abuse of process or civil conspiracy, and those causes 
of action are not encompassed by the definition of any action to which a specific limitation 
period is attached other than the "catch-air' provisions of § 78-12-25(3):. "An action may be 
brought within four years: (3) for relief not otherwise provided by law." Utah Code Ann. § 78-
12-25(3) (2007). See: Olsen v. Hooley, 1993 UT, 865 P.2d 1345, 1357, n. 1 ("A cause of action 
. . . that is not subject to a specific statutory limitations period is governed by the four-year 
limitations period found in § 78-12-25(3)"). 
Under Utah law, the statute of limitations begins to run when the cause of action accrues. 
Davidson Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Bonneville Inv. Inc., 1990 UT, 794 P.2d 11. A tort cause of 
action accrues when all its elements come into being and the claim is actionable. Id. at 19. 
Plaintiffs' claim for wrongful use of civil proceedings became actionable at least by the 
date when the purported "favorable termination" occurred in Puttuck I. That would have been 
June 5, 2000, when the Court's Order for Dismissal upon Stipulated Motion was filed. See: 
Exhibit A. The action here, however, was not filed until March 12, 2007, disqualifying plaintffs' 
wrongful use action on its face. 
As to the abuse of process, plaintiffs clearly were aware that defendants had filed a "false 
and wrongful counterclaim" on October 19, 1999, when served on their counsel. See: "'Answer 
and Counterclaim of Defendant LRG, Inc. " attached as Exhibit "C". From plaintiffs' pleading 
of the cause, the latest occurrence of a corroborative act in Puttuck I occurred at the deposition of 
Peter Gendron on June 23 and 24, 2000, when he purportedly gave perjured testimony. Since the 
suit was settled by the parties in May of 2000, the abuse of process claim, which should have 
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been brought as a counterclaim in Puttuck I, is obviously barred by the four-year statute of 
limitations. 
The general rule regarding statutes of limitations is that the limitation period does not 
begin to run until "the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action." 
Berenda v. Langford, 1996 UT, 914 P.2d 45, 50 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
The ulterior motive and corroborating wrongful act having become manifest during the course of 
Puttuck I, the final event - the determination of damages in the form of the substantial attorney 
fees plaintiffs complains of- had also been established by the time the case was settled. 
Plaintiffs attempt to extend the limitation period far beyond its maximum course by 
offering that defendants' abuse of process in Puttuck I became manifest when defendants 
counterclaimed against Mcintosh and Hale for the "same" mismanagement damages in Hale v. 
Gendron. See: Complaint Df 15, 17 and 19. However, this is by way of an added proof of the 
claim, not the point at which all elements of the tort had been completed. 
Since it is unquestioned that Hale functioned as general contractor at a different point in 
time than plaintiff Puttuck, it is self evident that the damages defendants asserted against those 
general contractors constitute separate losses, although both were accused of delay, neglect, poor 
scheduling, etc. Plaintiffs do not, and cannot, show that defendants attributed to Hale and 
Mcintosh exactly what had been attributed to Puttuck, e.g., a particular passage of time when 
work did not progress, a particular misstatement of the cost to complete the project, failure to 
properly supervise certain subcontractors or certain aspects of the project. It is most plausible 
16 
(and unfortunate) for defendants that the project was afflicted by two ineffectual general 
contractors.6 
Even assuming that defendants' duplicity wasn't manifest until LRG, Inc. served its 
counterclaim in Hale v. Gendron, on February 27, 2003, this is surely when the abuse of process, 
wrongful use of civil proceedings and civil conspiracy claims became actionable.7 Even by this 
stretch of the limitation period, however, plaintiffs' March 12, 2007 Complaint filing date herein 
falls outside the 4-year limitation period. 
III. THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF DEFENDANTS' 
STATUS AS CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS WHEN THE ACTS 
OR OMISSIONS OCCURRED, 
It is unquestioned that defendants' corporation, LRG, Inc., a Washington state 
corporation, was the contracting party with plaintiffs, as well as Hale and Mcintosh, to supervise 
construction on the log home project, and that the Gendrons were officers and directors of LRG 
o 
at all material times. See: Exhibit "D" attached. 
It is doctrine that, except when the corporate veil may be pierced, individual directors and 
officers are not liable for the actions of a corporation. The circumstances in which they may be 
held personally accountable were most notably set out in Messick v. PHD Trucking Serv., Inc., 
UT 1984, 678 P.2d 791, where the Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed its prior adoption of the 
following two-part test for determining when disregard of the corporate entity is justified: 
6
 Notice pleading would not require that defendants had to designate exactly what time periods delay occurred or 
what subcontractors want supervised or how much a cost estimate was misstated, as such particularity is a burden 
only required a trial, not at the pleading stage 
The counterclaim was asserted against plaintiffs Hale and his company, Chans Construction, in which Mcintosh 
held at least a 50% ownership interest. 
8
 These facts were established in Hale v Gendron at deposition and trial, and should be res judicata as to whether 
LRG was the business entity through which the individual defendants operated the log home venture These facts 
were also established in Peter Gendron's deposition in Puttuck I, which is referenced in the Complaint 
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[T]here must be a concurrence of two circumstances: (1) there must be 
such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the 
corporation and the individual no longer exist, viz., the corporation is, in 
fact, the alter ego of one or a few individuals; and (2) the observance of 
the corporate form would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or an 
inequitable result would follow. 
Id, at 794. 
Here, plaintiffs have made no attempt whatsoever to assert facts that would justify 
disregarding the corporate shield. Even if the Complaint had so alleged that Peter Gendron and 
William Gendron should be held personally liable, the claim could not succeed under any 
favorable interpretation of alter ego theory because, first: the issue of whether there was unity of 
interest and ownership between the LRG and its officers and directors was raised, fairly litigated 
in Hale v. Gendron and decided in defendants' favor by this Court's grant of motion for directed 
verdict at trial. 
Second, plaintiffs have not plead fraud by the individual defendants, ostensibly because 
there is no misrepresentation relied on in plaintiffs' claim for damages in Puttuck II. 
As to promoting an injustice or allowing an inequitable result to occur, it was wholly 
within plaintiffs' ability to rectify the purported damage to reputation and expenditure of attorney 
fees resulting from defendants' abuse of process, etc. during the course of proceedings in Puttuck 
I, as plaintiffs had full knowledge of the purported wrongful allegations and perjured deposition 
testimony during that litigation. See: Argument § II. 
As defendants' operating entity LRG, Inc. was named as a party defendant in both 
Puttuck I and Hale v. Gendron, and was the entity with which plaintiffs contracted for his 
services, plaintiffs are obliged to address the obvious presumption that William Gendron and 
Peter Gendron acted under the auspices and protection of the corporate entity. Plaintiffs do not, 
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however, make any case for corporate disregard and thus should have this latest attempt to harass 
Peter Gendron and William Gendnon dismissed upon these additional grounds. 
CONCLUSION 
For the multiple grounds set forth above, all claims presented in plaintiffs' Complaint are 
fatally defective, reflecting the improbable cause upon which they are founded, and should be 
dismissed. 
DATED this Jj^dzy of May, 2007. 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL PUTTUCK, an individual and PAUL 
PUTTUCK dba BREAKTHROUGH 
CONSTRUCTION, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
PETER GENDRON; LRG, INC.; GENDRON 
LIM & COMPANY, and KENNETH B. 
MclNTOSH; and Does 1 through 20, 
inclusive, 
Defendants. 
LRG, INC., 
Counterclaim Plaintiff, 
PAUL PUTTUCK, an individual and PAUL I 
PUTTUCK dba BREAKTHROUGH I 
CONSTRUCTION, ; 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
STIPULATED MOTION AND ORDER 
FOR DISMISSAL 
Case No. 99-0600212 
Judge Robert K. Hilder 
M0KHHHFWE176 
The parties in the above-captioned matter, through their attorneys of record, 
hereby stipulate and agree that Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants PETER 
GENDRON; LRG, INC.; GENDRON UM & COMPANY, and KENNETH B. MclNTOSH, as 
well as Defendants' claims against Plaintiffs, have been fully compromised and settled. 
Based on the foregoing stipulation, the parties jointly move this Court for an order 
dismissing Plaintiffs' claims against the above-named Defendants, and Defendants' 
claims against Plaintiffs, with prejudice, each of the parties to bear his or her own 
attorney's fees and costs of court ir 
DATED this i l day of (W/JiXMfeoOO. 
DATED this 
John Fayt>|flOT|w for Plaintiffs Paul Puttuck, an 
individual asfaralrt Puttuck dba Breakthrough 
Constru 
Geoffrey CgHaslam 
Attorney for Defendants Peter Gendron; LRG, Inc.; 
Gendron Lim & Company, and Kenneth B. Mcintosh 
ORDER FOR DISMISSAL 
For the reasons set forth in the parties1 Stipulated Motion, and for good cause 
appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs claims against Defendants Peter 
Gendron, LRG, Inc.; Gendron Lim & Company, and Kenneth B. Mcintosh, as well as 
Defendants* claims against Plaintiffs, are dismissed with prejudice, each party to bear its 
own costs. 
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY - STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL PUTTUCK, an individual and 
PAUL PUTTUCK dba, BREAKTHROUGH 
CONSTRUCTION, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PETER GENDRON, LRG, Inc., GENDRON, 
UQ\f & COMPANY, and KENNETH 
McBNTOSH, and Does 1 thru 20, inclusive, 
Defendants. 
COMPLAINT TO FORCLOSE ON 
REAL PROPERTY LIEN and FOR 
PERSONAL JUDGMENTS. 
ova NO.: qqobooifi O^N 
JUDGE: PAT BRIAN 
Comes now Plaintiffs and allege: 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND: 
1) Plaintiff Paul Puttuck is now, and at all relevant times was, a resident of Park City, Summit County, 
Utah all within the jurisdictional boundaries of this judicial district. 
2) Plaintiff Puttuck is now, and at all relevant times was, the sole owner of Plaintiff Breakthrough 
Construction, a Park City, Summit County, Utah general contractor business. Puttuck is duly licensed by 
the State of Utah as a general contractor. Breakthrough Construction builds homes in and about Park City 
and Summit County, Utah. 
* * * * * 
3) Plaintiffs are informed and believe and based upon such information and beliefs allege that: 
• Defendant Pete* Gendron is now, and at all relevant times was, a resident of Orange 
County, California. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that Gendron is an owner and officer of 
Defendant LRG. 
• Defendant LRG, Incorporated is now, and at all relevant times was, a Washington State 
corporation. It has offices in California and Arizona and does business in California, Arizona 
and within the State of Utah. 
• Defendant Kenneth Mcintosh is now, and at all relevant times was, a resident of Park City, 
Summit County, Utah, all within the jurisdictional boundaries of this judicial district He is an 
authorized agent of Defendants' Gendron and LRG, Inc. and in that capacity signed the home 
construction contract with Plaintiffs. 
4) Does Defendants 1 through 20, inclusive are persons or entities who identities are presently unknown 
and who are believed to have acted or failed to act in some way to caused a breach of the contractual 
obligations and tortuous conduct as complained of herein. And that through such conduct they, and each of 
them, directly caused Plaintiffs some/or all of the damages alleged. So soon as the identities of these Doe 
Defendants and the capacity in which they acted or failed to act in causing Plaintiffs damages are discovered, 
Plaintiffs will amend this Complaint setting forth their identities and intentional and/or negligent capacities. 
5) Plaintiffs bring this action to foreclose on their mechanic's lien under the authority of UCA Title 38, 
Chapter 1, Sections 1 through 27. 
6) Pursuant to U. C. A. Section 78-3-4, this court has subject matter jurisdiction of these claims in that 
the amount in controversy exceeds the sum of $20,000 exclusive of interests and costs. 
7) This Court is the proper court for personal jurisdiction because: 
• The contract which underlies this action was entered into and executed in Park City, 
Summit County, Utah, all within the jurisdictional boundaries of this judicial district; 
• Performance due under the contract were due in Park City, Summit County, Utah, 
all within the jurisdictional boundaries of this judicial district; 
• Defendants breached the contract and committed all their torts in Park City, 
Summit County, Utah, all within the jurisdictional boundaries of this judicial district; 
• The damages Plaintiffs' suffered occurred in Park City, Summit County, Utah, 
all within the jurisdictional boundaries of this judicial district; 
o 
• Defendants Gendron and LRG, Inc. do business in Paric City, Summit County, Utah, 
all within die jurisdictional boundaries of this judicial district; 
• Defendant Mcintosh resides and does business in Park City, Summit County, Utah, 
all within the jurisdictional boundaries of this judicial district; 
• The real property which is the subject of the Hen which underlie this Complaint 
is located in Park City, Summit County, Utah, all within the jurisdictional boundaries 
of this judicial district; and because, 
• The lien filed against the Sunridge Drive property was filed with the County Recorder, 
in the Third Judicial District Court, Summit County Division, Summit County, Utah 
STATEMENT of FACTS: 
8) On or about the 18th of March, 1998, Defendants Peter Gendron, Kenneth Mcintosh and LRG, 
Incorporation entered into a contract with Plaintiffs. Defendant Mcintosh was the authorized agent of 
Defendants Gendron and LRG and signed the contract in their behalf. Under said contract, Plaintiffs were to 
provide general contractor services under PUTTUCK'S general contractor's license to a residential 
construction project owned by Defendants Gendron and LRG. This residential construction, the "project," is 
commonly known as: 
3758 Sunridge Drive 
Tke Oakes At Deer Valley 
Park City, Summit County, Utah. 
9) Under this contract, Plaintiffs were to oversee the project, employ subcontractors and supervise the 
subcontractors* work. Under the contract, Defendants were to compensate Plaintiff Puttuck by paying him 
an hourly wage of $35 for every hour actually worked on the project Additionally, he was to receive a 10% 
commission on all subcontractor billings for both their labors and materials. He was to receive 
reimbursement of all necessarily incurred costs expended by him in the paformance of the contract. He was 
to receive a $2,000 bonus when and if the project was completed on time. And Plaintiff was due interest on 
all payments due him at Utah's legal rate of interest from the date the payments) was due through receipt of 
the payment A copy of the contract is attached hereto as Exhibit "A*. 
* * * * * 
10) In the event the owner, (Defendants herein) were to terminate Plaintiff Puttuck's services before 
completion of the contract, Plaintiff Puttuck was to receive full compensation "as if the work had been fully 
completed" by him. This compensation amount includes a "reasonable estimate of the costs of the work for 
work not actually (yet) completed." Exhibit "A". 
11) Per the contract and at Defendants* special requests on or about 03/19/98, Plaintiffs first commenced 
to provide labor, services, materials and supplies to the Sunridge Drive property. On or about 01/04/99, 
Plaintiffs last provided labor, services, materials and supplies to the Sunridge Drive property. All of 
Plaintiffs' labor, services, materials and supplies provided to the property permanently and physically 
improved the property. The reasonable value of Plaintiffs* labor, services and the reasonable costs of the 
materials and supplies they furnished to the project are at least $70,000. 
12) At all times relevant Plaintiff Puttuck perfbrmed all of the duties and work he was obligated to do 
undo: the contract. Further, at all relevant times he stood ready, willing and able to perform further duties 
and work expected of him under the contract. Plaintiff Puttuck performed all his contractual obligations 
under the contract in so far as Defendants peimitted him. He performed work, labor and services and 
advanced costs for materials and supplies toward the greater improvement of the project 
13) On or about 01/11/99 and again on 02/03/99, Plaintiffs made written demands to Defendants 
Gendron, and LRG, Inc. for the payment of these monies in an amount that was substantially reduced from 
that truly owing. Defendants have refused and continue to refuse to pay Plaintiffs the amount demanded. 
14) On 03/22/99, Plaintiff PUTTUCK filed a "Notice of Lien** against the Sunridge Drive property with 
the Summit County Recorder toward securing payment for the labor, services, materials and supplies, he 
provided to the property and which Defendants * failed and refused to pay for. Said notice was duly recorded 
Exhibit "B" attached hereto is a true copy of said Notice of Lien. Each of the statements contained in the 
Lien are true. Then, on 04/14/99 by certified mail, Plaintifife advised Defendants GENDRON and LRG of 
the filing and recordation of said Notice. Plaintiffs have completed all the statutory requirements to perfect 
said lien. Said Hen has not been revoked, cancelled or otherwise discharged. 
15) On 02/24/99, Plaintiffs filed an action in the Third Judicial District Court, Summit County Division 
against Defendants alleging breach of contract, tortuous breach of contract, fraud and deceit, and contractual 
bad faith. Puttuck & Breakthrough Construction v. Gendron, LRG, and Mcintosh, TJDC -
No. 99-0600069 CN. Said lawsuit is pending. 
16) Plaintiffs are not aware of any other liens filed against the subject property. 
17) Plaintiffe have been forced to employ and have employed legal counsel to file the lien, to file the 
other action and to file this action to enforce the Ken and prosecute these claims and consequent thereto 
Plaintiffs have incurred expenses and costs. Under authority of UCA 38-01-17 and 18 Plaintiffs are entitled 
to reimbursement of their costs and for reasonable attorney's fees. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION? 
18. Comes now Plaintiffs and here incorporate by reference each of the allegations contained in 
paragraphs one through 17, inclusive of this Complaint as if same were set forth here at length. 
19. From approximately May 1998 through early December, 1998, Defendants, and each of them, 
breached their contract with Plaintiffs. Defendants breached their contract with Plaintiffs by their conduct 
which included, but is not limited to, the following: 
• Interfering with Plaintiffe* performances due under the contract; 
• Repeatedly failing to meet with Plaintiffs to discuss the ongoing needs and progress of the job; 
• Hiring employees and independent contractors without licensing authority and/or consultation with 
Plaintiff Puttuck, the General Contractor; 
• Hiring undocumented aliens; 
• Repeatedly failing to pay the full amounts on invoices due Plaintiffs and other subcontractors; 
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• Failing to pay Plaintiffs and some subcontractors on certain invoices; and, 
• Hiring a replacement General Contractor. 
Defendants conduct made it impossible for Puttuck to continue to perform his contractual duties under the 
contract 
20) As a direct and proximate result of Defendants conduct, Plaintiffs have been financially damaged. 
21) Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer financial losses in not being reimbursed for the costs 
they advanced and furnished in behalf of the project They suffered and continue to suffer more financial 
losses in not being compensated for the value of the services rendered and labors spent on the project. And 
they suffered further financial losses in not being paid the commission due on all the subcontractors' labor 
and material charges on the project. Plaintiffs believe the reasonable value for their labor, services, 
materials and supplies provided to the project arc at least $70,000. 
22) On or about 01/11/99 and again on 02/03/99, Plaintiffs have made written demand to Defendants 
Gendron, and LRG, Inc. for the payment of these monies in an amount that was substantially reduced from 
that truly owing. Defendants have refused and continue to refuse to pay Plaintiffs the amount demanded. 
23) On 03/22/99, Plaintiff PUTTUCK filed a "Notice of Lira" against the Sunridge Drive property 
toward securing payment for the labor, services, materials and supplies, he provided to the property and 
which Defendants* failed and refused to pay fix. Exhibit *BW 
24) As a direct result of Defendants* conduct, Plaintiffs have suffered financial losses in the reasonable 
amount of at least $70,000. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION: 
25) Comes now Plaintiffs and here incorporate by reference each of the allegations contained in 
paragraphs one through 17, inclusive of this Complaint as if same were set forth here at length. 
a 
26) At the time Plaintiffs and Defendants entered into the contract for the construction of the home at the 
Sunridge Drive property, neither Defendant Gendron, nor Defendant LRG required any payment bond for (he 
protection of mechanics and materialmen. Further, no Defendant posted notice at the project, or filed any 
notice with the Court or with the Summit County Recorder or otherwise advised Plaintiffs that Defendants 
were asserting that they were not responsible for the labor, services, materials and supplies Plaintiff furnished 
to permanently improve the project. Accordingly, Defendants Gendron, LRG and Mcintosh are personally 
liable to Plaintiffs for the reasonable value of Plaintiffs' labor and services and for the materials and supplies 
they provided to the project 
27) Per the contract and at Defendants* special requests on or about 03/19/98, Plaintiffs first commenced 
to provide labor, services, materials and supplies to the Sunridge Drive property. On or about 01/04/99, 
Plaintiffs last provided labor, services, materials and supplies to the Sunridge Drive property. All of 
Plaintiffs* labor, services, materials and supplies provided to the property permanently and physically 
improved the property. The reasonable value of Plaintiffs' labor, services and the reasonable costs of the 
materials and supplies they furnished to the project are at least $70,000. 
28) From approximately May 1998 through early December, 1998, Defendants, and each of them, 
breached their contract with Plaintiffs. Defendants breached their contract with Plaintiffs by their conduct 
which included, but is not limited to, the following: 
• Interfering with Plaintiffs' performances due under the contract; 
• Repeatedly failing to meet with Plaintiff? to discuss the ongoing needs and progress of the job; 
• Hiring employees and independent contractors without licensing authority and/or consultation with 
Plaintiff Puttuck, the General Contractor, 
• Hiring undocumented aliens; 
• Repeatedly failing to pay the full amounts on invoices due Plaintiffs and other subcontractors; 
• Failing to pay Plaintiffs and some subcontractors on certain invoices; and, 
• Hiring a replacement General Contractor. 
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Defendants conduct made it impossible for Puttuck to continue to perform his contractual duties under the 
contract. 
29) On or about 01/11/99 and again on 02/03/99, Plaintiffs have made written demand to Defendants 
Gendron, and LRG, Inc. for the payment of these monies in an amount that was substantially reduced from 
that truly owing. Defendants have refused and continue to refuse to pay Plaintiffs the amount demanded and 
by their conduct further breached their contract with Plaintiffs. 
30) Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer financial losses in not being reimbursed for the costs 
they advanced and furnished in behalf of the project They suffered and continue to suffer more financial 
losses in not being compensated for (he value of the services rendered and labors spent on the project. And 
they suffered further financial losses in not being paid the commission due on all the subcontractors' labor 
and material charges on the project Plaintiffs believe the reasonable value for their labor, services, 
materials and supplies provided to the project are at least $70,000. 
* * * * * 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF: 
WHEREFORE based upon the foregoing allegations, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against Defendants, and 
each of than, for money damages as will be proven at trial, as follows: 
1) Defendants, and each of them, be adjudged indebted to Plaintiffs for $70,000 or whatever higher 
amount is proven at trial together with all interests due thereon at the legal rate; 
2) That Plaintiflfe be adjudged to have a valid lien on the Sunridge Drive property for $70,000 or in 
whatever higher amount is proven at trial; 
3) That upon compliance with the statutory requirements o foreclose on said lien, the Summit County 
Sheriff sell all the Defendants* collective interest in the Sunridge Drive property and pay over to 
Plaintiffs money from the sale sufficient to satisfy said Hen together with all costs of the sale and all 
costs, expanses and attorney's fees related to this action. 
4) In the event that the proceeds from said sale are insufficient to fully satisfy Plaintiffs' lien to render a 
personal judgment against Defendants, and each of them, for any remaining deficiency. 
& 
5) In the event that it is determined and adjudged that Plaintiffs do not have a valid and subsisting lien 
cm the Sunridge Drive property, that Plaintiffs have a personal judgment against Defendants, and 
each of them, for the sum of $70,000 or whatever higher amount is proven at trial together with all 
interests due thereon at the legal rate; 
6) An award to Plaintiffs of all their costs and expenses, including attorney's fees incurred in filing the 
lien and this action and in prosecuting this action and in proceeding with the judgment sale of the 
Sunridge Drive property; and, 
7) For whatever further relief this Court deems fair, just and necessary. 
* * * * * 
Dated: 01, July, 1999 
Plaintiffs' Address: 
P.O. Box 68-1976 
57 Ridgecrest Drive 
Park City, UT 8406841976 
**0»mp4Ck» 
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EXHIBIT C 
Alexander H. Walker III (5157) 
Attorney at Law 
57 West 200 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1632 
Telephone (801) 363-0100 
Attorney for Defendants 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL PUTTUCK, an individual and 
PAUL PUTTUCK dba BREAKTHROUGH 
CONSTRUCTION, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PETER GENDRON, LRG, INC., 
GENDRON LIM & COMPANY, and 
KENNETH B. McINTOSH, and Does 1 
through 20, inclusive. 
Defendants. 
ANSWER AND COUNTER-
CLAIM OF DEFENDANT 
LRG, INC. 
Civil No. 99-0600212 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
Defendants LRG, Inc., Peter Gendron, Gendron Lim & Company and 
Kenneth Mcintosh, by and through their counsel of record, hereby respond and assert 
their defenses and answer the Complaint in this action as follows: 
FBBST AFFIRMAIIVE DEFEMSE 
Answering the individual numbered paragraphs of the Complaint for 
damages, Defendants responds as follows:; 
1. Answering iba allegations contained in paragraphs 1 and2 of the 
Complaint* Defendants admit the same. 
2. Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 2 of the 
Complaint, Defendants state that they me without sufficient informatioii or belief 
regarding the accuracy of those allegations* and on that basis* deniee the same and 
each of them. 
S, Answering the allegatioios contained In paragraph 3 and each sub-
paragraph ttierennder, defendants admit the same with the exception of the last 
sentence of the tMrd subparagraph Defendants speeifically deny the defendant 
Mcintosh is the authorised agent of defendant Gendron and deny that defendant 
Mclntoeh sign any agreement on behalf of defendant Gendron* 
4. Answering the allegations contained in paragraphs 4f 5 and 6 of 
the Complaint, Defendants state that they are without sufficient information or 
knowledge to form a basis as to the troth of the allegations contained therein* and on 
that basisl deny the same, and each of them, 
5> Answering the allegations mntaraed in paragraph 7 and each sub-
paragraph thereunder* Defendants admit the first two subparagraphs under 
2 
paragraph 7. Defendants deny that any of them breached any contract or committed 
any torts in Park City, Summit County, State of Utah. Defendants also deny that 
plaintiff has suffered any damages. Defendants also deny that defendant Gendron 
does business in Park City, Summit County, Utah. Defendants admit the last three 
subparagraphs under paragraph 7. To the extent any allegation in paragraph 7, or 
any subparagraph thereunder, is not otherwise answered above, defendants deny any 
such unanswered allegation. 
6. Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 8 of the 
Complaint, Defendants deny that defendants Gendron and defendant Mcintosh 
entered into the agreement Defendant admit that defendant LRG entered into a 
contract with plaintiffs. Defendantsdeny the remaining allegations contained in 
paragraph 8 to the extent they allege terms which are inconsistent with the contract 
between LRG, Inc. and plaintifls. 
7. Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 9 of the 
Complaint, Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraph 9 to the extent 
they allege terms which are inconsistent with the terms of the contract between 
plaintiffs ami LRG, Inc. 
8. Answering the allegations contained in paragraphs 10,11,12 and 
18 of the Complaint, Defendants deny the same and each of them. 
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9. Answering the allegations contained to paragraph 14 of the 
Complaint, Defendants admit that plaintiff filed a lien against the property m 
qiiestioiJL Defendants deny that the statements contained in the lien are true. 
Defendants deny that plaintff has been damaged. Defendants admit that plaintiff 
forward notfce of his Men. With regard to the other allegation contained in paragraph 
14, defendants state that they are without sufficient informatioii or knowledge to form 
a basis as to the truth of the allegations contained therein, and on that basis, deny the 
same, and each of them, 
10. Answering the aUegations contained in paragraph 15 of the 
Complaint, Defendants admit the same. 
11* Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 16 of the 
Complain^ Defendants state that they are without sufficient information or knowledge 
to farm a basis as to the truth of the allegations contained therein, and on that basis, 
demy the same, and each of them, 
12, Answering the aEegations contained in paragraph 17 of the 
Complaint* Defendants deny the same, and each of them* 
13 Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 18 of the 
Complaint, Defendants reincorporate their responses to the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 1 through 17 of the Cbmpkint 
4 
14. Answering the allegations contained in paragraphs 19 through 24 
of the Complaint, Defendants deny the same, and each of them. 
15. Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 25 of the 
Complaint, Defendants reincorporate their responses to the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 1 through 17 of the Complaint 
16. Answering the allegations contained in paragraphs 26 through 30 
of the Complaint, Defendants deny the same, and each of them. 
17. With regard to the prayer for relief, Defendants deny that plaintiffs 
are entitled to the relief sought therein. 
18 Defendants deny any allegations contained in the Complaint to 
which no response was made above. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs have failed to mitigate their damages. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs claims are barred by Iheir own breach of contract and/or tortious 
conduct 
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FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Amy damages plaintiffs have sustained are the result of the actions of 
third parties war which Defendants have no control Ai^rdingly, plsintUfe are not 
entitled to receiver their damages! if anyt from Defendants, 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Any damages plaintiffs have sustained are the result of plaintiffs* 
conduct Acmrdingly, plaimtiffii are not entitled to recover their damages, if any, fmm 
Defendants* 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs* claims for damages are barred by the doctrine of unclean 
hands. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant LRG prays that plain til Is take nothing wider 
their Cbmplaint and that Delmdants be awarded their costs and reasonable attorneys 
fees in connection with defending this matter* 
COUNTERCLAIM 
For its causes of action against plaintiffs. Defendant LRG, Inc. alleges as 
follows: 
1. LRGf Inc. is a Washington corporation with places of bnsiness in 
California and Arizona. 
6 
2. Based upon information and belief LRG alleges that Paid Puttuck 
is an individual residing in Summit County, State of Utah, and is engaged in the 
construction business under the name Breakthrough Construction. 
3. On or about March 18,1998, Puttuck entered into an agreement 
with LRG in connection with the construction of a home located at 3758 Sunridge 
Drive, Park City, Utah. Pursuant to the terms of the agreement between the parties, 
Puttuck agreed to provide general contractor services in connection with the 
construction of the home in question. 
4. Pursuant to the terms of the contract, Puttuck was obligated to 
fully execute the work described in the contract Puttuck also accepted the 
relationship of trust and confidence established by the agreement between the parties 
and agreed to cooperate with the engineer on the construction of the home and exercise 
his skill and judgment in furthering the interests of LRG. 
5. Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, Puttuck also agreed to 
furnish sufficient business administration and supervision of the construction of the 
home in question, agreed to furnish at all times an adequate supply of workers and 
materials on the construction of the home, and to perform the work on the construction 
of the home in an expeditious and economical manner consistent with LRG's interests. 
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6* Also pursuant to the terms of the contract between the parties, 
Piitetick agreed to substantially complete the entire work am the contraction of the 
home no later than June 15,1998. 
7% Under the terms of Hie agt^ement between the parties, the parties 
agreed that Puttack would be entitled to a txintractor% fee equal to the sum of a $1,500 
starting bonus, plus 10% of all sub-miitract amounts on the home in question during 
the time Puttuck acted as general contractor, plus $35 per hour for all hours Pnttnck 
adbually worked on the home, plus a $2f000 payment when the home was finished on 
time. Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, Puttuck agreed that the entire fee to 
which he was due would not exceed $198,000* 
8. Abot pursuant to the terms of the agreement, Puttuck agreed that 
all ooete incurred b j LEG which would cause 10% of all of the subcontract amounts on 
ti&e coiiBtniefcion of the home in question to erased $198,000 would be paid by Pnttuek 
0« After the parties entered into the agreement regarding the 
instruction of the home in question, Puttuek breached that agreement. Puttuck*s 
breaches of the agreement between the parties include, but are not limited to the 
folowing dreiimstane^: 
a* Puttuck did not Mly execute the work described in the 
agreement between the parties. 
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b. Puttuck did not cooperate with the engineer on the construction 
project 
a Puttack did not exercise hkslriU 
the interests of LRG in connection with the construction of the home. 
dL Puttuck failed to provide sufficient business administration 
and supervision of the construction project 
e. Puttuck failed to supply an adequate supply of workers and 
materials and failed to perform his work in an expeditious and economical manner 
consistent with LRG's interests. 
£ Puttuck failed to substantially complete the constructipn of the 
home in question on or before June 15,1998. Indeed, the home has not been completed 
as of the date of this counterclaim. 
g. Ten percent (10%) of the costs of the construction of the home 
exceed the amount of $198,000 and Puttuck has failed to pay LRG for all applicable 
costs. 
10. Rather than perform his services in a manner consistent with 
LRG's interests in constructing the home, Puttuck often acted in a manner which 
hindered and delayed the construction of the home. For example, Puttuck expended 
an inordinate amount of time and incurred inordinate costs in connection with the 
installation of natural gas regulator in the home. Puttuck unnecessarily and 
9 
unreasonably contested the i^uirania&t of governmental inspectors for the Installation 
of a particular sfeed natural gas regulator, Puttuck*s unreasonable petition in this 
regard uimecessarily delayed the contraction of the home. 
1L Further, Puttuck failed to devote sufficient time to supervise the 
construction work and his absence from the project site often delayed the ccmatniction 
of the home. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Contract) 
12. Defendant LRG? Inc. and CoimteixiBlmant LRG? lac, reincorporates 
the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 11 above as though more fti% set 
forth herein, 
IS. Puttuck has breached his agreement with LRG in at least the 
following ways: 
m* Puttuck did not fully execute the work described in the 
agreement between the parties, 
b* Puttuck did not cooperate with the enpneer on the construction 
project 
e> Puttuck did not aKerase his skill and judgment in furthering 
the interests of LEG in connection with the construction of the home. 
d. Puttuck failed to pwrfde sufficient business admMstratiori 
and supervision of the construction project* 
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e. Puttuck failed to supply an adequate supply of workers and 
materials and failed to perform his work in an expeditious and economical manner 
consistent with LRG's interests. 
f. Puttuck failed to substantially complete the cons traction of the 
home in question on or before June 15,1998. Indeed, the home has not been completed 
as of the date of this counterclaim. 
g. Ten percent (10%) of the costs of the construction of the home 
exceed the amount of $198,000 and Puttuck has failed to pay LRG for all applicable 
costs. 
14* As a result of Puttuck's breach of contract, LRG has been damaged 
in an amount to be proven at trial, but in an amount not less than approximately 
$500,000. 
15. As a result of Puttuck's breach of contract, LRG is entitled to a 
judgment against Puttuck in an amount to be proven at trial, but in an amount not 
less than approximately $500,000, plus LRG's costs and attorneys fees, plus post 
judgment interest on the entire amount of the judgment at the maximum rate. 
SECOND CAUSE OP ACTION 
(Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing) 
16. Defendant LRG, Inc. and Counterclaimant LRG, Inc. reincorporates 
the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 15 above as though more fully set 
forth herein. 
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17. At the time LEG and Ptittaek entered into their contract, It was 
impliedly understood by both LRG and Puttuck that in order for LRG to perform its 
duties under the teraas of the agreement* Puttuck was required to be honest, to act in 
good faith and deal fairly with LRG and was to somptefcely refrain from doing anything 
thai would preheat LRG from realising the benefit of its bargain tinder the terms of the 
agreement 
18. Puttac&fs actions m connection with his breadies of the agreement 
between the parties eonsti tote a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
implied in all contracts and the breach of that covenant by Pnttuek presented LRG 
from realising the benefits of the contract 
19. As a result of Puttack*s breach of the covenant of good feith and fair 
dcMeJiiigj LRG has been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial, but in an amount 
not less than approximately $500*000, 
20* As a result of Puttuck's breach of the ewenami of good faith and fair 
dealing^ LEG is entitled to a judgment against Puttuck in an amount to be pro¥en at 
trial, butt in an amount not lesa than approximately $500,000, plus LRG*s costs and 
reasonable attorneys fees, pins post judgment interest at the maximum legal rate on 
the entire amount of the judgment 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Fidtieiary Duly) 
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21. Defendant LRG, Inc. and Counterdaimant LRG, Inc. reincorporates 
the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 20 above as though more fully set 
forth herein. 
22. Acting as the general contractor for LRG on the construction of the 
home in question, Puttuck had fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to LRG in 
connection with his services as the general contractor. 
23. The delays in the construction of the home caused by Puttuck and 
Puttuck*s failures to meet his duties under the terms of the agreement between the 
parties constitute a breach of Puttuck's fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to LRG. 
24. As a result of Puttuck's breach of fiduciary duty, LRG has been 
damaged in an amount to be proven at trial, but in an amount not less than 
approximately $500,000. 
25. As a result of Puttuck's breach of his fiduciary duties, LRG is 
entitled to a judgment against Puttuck in an amount to be proven at trial, but in an 
amount noit less than approximately $500,000, plus LRG's costs and reasonable 
attorneys fees, plus post judgment interest at the maximum legal rate on the entire 
amount of the judgment 
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FOUBTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Unjust Enrichment) 
26* Defendant lSGf Inc. and Connteidaimaiit LEGr» Inc. reinwiporates 
the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 25 aboYe as though more Mly set 
forth herein. 
27, Pmsnant to the terms of the agreement between the parties, LRG 
has made payments to Puttnck 
28, Because Pnttuck has failed to perform as agreed piirenajil to the 
terms of the agreement between the parties, Puttack accepted payments from LRG 
under cirenmstsnoas which make it nnjnst to allow Pnttnck to retain the benefit of 
those payments* 
29, As a result of his actions and the payment of LRGf Pntfcsiek has 
been unjustly enriched in the amount to be pr$¥en at trial 
80. As a result of Futtaekfe unjust enrichment* LRG has hem damaged 
in an amount to be piwen at trial* 
31* As a result of Puttueklte nmjnst enrichment, LRG is entitled to a 
judgment against Pnttaek in an amount to be proven at trial, plus LRG*s costs and 
reasonable attorneys fees? plus poet judgment interest at the majdimtim legal rate on 
the entire amount of the judgment, 
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FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Negligence) 
32. Defendant LRG, Inc. and Counterclaimant LRG, Inc. reincorporates 
the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 31 above as though more fully set 
forth herein. 
33. As the general contractor for the construction of the home in 
question, Puttuck owed LRG general duties of care. 
34. Puttuckfe actions in connection with the construction of the home 
constitute a breach of his duty of care to LRG, 
35. As a result of Puttuck's negligence, LRG has been damaged in an 
amount to be proven at trial, but in an amount not less than approximately $500,000. 
36. As a result of Puttuck's negligence, LRG is entitled to a judgment 
against Puttuck in an amount to be proven at trial, but in an amount not less than 
approximately $500,000, plus LRG's costs and reasonable attorneys fees, plus post 
judgment interest at the maximum legal rate on the entire amount of the judgment 
WHEREFORE, LRG prays for judgment on its counterclaim against 
Puttuck as follows: 
A. On Counterclaimant LRG's First Cause of Action, for judgment 
against Puttuck in an amount to be proven at trial, but in an amount not less than 
15 
appirtmmatety $500,000, plus LRG's coste and attorneys fees, pins post judgment 
interest on the entire amount of the judgment at the maximum rate, 
B. On CbtmtefdWmant LRG*s Second Cause of Action, for a judgment 
against Putfcuek in an amount to be proven at trial, but in an amount not less than 
appitiiimatefy $500f000f plus LBG*s costs and repsonable attorneys fees, plus post 
judgment interest at the maximum legal rate on the entire amount of the judgment. 
(X On Counterelaimant LRG's Third Cause of Action, for a judgment 
against Futtuck in an amount to be proven at trial, plus LRGPs exists, plus post 
judgment Interest at the maximum legal rate on the entire amount of the judgment 
D. On CkHmterclaimant LltG's Fourth Cause of Action, for a judgment 
against Puttuek in an amount to be proven at trial, but in an amount not less than 
approximately $SOOS000, plus LRG's eosts and reasonable attorneys fees* plus post 
judgment interest at the maximum legal rate on the entire amount of the judgment 
E. On Ctounterclaimant LBG*s Fifth Cause of Action* for a judgment 
against Puttuek in an amount to be proven at trial, but in an amount not less than 
approximate^ $500,000, plus LRG's costs, plus post judgment interest at the 
majdmum legal rate on the entire amount of the judgment 
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F. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and 
equitable under the circumstances. 
DATED this 19th day of October, 1999. 
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C l^EiRTff'I.CATE OJE SISHVIOE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, to John F. 
Pay, Attorney for the PlaintMfe, a t P.O. Box 68-1454, Park City, Utah 84068-1454, on 
Match 01,1999/a true andoorrectcopy of tiie ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM OF 
DEFENDANT LRG, INC. filed with the Court. 
Walker III 
for Defendants 
EXHIBIT D 
AIA DOCUMENT I Alll-1997 
Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Contractor 
where the basis for paymenl is the COST OF THE WORK PLUS A FEE with a negotiated Guaranteed 
Maximum Price 
A G R E E M E N T made as of the 18 t h 
in ihe year 1998 
(In words, indicate day, month and year) 
B E T W E E N the Owner: 
(Name, address and other information) 
L R G I n c . 
2100 East 4th Street, Suite 100 
Santa Ana, California 92705 
day of March 
This document has impor-
tant legal consequences. 
Consultation with an 
attorney is encouraged 
with respect to its 
completion or modification. 
This document is not 
intended for use in 
competitive bidding. 
and the Contractor: 
(Name, address and other informal ion) 
Paul A. Puttuck 
57 West R i d g e c r e s t Dr ive 
Park C i t y , Utah 84060 
AIA Document A20M997, 
General Conditions of the 
Contract for Construction, 
is adopted in this document 
by reference. 
The Project is: 
(Name and address) 
Oakes at Deer Valley 
3758 Sunridge Drive 
Park City, Utah 84060 
This document has been 
approved and endorsed by 
The Associated General 
Contractors of America. 
D-421 
The Archilecl is: 
(Name, address ana* other information) vavjw *x 
The architect that created thi6 home is Pioneer LOR Homes of Wllllaq^g^, 
Lake, British Columbia> Canada, however, this home was certified *^M&? 
for building by Eric M. Kankainien - registered proffessional Engineer***! 
#5224, who remains the engineer of record. As such all reference 01997 AIA# 
herein to "architect" will be construed to mean: Engineer, Owner AtADOCUMENTAHMW 
or Contractor, as is appropriate. OWNER-CONTRACTOR 
AGREEMENT 
The American Institute 
of Architects fc 
173S New York Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, D.C 20006-5292 
The Owner and Contractor agree as follows. 
Copyright 1920. 1925. 1951,195S. 1961, 1963,1967, t9W, 1978,1987,O 1997 by The America* Institute of Architects. 
Reproduction of the material herein or substantial quotation of It J provisions without written permission of the AtA 
violates the coovrtaht b w t of th* United States and vAU tubieet the violator to l*o*l nmc^cutlon. fl 
ARTICLE 16 INSURANCE AND BONOS 
(List raptircd limits of liability for insurance and bonds. AIA Document A201-1997 gives other specific 
raiuimnents for insurance and bonds.) 
$1,000,000.00 General Liability 
This Agreement is entered into as of the day and year first written above and is executed in at least 
three original copies, of which one is to be delivered to the Contractor, one to the Architect for use 
in the administration of the Contract, and the remaiiukrDb the Owner 
OWN IK(Signature) CQniKr\CXOR($ignature) 
4.^/t/C /I O.S?*JCJrZ(> 
(Printed name and title) *M7Z+r**U *Z? 
v/fTci x <%Q<)&^ 
(Printed name and title) 
0 1 9 5 ? A I A O 
AfAtXXrUMENTAHMW 
OWNER-CONTRACTOR 
AGREEMENT 
CAUTION: You should sign an original AIA document or a licensed reproduction. Originals contain the AIA logo The American Institute 
printed in red; licensed reproductions are those produced in accordance with the Instructions to this document, of Architects 
1735 New York Avenue, H.W. 
Washington, D.C 20006-5292 
EXHIBIT E 
•ttCOPT 
SCOTT C. WELLING, 3420 
Attorney for Defendants 
2064 Prospector Avenue, Suite 203 
P.O. Box 680715 
Park City, Utah 84068-0715 
Telephone: (435) 649-8406 
Facsimile: (435) 649-8412 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN HALE, an individual and CHARIS 
CONSTRUCTION, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PETER GENDRON, WILLIAM 
GENDRON, HANK LANG and LRG, 
INC., and Does 1 thru 10, inclusive, 
Defendants. 
ANSWER 
and 
COUNTERCLAIM 
Civil No. 02-0500738 CN 
Judge: Bruce Lubeck 
Defendants Peter Gendron, William Gendron, Hank Lang and LRG, Inc., hereby respond 
to the Complaint, herein admitting, denying and alleging in their separate or joint capacities, as 
follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
The Complaint fails to state the cause of action against any of the defendants upon which 
relief may be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
In response to the numbered paragraphs of the Complaint, defendants admit, deny and 
allege as follows: 
•JA 
1. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to 
the truth of the allegations of paragraphs 1 and 2 and therefore deny the same. 
2. Defendants respond to the allegations set forth in the un-numbered subparagraphs of 
paragraph 3 as follows: 
(a) Admit that defendant Peter Gendron is a resident of Orange County, California, 
and is the president of defendant LRG, but deny each and every other allegation of first 
subparagraph. 
(b) Admit the allegations of the second and third subparagraphs. 
(c) In response to the allegations of the fourth subparagraph, admit that defendant 
LRG is a Washington State corporation, has offices and does business in the state of California. 
Deny each and every other allegation of said subparagraph. 
(d) In response to the allegations of the fifth subparagraph, admit that Ken Mcintosh 
and Mark Howard were agents of defendant LRG, but deny that either agent had authority to 
contract with plaintiffs to perform general contractor or other services or to provide any materials 
or supplies to the project. 
(e) Deny the allegations of the sixth subparagraph. 
3. In response to the allegations of paragraph 4, defendants, for themselves, deny that 
any breach of contractual obligations or tortious conduct has occurred, and deny that plaintiffs 
have suffered any injury or damage. As the remaining statements in paragraph 4 are not 
allegations, defendants neither admit nor deny the same. 
4. In response to the allegations of paragraph 5, admit that plaintiffs claim a lien, but 
deny that plaintiffs have any factual or legal basis for such claim under the statutory authority 
cited. 
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5. Admit the allegations of paragraph 6. 
6. Defendants respond to the unnumbered subparagraphs of paragraph 7 as follows: 
(a) Deny the allegations of the first, second, third, fourth, seventh and eighth 
subparagraphs. 
(b) In response to the allegations of the fifth subparagraph, admit that defendant 
LRG did business in Park City, Utah, but deny each and every other allegation of said 
subparagraph. 
(c) In response to the allegations of the sixth subparagraph, admit plaintiffs have 
made the lien and contract claims described. 
(d) In response to the allegations of the seventh subparagraph, admit a lien was 
filed; deny there is any factual or legal basis for the lien claim. 
7. Deny each and every allegation of paragraph 8 excepting those set forth in the last 
sentence thereof, admitting the address of the subject property is correctly stated. 
8. Deny the allegations of paragraphs 9,10 and 11. 
9. Deny each and every allegation of paragraph 12 excepting those set forth in the last 
sentence thereof, which are admitted. 
10. In response to the allegations of paragraph 13, admit that plaintiff filed such notice 
of lien, but deny there is a factual or legal basis for such claim. Deny each and every other 
allegation of paragraph 13, with exception that defendants were aware of plaintiffs' lien, but 
deny that the notification thereof required by law was duly provided by plaintiffs. 
11. Deny the allegations of paragraphs 14 and 15. 
12. In response to paragraph 16, defendants re-allege their answers to paragraphs 1 
through 15 as if fully set forth herein. 
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13. Deny the allegations of paragraphs 17,18 and 19. 
14. In response to the allegations of paragraph 20, defendants are without information or 
knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to what amount plaintiffs believe to be owed and 
therefore deny the same. Admit the allegations of the last sentence of paragraph 20. 
15. In response to the allegations of paragraph 21, admit that plaintiff Hale filed such 
notice of lien, but deny there is a factual or legal basis for such claim. Admit refusing to pay any 
amount demanded by plaintiffs. 
16. Deny each and every allegation set forth in paragraph 23, excepting those set forth 
in the second subparagraph, admitting that defendants disavow the existence of any contract with 
plaintiffs. 
17. Deny the allegations in paragraph 24. 
18. In response to paragraph 25, defendants re-allege their answers to paragraphs 1 
through 15 as if fully set forth herein. 
19. Deny the allegations of paragraphs 26,27, 28, 29 and 30. 
20. In response to paragraph 31, defendants re-allege their answers to paragraphs 1 
through 15 as if fully set forth herein. 
21. Deny the allegations of paragraphs 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39 and 40. 
22. In response to paragraph 41, defendants re-allege their answers to paragraphs 1 
through 15 as if fully set forth herein. 
23. Deny the allegations of paragraphs 42, 43, 44, 45 and 46. 
24. In response to paragraph 47, defendants re-allege their answers to paragraphs 1 
through 15 as if fully set forth herein. 
25. Deny the allegations of paragraphs 48,49, 50, 51, 52 and 53. 
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FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' claims against individual defendants Peter Gendron, William Gendron and 
Hank Lang should be barred for reason that: at all material times, all statements, acts or 
omissions of said defendants with respect to the subject project and/or plaintiffs, including any 
contractual obligations, were conducted in the name of the corporate entity LRG, Inc., which is 
the real party in interest in this matter and is solely liable for the injuries and damages plaintiffs 
complain of, if any there are, and not said defendants in their personal capacities. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' claims should be barred and all relief denied in connection therewith for reason 
that: plaintiffs have failed to comply with the statutory requirements concerning the filing, 
perfecting and foreclosure of any mechanics lien. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' claims should be barred and all relief denied in connection therewith for reason 
that: plaintiffs neither performed services, nor provided labor, materials or supplies to the 
subject property and therefore have no basis for a claim in quantum meriuL 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' claims should be barred and all relief denied in connection therewith for reason 
that: there is no privity of contract between plaintiffs and any defendant, and no authorization of 
any agent by defendants to contract for the services purportedly rendered by plaintiffs. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' claims should be barred in whole or in part and all relief denied in connection 
therewith by reason of the doctrines of estoppel, laches, waiver and release, arising from 
plaintiffs' failure to bill for contractor services or other benefit purportedly provided to defendant 
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LRG or the subject property, or to make any other demand for compensation, except for one 
billing notice, which was paid. 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' claims should be barred and all relief denied in connection therewith by reason 
of accord and satisfaction, plaintiffs having accepted payment from defendant LRG specifically 
designated as final payment. 
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' claim for recovery under the mechanic's lien statute should be barred and all 
relief denied in connection therewith for reason that: the statutory periods for filing and 
enforcing such lien right expired prior to plaintiffs' compliance therewith. 
EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' claim for recovery under the mechanic's lien statute should be barred and all 
relief denied in connection therewith for reason that: plaintiffs are not qualified beneficiaries 
under the Utah mechanic's lien statute and are barred from filing any lien pursuant thereto. 
NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' claim for recovery under the contractor's bond statute should be barred and all 
relief denied in connection therewith for reason that: defendants are exempt from the 
requirements thereof, due to plaintiffs being barred from filing any mechanic's lien. 
TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' claim for recovery under the contractor's bond statute should be barred and all 
relief denied in connection therewith for reason that: plaintiffs have failed to provide 
preliminary notice of claim and have failed to initiate action to recover thereunder within the 
statutory compliance period. 
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ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Hainaus' claim for fraud should be barred and all relief denied in connection therewith 
due to plaintiffs' failure to specifically state the items of special damages alleged. 
§ 78-27-56 U.C.A. CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
found if/hum drlcnihiiL' causes of ju'linn air vufliniiil iim ill .uid ii.ni nol been luou^ht 
in good faith, entitling Counterclaimant to the award of reasonable attorney fees should it prevail 
in ildeiidingagitiiiid lliiji ailion 
WHEREFORE, defendants pray for judgment dismiss tr^ 
under plaintiffs* causes of action, and for the award of cosis of attorney lees incurred oy 
<" ndants. 
COUNTERCLAIM 
For cause of action against plaintiffs John I lale and Chads Construction ("Counterclaim 
deicritiaiiii ), clclcnu:.*:i i.iw.j, . .U . ^,i.v^.i.;uel.ain«.i,-t \ UILLLS a* iollows: 
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
Breach of Contractor Services Contract 
/•= 1. Counterclaimant is a Washington, state corporation, registered with : ' * 
Division of Corporations as a foreign corporation, doing business in the State of I Jtah, 
y| 2. Upon information and 1* y 
company, doing business in Summit County, Utah. 
/' 3 '*:.-"• m ."«H1 l^'lu'l, Inlip mil i", ili< ,i l|i;,iiijs ct nlrarlur huns>j lor 
.t Charis Construction. 
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7 •' 
f •: .: ,i dcicndants allegedly pcrfr-rmoi ^cn.^iil enntr >: . ..• * 
benefit of Couiiterclaimaiit and in connection with the improvement of th: property located at 
3;$S :1\.IKIJ;^ f • 
.v -A 5 Counterclaimant denies having obligation to compensate Counterclaim defendants 
for scivices, inatciiiillls« r i supplies puiportedly piovidnl, .iiinlll t IIIIIIILI'I luimmil luiiillini (Hunts 
obligation to Counterclaim defendants based OM ; ** \iu*n wruit or of her equitable doctrine. 
i" ) 6 ' I o the extent, however, mat w . :,e Jcicn;;i.^u .:„ contract was iormed 
between Counterclaimant and Counterclaim defendants ; • the performance of general 
contracting or supervisory services, or for the prov ision of supplies and materials to the project, 
Counterclaim defendants failed to perform such services competently and failed to provide the 
materials and supplies required, 
\Jj , result of Coil interclaim defendants1 failure lo perform their duties in competent 
manner, the construction o\ \:\e residence on :he subject property was performed inefficiently, 
i n c o M " • : • ' ' . ? ! • • • **• •• 
f ('ounterclaunani *\!S suffered injury as result of Counterclaim defendants' failure to 
p- - • . , ! 
budget, -is well :.* what the reasonable « t:.e nro,^ i should have been, contributing to 
v ) 9, Counterclaim defendants* acts or omissions in violation of its duties, as general 
contriiilnr caused Ioiiuilui l.iiiiiaiil lo expend ill n Lulablc capihl on the projcil, necessitating 
the expense of additional commercial borrowing to complete the project. 
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IQ Counterclaim defendants iauurc to j r -ontributc ; • i ' •> I 
inability to meet its financia! % Ib^io*;: U> f.;--1 panics, resulting ni liens and
 : . i , - \ ; ^ " a,.d 
addi--- ! • ( ^ ** - ( \ i • , : . . ..* 
11. The injury and damages suffered by Counterclaimant were a direct and foreseeable 
lesull nlT'omiti'ic laiin ddeiiduiits1' lailu»o c ;••.. jinn the duties of a general contractor. 
12 A s the consequence < • f -.lorehum. defendants' f iailure to perform, 
f •-tmterclaimant has suffered economic damage in the amount of at least $100,000, to be 
specifically proved at trial. 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
Breach of Contract i o*.£UiLllLlll-lJii.,J,lLLiiliJ! 
13. Counterclaii naiit re-alleges and incorporates the allegations of the foregoing 
paragraphs. 
14. To the extent determined that binding contract! lal relations were established between 
Counlori'Liiiuanl and '< • " . .enu u . »^ 
the latter are deemed u hd\\ '.overa.ii d with ! Vitntcrclaimant to perform tuch ^emces ir a 
tiint ly and lompcluil niaiinn, nut Iiiding ailiny in such I;L-.P.:.-:. - • assure u\v etiXKiU v.-.-iA tiiiieiy 
completion of the work being supervised. 
15. Counterclaimant reasonably relied upon. Counterclaim defendants' good faith 
covenant in expecting that the subject project would be supervised in a competent manner. 
1 ' ounterclaim defendants failed to perform the si ipervisory duties required of a 
general contract! r. appearing at the work site only infrequently, if at all, to oversee constructioi I 
activities. 
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17, Counterclaim defendants completely failed to communicate with Counterclaimant 
concerning the project and the problems with cost overruns and, completion delays that occurred. 
Ig^ Counterclaim defendants gave no notice or other indication to Counterclaim; : * *; it 
compensation for the services purportedly rendered was expected from. Counterclahnart, i.. iw •; 
(ii u< ill llir clojsiiiu of 'iNiilr11 I I lie ftmpiity In .1 lll'iiiui p.ntv, ill vvlliin III linn ' '" "fr^laim drfendanl'i 
attempted to impede that transaction by demanding payment of an unheard t sum pursuant to a 
mechanic's lieu till qucslionalili: validity. 
1>. A-; rf^ t|)f- of Counterclaim defendants* breach of covenant to act in good faith and 
treat Counterclaimant fairly in performing any contract '"« hich may be determined to bind the 
parties, Counterclaimant has suffered injury and damages, including lost profit and additional 
construction expense, in the amount of at least $100,000, to be specifically proved at trial. 
20. A.s a dii ect and foreseeable consequence of Counterclaim defendants' breach of 
COY-TI mt of good faith and fair dealing, Counterclaimant K?s required the services of counsel to 
renw^i .* : •- - . v ; ,s --5i 1 ant thereto 
WIIFKr.FORr, "l "i mull iclaiiiiiinl puys lor jiulj'jmuit aj.',;misl (jiiiiiitcicl.iiiii, ikTriidants as 
follows: 
1 Il I itliri Hit' hn.it ( him lin RYfln.T 
(a) For the award of damages for breach of contract, if contractual relations are 
detenu 1 ned In line IUTII established IXIWITH llII- pjilies, mi 1II111 .minimi nl nt le.tsl 'ill1111,11(111, lu 
be specifically proved at trial. 
(b) For interest accruing at the legal rate, costs ol coui\ . ; 1 icacniiuiao auorney 
fees, together with such other relief as the court deems equitable in the circumstances. 
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I '.^c- r <Hi* Second Claim for K elief: 
(a) I ""or the award of general damages for breach of covenant of good faith arid fair 
dealing, including lost profit and additional construction expense; 
(b) For the award of attorney fees incurred by Counterclainiant as consequence of 
(/nunli/ii'Ljinnlcfcndnnls' hwl finlli; 'irul 
(c) I1'or interest accruing at the legal rate and costs of coin t, together with such 
oilier relief as the eoyil duiii'i u|iiil ihlr in lite i in iinislriiiu'.s 
DATED this g 7 ^ d a y of February, 2003, 
Au& ^ 
Scott C. Welling, Attome) 
Defendants and Counterclainiant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this T7m day of February, 2003, a true and correct e<.>,>> >i ,' 
foregoing Answer and Counterclaim was mailed by U.S. mail, first-class postage prepaiti, 
plaintiffs' attorney as follows: 
John F. Fay, Esq. 
GREGORY, BARTON & SWAPP 
2975 W. Executive Pkwy., Ste. 300 
Lehi, UT 84043 
Fax: (801)990-1976 
/CJ^s'y v (- t_^i 
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EXHIBIT F 
SCOTT C. WELLING, 3420 
Attorney for Defendants 
2064 Prospector Avenue, Suite 203 
P.O. Box 680715 
Park City, Utah 84068-0715 
Telephone: (435) 649-8406 
Facsimile: (435) 649-8412 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN HALE, an individual and CHARIS 
CONSTRUCTION, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PETER GENDRON, WILLIAM 
GENDRON, HANK LANG and LRG, 
INC., and Does 1 thru 10, inclusive, 
Defendants. 
LRG, INC., A WASHINGTON 
CORPORATION, PETER GENDRON, 
WILLIAM GENDRON and HANK 
LANG 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
KENNETH McINTOSH, 
Third Party Defendant. 
Defendants Peter Gendron, William Gendron, Hank Lang and LRG, Inc., answer 
Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint for Damages ("Amended Complaint") as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which this Court may grant 
relief. 
DEFENDANTS' ANSWER TO 
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 
AND COUNTERCLAIM 
and 
THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 02-0500738 CN 
Judge: Bruce C. Lubeck 
SECOND DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint fails to state a claim against the individual defendants 
upon which relief may be granted. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
Defendants respond to the individually numbered paragraphs of Plaintiffs' Amended 
Complaint as follows: 
FACUTAL BACKGROUND 
1. Admit the allegations of paragraph no. 1. 
2. In response to paragraph no. 2 of the Amended Complaint, admits the allegations of 
the first and third sentences thereof. Is without information or knowledge sufficient to form a 
belief as to the truth of the allegations of the second paragraph and therefore deny the same. 
3. In response to the unnumbered subparagraphs of paragraph 3 of the Amended 
Complaint: 
a. Admit that defendant Peter Gendron is a resident of Orange County, California, 
and that he is the president of defendant LRG, but deny each and every other allegation of the 
first subparagraph. 
b. Admit that defendant William Gendron is a resident of Friday Harbor, 
Washington, and that he is an officer and shareholder of defendant LRG. Deny each and every 
other allegation of the second subparagraph. 
c. Admit that defendant Hank Lang is a resident of Friday Harbor, Washington, 
and that he is an officer and shareholder of defendant LRG. Deny each and every other 
allegation of the third subparagraph. 
d. Admit that defendant LRG is a Washington state corporation, with office and 
business in the state of California. Deny each and every other allegation of the fourth 
subparagraph. 
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e. In response to the allegations of the fifth subparagraph, admit that Ken Mcintosh 
and Mark Howard were agents for defendant LRG. Deny that either agent had independent 
authority to bind LRG to contract with plaintiffs to perform general contracting services. Deny 
the allegations of the last sentence of said paragraph. 
f In response to the sixth subparagraph, admit that all relevant times the Sun Ridge 
Drive home was owned by defendant LRG. Deny each and every other allegation of said 
paragraph. 
4. In response to the allegations of paragraph no. 4, defendants, for themselves, deny 
that any breach of contractual obligations or tortious conduct has occurred, and deny that 
plaintiffs have suffered any injury or damage. As the remaining statements in paragraph 4 are 
not allegations, defendants neither admit nor deny the same. 
5. In response to the allegations of paragraph no. 5, admit that plaintiffs claim a lien, 
but deny that plaintiffs have any factual or legal basis for such claim under the statutory authority 
cited. 
6. Admit the allegations of paragraph no. 6. 
7. In response the unnumbered subparagraphs of paragraph 7 of the Amended 
Complaint: 
a. Deny the allegations of the first, second, third, fourth, seventh and eighth 
subparagraphs. 
b. In response to the allegations of the fifth subparagraph, admit that defendant 
LRG did business in Park City, Utah, but deny each and every other allegation of said 
subparagraph. 
c. In response to the allegations of the sixth subparagraph, admit plaintiffs have 
made the lien and contract claims described. 
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d. In response to the allegations of the seventh subparagraph, admit a lien was 
filed; deny there is any factual or legal basis for the lien claim. 
e. In response to the eighth subparagraph, deny that any fraud deceit or bad faith 
was perpetrated by defendants, regardless of the location alleged. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
8. In response to paragraph no. 8, admit that sometime during the months of December 
1998 or January 1999, defendant LRG hired plaintiff Hale to provide general contractor services 
under said plaintiffs license in order to complete the subject project owned by defendant LRG. 
Admit Mark Howard was aware of certain terms of a proposed contract with Hale. Deny each 
and every other allegation of said paragraph, excepting those of the last sentence only, which are 
admitted. 
For purposes of responding to paragraph eight, and to the extent elsewhere alleged that 
Chads Construction had a direct contractual relationship with any defendant to perform general 
contractor services, defendants deny such allegation, whether express or implied. 
9. In response to paragraph no. 9, admit that LRG hired plaintiff Hale to oversee the 
finishing of the project, employ subcontractors and supervise their work. Deny the allegations of 
the second sentence. Admit that plaintiff Hale requested and was paid an initial retainer of 
$1,500 and a $750 monthly management fee. Deny the remaining allegations of paragraph 9. 
10. Deny the allegations of paragraphs 10 and 11. 
11. Deny each and every allegation of paragraph 12, excepting those set forth in the last 
sentence thereof, which are admitted. 
12. In response to the allegations of paragraph 13, admit that plaintiff filed such notice 
of lien, but deny there is a factual or legal basis for such claim. Deny each and every other 
allegation of paragraph 13, with exception that defendants were aware of plaintiffs' lien, but 
deny that the notification thereof required by law was duly provided by plaintiffs. 
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13. Deny the allegations of paragraphs 14,15,16 and 17. 
14. In response to paragraph 18, admit that no payment bond was posted by defendant 
LRG. Deny that any defendant is liable to plaintiffs for failure to post payment bond. 
15. Deny the allegations of paragraph 19. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
16. In response to paragraph 20, defendants re-allege their answers to paragraphs 1 
through 19 as if fully set forth herein. 
17. Deny the allegations of paragraphs 21, 22 and 23. 
18. In response to paragraph 24, deny the allegations of the first sentence. Admit that 
defendant LRG has refused to pay plaintiffs. 
19. In response to the allegations of paragraph 25, admit that plaintiff Hale filed such 
notice of lien, but deny there is a factual or legal basis for such claim. Admit refusing to pay any 
amount demanded by plaintiffs. 
20. In response to paragraph 27, deny all allegations of the initial paragraph thereof and 
deny the allegations of the first, second, third, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth and fourteenth 
unnumbered subparagraphs. With regard to the fourth subparagraph, admit refusing to pay 
Pioneer Log Homes. Deny each and every other allegation of said subparagraph. In response to 
the fifth unnumbered subparagraph, admit refusing to pay Breakthrough Construction. Deny 
each and every other allegation of said subparagraph. In response to the eleventh, twelfth and 
thirteenth subparagraphs, are without information or knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to 
what plaintiffs may have "learned", and therefore deny said allegations. In response to the 
fifteenth subparagraph, admit bonding around plaintiffs' lien, but deny that not having said lien 
removed or otherwise satisfied, constitutes a failure of any legal or equitable obligation to 
plaintiffs. 
21. Deny the allegations of paragraphs 28 and 29. 
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
22. In response to paragraph 30, defendants re-allege their answers to paragraphs 1 
through 19 as if fully set forth herein. 
23. Deny the allegations of paragraphs 31 and 32. 
24. In response to paragraph 33, deny the allegations of the first sentence. Admit 
refusing to pay plaintiffs, but deny such failure to pay constitutes misconduct or breach of 
contract. 
25. Deny the allegations of paragraph 34. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
26. In response to paragraph 35, defendants re-allege their answers to paragraphs 1 
through 19 as if fully set forth herein. 
27. In response to paragraph 36, admit that defendant LRG promised to pay plaintiff 
John Hale a $1,500 initial fee and $750 management fee for a limited period of time per billing 
statement from said plaintiff. Deny each and every other allegation of said paragraph. 
28. Deny the allegations of paragraphs 37, 38 and 39. 
29. In response to paragraph 40, deny misrepresenting any facts to plaintiffs. Admit 
defendant LRG requested that plaintiff Hale act in the capacity as general contractor in the 
completion of the project. Deny each and every other allegation of paragraph 40. 
30. In response to paragraph 41, deny misrepresentations were made by any defendant 
to plaintiffs. Deny each and every other allegation of paragraph 41. 
31. In response to paragraph 42, deny the allegations of the first full paragraph thereof 
and deny the allegations of the first, second, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, thirteenth and last un-
numbered subparagraphs thereof. In response to the third, fourth and fifth subparagraphs, admit 
refusing to pay G&M Associates, Pioneer Log Homes and Breakthrough Construction, but deny 
such refusal was wrongful, without justification or in breach of contractual agreement with said 
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general contractors. In response to the tenth, eleventh and twelfth subparagraphs, without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to what plaintiffs "learned," and therefore 
deny said allegations. 
32. Deny the allegations of paragraphs 43 and 44. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
33. In response to paragraph 45, defendants re-allege their answers to paragraphs 1 
through 19 as if fully set forth herein. 
34. In response to paragraph 46, admit that sometime during December 1998 and 
January 1999, plaintiff Hale orally agreed with LRG's agent, Ken Mcintosh, to perform general 
contracting services for a limited time in completing the project, and that plaintiff Hale would be 
entitled to a $750 monthly management fee during the last few months of the project's 
completion, per billing statement. Deny each and every other allegation of said paragraph. 
35. In response to paragraph 47, admit that plaintiff Hale commenced acting as general 
contractor on the project some time during the month of January 1999. Deny each and every 
other allegations of said paragraph. 
36. Deny the allegations of paragraph 48. 
37. In response to paragraph 49, deny the allegations of the first sentence. Admit that 
plaintiff Hale oversaw the project and employed and supervised subcontractors. Admit that 
defendant Charis Construction provided hourly labor and services. Admit plaintiff Hale 
registered his general contractor license on the building permit for the project. Deny each and 
every other allegation of paragraph 49. 
38. Deny the allegations of paragraph 50. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' claims against individual defendants Peter Gendron, William Gendron and 
Hank Lang should be barred for reason that: at all material times, all statements, acts or 
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omissions of said defendants with respect to the subject project and/or plaintiffs, including any 
contractual obligations, were conducted in the name of the corporate entity LRG, Inc., which is 
the real party in interest in this matter and is solely liable for the injuries and damages plaintiffs 
complain of, if any there are, and not said defendants in their personal capacities. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' claims should be barred and all relief denied thereon for reason that: plaintiffs 
have failed to comply with the statutory requirements concerning the filing, perfecting and 
foreclosure of any mechanics lien. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' claims should be barred and all relief denied thereon for reason that: plaintiffs 
neither performed services, nor provided labor, materials or supplies to the subject property and 
therefore have no basis for a claim in quantum meriut. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' claims should be barred in whole or in part and all relief denied thereon by 
reason of the doctrines of estoppel, laches, waiver and release, arising from plaintiffs' failure to 
bill for contractor services or other benefit purportedly provided to defendant LRG or the subject 
property, or to timely make other demand for compensation, which was not paid. 
FIFTH Al'MltlM \ IJVK DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' claims should be barred and all relief denied thereon by reason of accord and 
satisfaction, plaintiffs having accepted payment from defendant LRG specifically designated as 
final payment. 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' claim for recovery under the mechanic's lien statute should be barred and all 
relief denied thereon for reason that: the statutory periods for filing and enforcing such lien right 
expired prior to plaintiffs' compliance therewith. 
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SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' claim for recovery under the mechanic's lien statute should be barred and all 
relief denied thereon for reason that: plaintiffs are not qualified beneficiaries under the Utah 
mechanic's lien statute and are barred from filing any lien pursuant thereto. 
EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' claim for recovery under the contractor's bond statute should be barred and all 
relief denied thereon for reason that: defendants are exempt from the requirements thereof, due 
to plaintiffs being barred from filing any mechanic's lien. 
NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' claim for recovery under the contractor's bond statute should be barred and all 
relief denied thereon for reason that: plaintiffs have failed to provide preliminary notice of claim 
and have failed to initiate action to recover thereunder within the statutory compliance period. 
TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' claim for fraud should be barred and all relief denied thereon due to plaintiffs' 
failure to specifically state the items of special damages alleged. 
ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' claims for bad faith and fraud should be barred and all relief denied thereon for 
reason that: plaintiffs waived said claims by continuing to perform the contract without 
objection or notice of default after plaintiffs' purportedly discovered defendants' 
misrepresentations and bad faith. 
TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' claims should be denied and all relief denied thereon by reason of failure of 
consideration, in that plaintiffs did not perform general contracting services competently, nor in 
accordance with the agreement with LRG. 
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§ 78-27-56 U.C.A. CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
Plaintiffs' causes of action are without merit and have not been brought in good faith, 
entitling defendants to the award of their reasonable attorney fees in defending against this 
action. 
WHEREFORE, defendants pray for judgment dismissing all plaintiffs' causes of action, 
or denying all relief requested thereunder, and for the award of costs and attorney fees incurred 
by defendants. 
COUNTERCLAIM 
For causes of action against plaintiffs John Hale and Charis Construction, LC 
("counterclaim defendants"), defendant LRG, Inc., along with defendants Gendron and Lang as 
their interests may appear, allege as follows: 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
1. LRG ("LRG") is a Washington state corporation, registered with the Utah Division 
of Corporations as a foreign corporation and doing business in the State of Utah. Defendant 
Peter Gendron is a resident of California. Defendants William Gendron and Hank Lang are 
residents of the state of Washington. 
2. Defendant Charis Construction ("Charis Construction") is a Utah limited liability 
company, doing business in Summit County, Utah. 
3. Defendant John Hale ("Hale") is a resident of Salt Lake County, Utah. At all 
material times, Hale purported to be the qualifying general contractor licensee for Charis 
Construction. 
4. At all material times, LRG was the owner and developer of a residential construction 
project located at 3758 Sunridge Drive in Park City, Utah ("Project"). 
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5. As none of the officers or shareholders of LRG have ever resided in Utah, LRG 
retained the services of Kenneth Mcintosh ("Mcintosh"), a resident of Summit County, Utah, to 
act as construction supervisor and liaison for LRG with the general contractor on the Project. 
6. Mcintosh solicited the services of Hale to act as general contractor on the Project, to 
replace LRG's previous general contractor. 
7. At the time Hale was retained, the Project was nearing completion, with construction 
thereon scheduled to be finished during the spring of 1999. 
8. Hale was retained by Mcintosh in December 1998, under authorization from LRG to 
pay Hale an initial fee for accepting responsibility as general contractor on the Project, along 
with a monthly fee during the aforesaid time anticipated to complete the Project. 
9. When he was retained, Hale estimated the cost to complete the Project at $95,000. 
10. In March 1999, Mcintosh estimated the cost to complete the Project at 
approximately $170,000. 
11. From and after January 1999, the cost to complete the Project exceeded $500,000. 
12. In March 1999, Mcintosh represented to LRG that a certificate of occupancy for the 
Project would be issued that same month. 
13. In May 1999, Hale represented to LRG that the Project was complete except for 
some minor finish work. 
14. The Project was not approved for residential occupancy by the Park City Building 
Department until August, 2000. 
15. In April 1999, Hale and Mcintosh formed Charis Construction as a Utah limited 
liability company. 
16. Charis Construction was hired by Mcintosh to perform minor completion items at 
the Project. 
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17. At all material times, defendants were uninformed of the business affiliation 
between Mcintosh and Charis Construction, as well as that of Charis Construction and Hale. 
18. On or about May 24, 2001, Hale filed a mechanic's lien against the Project. No lis 
pendens was filed in connection with Hale's mechanic's lien. 
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
Breach of Contractor Services Contract 
19. LRG realleges and incorporates the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 18 as if fully 
set forth. 
20. Hale and/or Charis Construction allegedly performed general contracting services 
for the benefit of LRG in connection with the Project. 
21. No invoice or other request for payment for Hale's services was received by LRG, 
nor defendants Gendron and Lange following June 1999, until November 2000. 
22. Hale assumed certain general contractor duties on the Project, including supervision 
of construction, the hiring and firing of subcontractors, inspection of work and materials, and 
adhering to LRG's objectives and expectations concerning the cost of, and completion time for, 
the Project. 
23. Hale delegated all or part of his duties as general contractor to Charis Construction. 
Defendants did not approve said delegation of duties. 
24. Hale assigned his financial responsibility to LRG as general contractor to Charis 
Construction. LRG did not approve of said assignment of financial responsibility. 
25. To the extent determined that the aforesaid delegation of duties and assignment of 
financial responsibility is deemed lawful, or that Charis Construction may have effectively 
assumed said obligations, Charis Construction became jointly and severally responsible with 
Hale to supervise the construction work, hire and fire subcontractors, inspect work and materials 
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and adhere to LRG's objectives and expectations concerning the cost of, and completion time 
for, the Project. 
26. LRG paid Hale's initial fee. LRG thereafter paid all Hale's monthly fees that were 
submitted for payment by Mcintosh. 
27. Counterclaim defendants, and each of them, defaulted in performing the general 
contracting services for which they were hired, or assumed, by failing to: properly supervise the 
performance of work and installation of materials; retain competent subcontractors, or to monitor 
subcontractor performance; assure the installation of materials on a timely basis, or in 
compliance with design specifications; communicate with the owner of the Project in any 
fashion; and use best efforts to adhere to LRG's construction budget and completion time frame. 
28. Without the permission of LRG, counterclaim defendants, and each of them, 
suspended their performance of general contracting services on the Project, and/or rendered the 
same only on an intermittent basis, while working on project(s) unrelated to that of LRG. 
29. As direct result of counterclaim defendants' failure to perform in a competent 
manner, the construction work on the Project was performed inefficiently, incompetently and in 
an untimely fashion. 
30. LRG has suffered financial injury as a result of counterclaim defendants' default, in 
the amount by which the actual cost of the Project exceeded that cost of construction that had 
been bargained for and expected by LRG under the parties' contract. 
31. As result of counterclaim defendants' default, LRG expended all available capital 
on the Project, necessitating additional time to secure funding to complete the Project, and 
incurred costs and interest charges attendant to such financing. 
32. Defendants' acts or omissions of default caused shortfalls in LRG's operating 
capital, resulting in an inability to meet financial obligations to third party subcontractors and 
materialmen in connection with the Project. The consequence thereof was further delay in 
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completion, the filing of liens against the Project, and litigation expenses, attorney fees and other 
costs incurred by LRG in resolving such claims. 
33. The injury and damages suffered by LRG were the direct and foreseeable 
consequence of counterclaim defendants' failure to perform the duties of general contractor on 
the Project in a competent manner. 
34. As a consequence of defendants' breach of contractor services contract, LRG has 
suffered economic damage in the amount of at least $300,000.00, to be specifically proved at 
trial 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
Breach of Contract - Covenant of Good Faith 
35. LRG realleges and incorporates the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 18 as if fully 
set forth. 
36. Defendant Hale, as well as Charis Construction, to the extent determined that said 
entity had a binding contractual relation with LRG, are deemed to have covenanted with LRG to 
conduct their contractual relations with LRG fairly and in such manner to meet LRG's 
reasoanble expectations of said defendants' performance under the contract. 
37. LRG reasonably relied upon Hale's covenant of good faith in retaining said 
defendant and in expecting that the Project would be supervised and completed in a competent 
and timely manner. 
38. Counterclaim defendants, and each of them, breached their covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing in the following regards: 
a. appeared at the worksite infrequently, if at all, to supervise construction 
activities; 
b. completely failed to communicate with LRG concerning Project cost overruns 
and completion delays; 
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c. suspended performance of services on the Project, or worked only 
intermittently, while working on other projects unrelated to the subject Project; 
d. failed to disclose their business affiliation, as well as that with defendants' 
agent Mcintosh; 
e. used their affiliation to benefit their own financial interests, unnecessarily 
extending the completion of the Project in order to optimize their collection of monthly fees and 
other compensation; 
f failed to obtain competitive bids for services performed by Charis Construction 
without the knowledge of LRG; 
g. breached duties of disclosure, impartiality, independence and allegiance to 
LRG as their employer and/or owner of the Project; 
h. conspired with Mcintosh to wrongfully encumber LRG's title to the Project and 
to coerce undeserved compensation from LRG just prior to closing of sale of the Project; 
i. conspired with one another and Mcintosh to coerce LRG to pay unreasonable 
and outrageous sums to resolve said defendants' claims, including the revelation of proprietary 
and confidential business information belonging to LRG, in order to foment this and other 
lawsuits against all defendants. 
39. As result of the breach of covenant to act in good faith and treat LRG fairly in 
performing their contract, counterclaim defendants have caused LRG to suffer injury and 
damage, including loss profit, additional construction expense, interest charges, and litigation 
expense, all in the amount of at least $300,000.00, to be specifically proved at trial. 
40. As a direct and foreseeable consequence of breach of covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing by counterclaim defendants, LRG has required the services of counsel to represent 
LRG's interests, and should be awarded all attorney fees incurred pursuant thereto. 
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THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
Abuse of Process 
41. LRG realleges and incorporates the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 18 and 38 as 
if fully set forth. 
42. Counterclaim defendants have been paid all amounts requested for their services as 
general contractor. 
43. Hale has accepted funds designated as final payment from LRG for his general 
contractor services. 
44. Counterclaim defendants never billed defendants for the services for which recovery 
of compensation is sought under the Second Cause of Action in plaintiffs' First Amended 
Complaint. 
45. Charis Construction has acknowledged having been paid all compensation due for 
contracting services performed on the Project. 
46. The claims for bad faith breach of contract under plaintiffs' First Cause of Action 
are baseless and wholly without merit. 
47. Counterclaim defendants' Third Cause of Action, for fraud and misrepresentation, is 
baseless and wholly without merit. 
48. Counterclaim defendants have sued the members and directors of the LRG 
corporation in their individual capacities without factual support for the allegations that LRG is 
an alter ego for said defendants. 
49. Counterclaim defendants' claim for damages arising from bad faith and fraud are in 
amount more than ten times that of the principal amount of the underlying breach of contract 
claim in the First Amended Complaint. 
50. Counterclaim defendants have disregarded court order herein to engage in 
meaningful mediation and good faith negotiation. 
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51. Counterclaim defendants have engaged in unnecessary, intrusive and excessive 
discovery in this matter and unseemly disputation in connection therewith. 
52. Counterclaim defendants' aforesaid acts constitute an abuse of the litigation process, 
for reason that this litigation was primarily instituted to accomplish the purpose of extracting an 
exorbitant settlement from defendants, a purpose not within the scope of the claims made within 
the Amended Complaint and the actual damages alleged therein. 
53. Plaintiffs have instigated this litigation against defendants with malicious intent, 
having done so for revenge and/or vindication of purported injury or damage purportedly caused 
by defendants to associates of plaintiffs otherwise involved in the Project as subcontractors. 
54. Plaintiffs' use of legal process to instigate these improper purposes is a wanton 
misuse of the legal system and the rights of defendants to be unfettered by bad faith litigation. 
55. As a direct and foreseeable result of plaintiffs' malicious prosecution of this action 
against defendants, defendants have suffered general damages in an amount in excess of 
$1,000,000, to be specifically proved at trial. 
56. As a consequence of plaintiffs' malicious prosecution of this action against 
defendants, defendants have suffered special damages including emotional distress, attorney fees 
and litigation expense, in an amount in excess of $100,000.00, to be specifically proved at trial. 
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THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT AGAINST KENNETH McINTOSH 
LRG, Inc., along with Peter Gendron, William Gendron and Hank Lang, as their interests 
may appear, complain and allege against Kenneth Mcintosh as follows: 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. LRG is a Washington state corporation, registered with the Utah Division of 
Corporations as a foreign corporation and doing business in the state of Utah. 
2. Peter Gendron is a resident of California. William Gendron and Hank Lang are 
residents of the state of Washington. 
3. Mcintosh is, on information or belief, a resident of Summit County, Utah. 
4. Jurisdiction is appropriate in this court pursuant to § 78-3-4 U.C.A. 
5. Venue is proper under § 78-13-7 U.C.A. 
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
Breach of Personal Services Contract 
6. LRG realleges and incorporates the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 5 as if fully 
set forth. 
7. On or about November 1997, LRG retained the services of Mcintosh to serve as 
construction supervisor for the Project, compensable by way of a monthly fee. 
8. Mcintosh was hired to oversee the construction work on the Project as LRG's agent, 
to coordinate the work of subcontractors and the provision of supplies and materials to the 
Project, to communicate with LRG, to serve as liaison between the general contractor on the 
Project and LRG as owner, and to use best efforts to accomplish LRG's objective of completing 
the Project expeditiously and economically. 
9. LRG has compensated Mcintosh in full for all such supervision services performed 
in connection with the Project. 
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10. Mcintosh failed to perform his duties as construction supervisor in a competent or 
timely manner by failing to: adequately supervise the work; hire competent subcontractors; 
select appropriate materials; maintain an efficient schedule; keep adequate records; and devote 
sufficient time to the project. 
11. At a point where the Project was nearing completion, Mcintosh discontinued 
supervising the work, or did so only on an intermittent basis, while working on other unrelated 
projects. 
12. Mcintosh failed to act in a timely manner to keep LRG current with Project 
creditors. 
13. As result of Mcintosh's breach of his contract obligations as construction supervisor, 
completion of the Project was considerably delayed and the cost thereof considerably increased, 
beyond Mcintosh's own estimates. 
14. As direct result of Mcintosh's breach, LRG has been suffered economic injury and 
general damages in an amount in excess of $300,000.00, to be specifically proved at trial. 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
Breach of Contract - Covenant of Good Faith 
15. LRG realleges and incorporates the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 14 as if fully 
set forth. 
16. Mcintosh owed duty to LRG to supervise construction on the Project to achieve 
LRG's business objective to complete the Project expeditiously and in a cost efficient manner. 
17. As LRG's agent, Mcltosh owed duty of allegiance to the business interests of LRG 
in the first instance, including but not limited to, duty to disclose or avoid any conflict of interest. 
18. Mcintosh had duty to disclose to LRG all terms and conditions of the contract for 
Hale's general contractor services, including but not limited to, what compensation, if any, 
would be owed to Hale for services beyond the anticipated completion date. 
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19. Mcintosh failed to disclose his purposed and/or actual business affiliation with Hale 
and Charis Construction as general contractor, thereby denying LRG pertinent information in the 
determination to hire, as well as continue to retain the services of, Hale as general contractor. 
20. Mcintosh failed to disclose his purposed and/or actual business affiliation with 
Charis Construction, to the detriment of LRG, which was entitled to have the bidding for work 
on the Project be competitive and the ultimate cost for such work to be as economical as 
possible. 
21. LRG was entitled to the allegiance of Mcintosh as its agent, including duty to take 
no intentional action which would harm the financial interests of LRG, nor to disclose any 
proprietary or confidential information which would reasonably be anticipated to cause 
determinant to LRG's interest. 
22. Mcintosh failed to abide by his covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the 
following respects: 
a. failed to competently evaluate the costs and time necessary to complete the 
Project; 
b. intentionally withheld information from LRG concerning conflict of interest 
with Hale and/or Charis Construction as general contractor; 
c. intentionally failed to apprise LRG of the likelihood or necessity of substantial 
expenses to complete the Project beyond that estimated; 
d. failed to advise LRG of Hale's expectations for compensation and/or to notify 
LRG of Hale's charges, after the Project continued past the scheduled completion time; 
e. intentionally prolonged the completion of work on the Project in order to 
accrue additional fees for his services; 
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f. conspired with Hale and Charis Construction to prolong the completion of the 
Project in order to enhance the claim of Hale and/or Charis Construction for additional general 
contractor fees; 
g. continually denied LRG the necessary time and attention to the Project while 
working on unrelated projects; 
h. conspired with Hale and/or Charis Construction to coerce LRG into paying 
compensation to which Hale and/or Charis Construction were not entitled; 
i. conspired with Hale to encumber the Project with mechanic's lien at a 
penultimate date prior to the closing of sale of the Project, in order to coerce undeserved 
payment from LRG; 
j . conspired with Hale and/or Charis Construction to foment litigation against 
LRG, including soliciting counsel previously involved in litigation with LRG, divulged 
confidential and proprietary information of LRG provided false information concerning LRG's 
business practices to support this litigation; 
k. and failed and/or refused to return the proprietary business records, data and 
other information of LRG concerning the Project. 
23. As result of Mcintosh's bad faith omissions and conduct of his contractual relations 
with LRG as aforesaid, the Project was not completed in timely fashion, nor at reasonable cost. 
As a direct and foreseeable result thereof, LRG has suffered injury and damage in an amount in 
excess of $100,000.00, to be specifically proved at trial. 
24. As result of Mcintosh's aforesaid bad faith conduct of his contractual relations with 
LRG, LRG and defendants Gendron and Lang have been required to defend their interests 
against the wrongful and unmeritorious litigation instigated by Hale and Charis Construction, 
and as a direct and foreseeable result thereof, has incurred substantial attorney fees and litigation 
costs, in the amount in excess of $50,000.00, to be specifically proved at trial. 
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WHEREFORE, LRG prays for judgment and relief against the counterclaim defendants 
and third party defendant as follows: 
1. Under the First Claim for Relief of the Counterclaim, for judgment in the amount of 
at least $300,000.00, to be specifically proved at time of trial; 
2. Under the Second Claim for Relief of the Counterclaim, for judgment in the amount 
of all attorney fees incurred by defendants in this matter; 
3. Under the Third Claim for Relief of the Counterclaim, for the award of actual 
damages, including attorney fees, costs and all other expenses incurred in defending plaintiffs' 
claims, together with punitive damages in the amount of at least $100,000.00, to be specifically 
proved at trial; 
4. Under the First Claim for Relief of the Third Party Complaint, for the award of 
actual damages in the amount of at least $300,000.00, to be specifically proved at trial; 
5. Under the Second Claim for Relief of the Third Party Complaint, for judgment in 
the amount of $300,000 attorney fees and all costs and expenses otherwise incurred in 
prosecuting action against third party defendant. 
6. Under the Counterclaim and the Third Party Complaint, for the award of interest at 
the legal rates, before and after judgment. 
7. Under the Counterclaims and the Third Party Complaint, for the award of costs, and 
such further relief as deemed just in the matter. 
DATED this / f * £ day of May, 2004. 
Scott C. Welling, Attojw€y for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this of May, 2004, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Defendants' Answer to First Amended Complaint and Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint of Defendant LRG, Inc., was mailed by U.S. mail, first-class postage prepaid, to 
plaintiffs' attorney as follows: 
John F. Fay, Esq. 
GREGORY, BARTON & SWAPP 
2975 W. Executive Pkwy., Ste. 300 
Lehi, UT 84043 
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JOHN F. FAY, #5691 
Gregory & Swapp, P. L. L. C. 
2975 West Executive Parkway, Suite 300 
Lehi, UT 84043-9627 
Telephone: (801) 990-1919 
Fax: (801) 990-1976 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL PUTTUCK, an individual, 
PAUL PUTTUCK, dba BREAK-
THROUGH CONSRUCTION 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PETER GENDRON, WILLIAM 
and 
GENDRON, and Does 1 thru 5 inclusive. 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM OF 
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Case No: 07-0500114 
JUDGE: Bruce Lubeck 
COMES NOW Plaintiffs Paul Puttuck and Break-Through Constmction, by and through 
counsel of record, John F. Fay, and submit this Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs ask this court to DENY Defendants' 
Motion for the reasons set forth below. 
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS 
1. The Defendants hired Mr. Puttuck in March 1998, and he worked for them until he 
was fired in December 1998. (Gendron Dep., 2/23/00, at 76.) 
2. The Plaintiff filed suit against the Defendants for various claims (breach of contract, 
fraud, and bad faith breach of contract) in Paul Puttuck and Breakthrough Construction v. Peter 
Gendron, LRG, Inc., Gendron Lim and Company and Kenneth Mcintosh [99-0600212] ("Puttuck 
I"), and the defendants filed a counter-claim. Id. 
3. Defendant Peter Gendron was the principal source of the information regarding the 
counter-claim against Plaintiff Puttuck, in terms of the dollar size of the counter-claim. Id. at 70. 
4. In 2000, Defendant Peter Gendron testified that Mr. Puttuck was to complete the 
contract, including his ten percent payment, for $198,000. Id. at 75. 
5. During the time Mr. Puttuck was working under contract, Defendant Peter Gendron 
claimed there was over $700,000 expended on the project. Id. He testified that he arrived at the 
$500,000 counter-claim simply by taking what was expended under the contract, $700,000 and 
subtracting the $198,000, the amount of the Puttuck contract. Id. 
6. The $500,000 in damages the defendants alleged were from the date of inception of 
the contract, March 1998, with Mr. Puttuck to the date of the completion of the log home, Feb. 
2000. Mat 133. 
7. Defendants settled with Plaintiff in Puttuck I, and individually the Defendants paid 
the Plaintiff, $29,000 and their insurance company, State Farm, paid Puttuck another $50,000. 
8. After firing Mr. Puttuck, the defendants hired Mr. John Hale in January 1999, to 
complete the project. Mr. Hale (Charis Construction) also brought a lawsuit against the 
defendants, for breach of contract, fraud and bad faith breach of contract. {Hale v. Gendron, tried 
to a jury before this court in June, 2006). 
9. Defendant Peter Gendron was again deposed on November 3, 2003 regarding the 
Charis lawsuit. In Charis, Peter Gendron testified he arrived at his loss for the $500,000 counter-
claim by taking the costs to complete the job of $600,000 as of January 7th 1999, the date that 
Mr. Hale signed the Charis contract, for $95,000, by using the period from January 1, 1997 
through the occupancy permit date of August 18, 2000. {Gendron Dep., 11/5/2003, p. 109) 
10. During this period, Peter Gendron claimed there was $600,000 expended on the 
project. He testified that he took the $600,000 minus the $95,000 and that was roughly the 
$500,000 counter-claim. Id. 
11. The period Gendron used to calculate his losses in Hale and Charis was substantially 
the same period he used to determine the amount of his counter-claim in Puttuck I. Thus, the 
same costs are substantially overlapped. 
POINTS & AUTHORITIES AND ARGUMENTS 
A. MOVANTS'FATAL ERROR 
The allegations in defendant's motion claim that Plaintiffs should have been aware that 
during the pendancy of the Puttuck I case, that the counter-claim was false and thus Plaintiffs 
could/should have prosecuted their claims for sanctions in that lawsuit. 
However, this is manifest error because: 
1. When Peter Gendron testified in February 2000 in Puttuck I, this was the first time he 
asserted how he arrived at the defendants' counter-claim. Plaintiffs could not have known that he 
was lying at this time. That claim was later resolved in favor of the plaintiffs. 
2. It was only in November 2003, nearly two and a half years after the Puttuck I lawsuit 
was resolved in June 2000, (Def. Exhibit A), that the Plaintiffs had the slightest inkling that 
maybe Peter Gendron perjured himself in the Puttuck I deposition. Realistically, all that 
Plaintiffs knew in 2003 was that Peter Gendron had falsely testified in one of the two 
depositions. 
3. It was only at the trial in June 2006,, when Defendants reaffirmed the counter-claim 
testimony against Charis, that Plaintiffs knew Peter Gendron had testified falsely in February 
2000. [Puttuck I] 
It. DKI'T NDAN TS r \ , .K 1, \W \1 ITHORITIES ARE INAPPLICABLE 
Most of the cases the defense cites in their motion are cases that were tried or not 
resolved o:t i motions. Oprian v. Goldrk 'h, (Sei "." Defendants ' . I\ lemorandi lm in Si lppoi t • :»f 
Mot ion to Dismiss ,
 F. -r, Winar v. Northwest Pipeline Corp. (Id. at 6), Lackner v. LaCroix (Id. at 
3,4), Broadbent v. Board of Ed \ /.;. ,\\ • • =. Nicholson v. Lucas (/.; -M ), u •: ,. lied \ ./ • ), 
« .v.'- o), die ail cases that were resolved by s u m m a r y judgment , long 
after defendants filed an answer and after discovery. 
III. mi In H" lirs «i I I ' i I I11"! i" II'II I i i mi" R i i l f • ' ; -s that si immary ji ldgment L; propu" 
when the evidence shows that " there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a m a t t e r o f • '"' IIKCP 5(i(t/K House w Arnujut M/ America, '*.?'J \\2d 
340, 342 (Utah 1996). Summary judgment typically occurs after the part ies have engaged in 
significant discovery to prove/disprove facts that were in dispute before discovery. In the instant 
, . * - , .
 t l lcj accordingly, there are many issues of material fact yet to be 
resolved. The defendants have not made a summary judgment mot ion so the standards proffered 
fran i t! iew e':>^ ^  ari i \ vholb inapplicable to defendants ' n lotioi I to dismiss . 
'..!:• ' of the other cases that defendants cite in their brief suggest trial standards of proof 
and are *;w ->..' v inapplicable to the case at hand i st ael 1 \ ig < in Bsit lie v, G innon (Def. 
M e m o r a n d u m at 7,11,12), Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker ? /•/ at S>) I V. w Medina-
Estrada (Id. at 9), U.S. v. Ellis (Id at 9), Dill v. Rader (Id. at ; . ...:u -. .. / m , i :\. at 
j , 4 , .. •. '• -i i ,\ , i4) , and Templeton Feed & Grain v. Ralston-Purina Co. (Id. 
w\ ! > \ it :• u!l cases that proceeded through the trial stages. The instant case is not yet near the 
A 
trial stage. The Complaint was recently filed and no other operative pleadings have been filed, 
save tl le defendant's motion tc dismiss 1\ lany of the cases cited 1: y the defendants indicate a 
"clear and convincing" standard of proof, which is required at trial, and certainly plaintiffs 
cannot be held to this standard at the pleading stage. Plaintiffs have yet had the opportunity to do 
discovery or even receive an answer to their Complaint. 
Defendants further claim that, at all material times, they were acting in their capacity as 
this assertion and that is why discovery should be required. In this motion, the standard that 
plaintiffs are held to is oi le w hei e the defendants cai i show that thei e is i 10 possit Hit) at i 11 that 
plaintiffs can prevail on the facts. Defendants have not shown and cannot show, this requirement 
in the pleading stage. 
C " AINTIFF'S PLEAD SUFFICIENT FACTS TO STATE A CI , \ 11 1 
In a motion to dismiss, the court generally considers only facts alleged within the 
c<: >mph iii it Et hu •aim si 1 i i it h • r 1 >s\ i" > iliiet / I Vc: >pt 7 i) >& Cc is h i y. Co., 890P.2d 1029, 1029 
(Utah 1995) (citations omitted), In doing so, the court "accepts the factual allegations in the 
complaint as true and considers all reasonable inferences to L\ *.;» ..•»;» IU M those facts ;n a iiuht 
most favorable to the plaintiff" J'rows v. State, 822 P.2d 764, 766 (Utah 1991). Generally, uw 
court grants a motion to dismiss "only where it clearly appears that the plaintiff or plaintiffs 
v 'oi lid i L : I't be ei ititled to i elief under the facts alleged or under any state of facts they could prove 
to support their claim" Li "A dismissal is a severe measure and the courts are a forum for 
settling controversies3 and if thei e is ai iy doubt aboi it wl lethei a claim siioi lid be dismisse d for 
the lack of a factual basis, the issue should be resolved in favor of giving the party an 
opportunity to present its proof." Colmanv. Uuih State Land Bd.. \ M \ . .i .J , >_•*,; , ;h 
1990). Accordingly, the present motion must be denied, because it is apparent -*. *. ,: . • ;, 
h , '„•;• "*. ' ? mi under the facts alleged. Educators, at 1030. 
A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief shall contain (1) a short and plain 
statement of !.:e .... .. -: ... •' • ' . . -..HJLT^V •';.'*••<••" v! ^ >.'.T n.i.'^ r 
judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled. U.R.C.P. 8(a). Each averment in a 
pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. ( \ •-c fundamental pun* ;;c .u 
plciuliiij; rules is lo ;il'fonl parties the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate contentions they 
have pertaining to their dispute, subject only to the requirement that their adversaries have fair 
notice of the nati a e ai id basis oi ground s of the claim and :i genei 'al indication of the t) pe of 
litigation that is involved. Williams v. State Farm Ins. Gx, 656 P.2d966, 971 (Utah 1982). It is 
highly proper for the Plaintiffs to make allegations based on It leii infon nation and beliefs. 
Plaintiffs clearly allege facts sufficient to prevail at trial and surely sufficient to prevail 
under this Motion. Accepting the factual allegations in the complaint as true, the court can draw 
fi om tl lose facts that the defendants k i lew tl lat the) did not have a legitimate counter-claim and 
falsely presented it. During the two different depositions where Defendant Peter Gendron 
testified, 1 lemade tl ic exact sai i :ie $500,000 eoi inter clain I against t1 * o different defendants. It 
follows that in at least one of these instances he was lying. Plaintiffs assert that defendants did 
not prosecute said counter-claims to try and secure a proper;... • .. ,.. . -.,. 
rather asserted it to delay, discourage and intimidate plaintiff from pursuing his legitimate claim. 
If the defendants have a legitimate conclusive objection to an allegation, then they may assert 
ili.il ilu III(H ili^ t u\ ci\, (tii «i Miiimiiiry judgment motion or at tnal. 
1. OUTCOME OF PUTTUCKI QUALIFIES AS FAVORABLE TERMINATION 
Wrongful use of nvil pmeealiii;/,1! iscuuslilnkd h. uvliluliny m m tinlaiiinig tn'd 
proceedings for an improper purpose and without a justifiable basis. Gilbert v. Ince, 981 P.2d 
841, 845 (Utah 1999). The Utah Court of Appeals has more clearly stated the elements of the tort 
are when (a) a litigant acts without probable cause, and primarily for a purpose other ..:•:;; <f 
s'.Tuiin ,^ llic proper adjudicnlion ^fthe claim in which the proceedings are based, and (b) except 
when they are ex parte, the proceedings have terminated in favor of the person against whom 
they are brought. Hati\ '"? r, I h i v t \ , \\iLV Ul 774 " /(»(I Kali App Jnu-I ) (n'liny iUlbvrt, .it 84Y 
and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 674 (1997)). 
Probable cause in the context of civil litigation is define,;.. ^-;. . .. . iVesanac 
\VAV\ in Iho initi.'itiun, nnifnniiitini] or procurement of civil proceedings against another has 
probable cause for doing so if the litigant reasonably believes in the existence of the facts 
upon which ill \ iiiiiini is based and * . -, flu: it i n idei those facts the 
claim may be valid under the applicable Jaw. <ki!*crt, at 845-46 (quoting Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 675 (1997)) 
I o testify under oath, asserting substantially the same counter-claim, against two 
different parties in two different lawsuits is to act without probable cause. Likewise, it suggests 
tl \i t..t tl le litigant defendants perp ired themselves prii narily for tl le purpose of intimidating the 
plaintiffs. This is not an approach to proper adjudication of the claim. In the defendants' motion, 
they claim I hat the pluni'ilt"-; do runt Iia\ c
 ti rl m Inr i\mnj'lul MM ol < \\ il proceedings because 
the outcome of the prior case, Puttuck I, did not terminate favorably for the plaintiffs. 
Clearly, a settlement in favor o I Mr IJu((in k \u ,i IIJSOI.IIIIL Miitcoinc '' heir tli i 
Defefidaiits indivi< lually paid $29,000 to Mr. Puttuck, and their insurance company, State Farm, 
paid another $50,000. More importantly, the defendants' false counter-claim was dismissed 
wilhoul < onipu'silion. 
2. \ CIVIIL RIGHT OF ACTION FOR PERJURY DOES EXIST 
T!• '; * " ;^:v ' aiat there is no civil right of action for perjury or an obstruction of 
jus t ice claim. However , the Utah legislature has recently modified the cr iminal statute to include 
perjury committed in the civil context . 
A person is guilty of tamper ing wi th evidence if, bel ieving that an official proceeding 
or investigation is pending or about to be instituted, or wi th the intent to prevent and 
official proceeding or invest igat ion or to prevent the product ion of any thing or i tem 
which reasonably would b e anticipated to be evidence in the official p roceeding or 
investigation, the person knowing ly or intentionally., .(b) makes , presents , or uses 
anything or i tem which the person knows to be false wi th the purpose of deceiving a 
publ ic servant or any other par ty w h o is or may be engaged in the proceeding or 
investigation. A n official p roceeding includes any civil or administrat ive action, tiial, 
examinat ion under oath [deposi t ions] , administrative proceeding, or o ther civil or 
administrative adjudicative process . U.C.A. § 76-8-510.5 (2007). 
Whi le this is a criminal statute, c o m m o n law and the Utah State Consti tut ion also provide 
redress for si ich t> pes of actn it;; r The I Jtah State Constitution provides: 
Al l courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to h im in his person, 
proper ty or reputation, shall have r emedy by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary delay. Utah Const. Art, I, Sec. 11 . 
Further, Parties to a silit, subject to all valid claims and defenses, are constitutionally 
entitled to litigate any jus t ic iable c< nf < crsv ; , „ : v ^ n i-i.m. i.;.. t \ •_ t\ i.- ^ 4 
P U\ ()(»3, 43K (I Jtah 2002) . W h i l e open courts provision of the State Consti tut ion may not 
guarantee any specific remedy, it certainly guarantees access to the courts,, J tJJs w Slubbs, 9 /() 
P.2d 1234(1 It;: il i 1/998) 
Plaintiff alleges that Mr . Gendron presented tes t imony in his deposi t ions that he knew to 
be false. I liscountei clain is * ere not legitimate, bi it oi ily ai 1 atte i l ipt to intin lidate ai id injure Mr. 
Puttuck. His deposit ions qualify as and examination under oath and as proceedings in a civil 
action. Thus, whi le plaintiffs certainly have a criminal right of action for pe rjui j " and obsti i iction 
of justice against the defendants, common law and the Utah Constitution also provide for redress 
of si ich contei i lptible condi ict. 
3. FACTS ALLEGED SUPPORT A CIVIL CONSPIRACY CLAIM 
The facts that Plaii itiffs have set foi th in their Complaint are sufficient foi the coi :n t to 
find and accept that the elements for civil conspiracy have been met. To prove civil conspiracy, 
five elements must be shown: " ( 0 a combination of two or more person?. ( J ) an OLJULI . 
accomp lished, (3) a meeting of the minds on the object or course of action, (4) one ui inuic 
unlawful, overt acts, and (5) damages as a proximate result thereof." Peterson v. Delta Airlines, 
. •: . * . * * * .1 iat allegations in the 
complaint as true and consider all reasonable inferences tn he di i\\ :i from those facts in a light 
most favorable to the plaintiff. Prows, at 766. 
Defendants also wrongly assume in their memorandum that the "proponent must present 
clear and convincing evidence to carry his burden or proof on a civil charge of conspiracy." 
\\ hile tl lis maj be ti ue at the trial level, it« ««.:« • the pleading stage. The complaint 
need only set out a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief and that the pleading be simple, concise and direct I J R ,C.I "'. 8(a) Defendants erroneoi isly 
cite to Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co,y 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982), claiming that "the 
surrounding facts must be set fbrtl 1 w ith sufficient pai ticulai it> to si ic>\\ v /hat facts at e clain led to 
constitute such charges." Williams is a case about pleading fraud and not one of civil conspiracy. 
While it is true that when pleading fraud the facts must be set forth v uii ufficient particularity 
under 1 J.R.C.P. 9, Defendants have 1 lot si lown this rule applies when pleading civil conspiracy. 
Defendant Peter Gendron had the opportunity to review and correct his first deposition. 
He made no coi rections. Ii 1 his ck: position, he said, fa 3 v.»- .' ^ - ,• p r •• -.? ; the dollar 
amount of the counter-claim. He made an exact assertion > A h^ \\\>: dof u : mount was, not an 
estimation. The plaintiffs allege a charge for civil conspiracy ha .nisr LVfcndant William 
Ciemlii mi was pn sent at Peter's deposition in Puttuck I and heard when Peter testified about the 
$500,000. When Peter Gendron testified this same $500,000 was attributable to r, ... • .. c .:..• 
Chads, lie used ihe le;Jimuriv n William GcmlimVs behalf, as a defendant, at the Chads trial. 
Clearly, William Gendron knew of the false testimony and ratified it by allowing it to be used in 
his defense in the Charis trial. 
It should be for * a a < * decide whether or not William ratified Peter's testimony by 
being present at the deposition, hearing the false testimony, and not doing anything ab< n l il. If 
Willi.nn Gendmn, wns M all huu-s dining these proceedings, a director and stockholder of LRG 
then he should be responsible for the actions taken by his company and its officers. Plaintifls will 
need more information lo hilly dc\ dup their claim, "\ Inch is why discovci y should be allowed, 
but they have plead sufficient facts to meet the elements of civil conspiracy. 
LAINTIFF'S ABUSI<: OF VMM 'F.NN ('LAIM Al ,1 VXIKS SUFFICIENT FM .'TS 
Plaintiffs have stated facts necessary to afford the defendants fair notice of the nature and 
basis of their claim. "Parties are entitled to notice of the issues raised and an opportunity to meet 
i«'ii (liis is ai ntiiiplr.hf d, lli.il is all that is required." Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 
: I • 11963); See also Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 667 (Utah 1985). The elements of 
an . - , .. oi'pivtvss '. Li i m .ir I I I ;III ullnirr n in live; and ( 2) a willful act in use of the process 
not properly in the regular conduct of the proceedings. Hatch v. Davis, 102 P.3d 774, 782 (Utah 
App. 2004). 
Plaintiffs have alleged in their Compliant that Peter Gendron lied under oath. Certainly it 
is not proper in any proceeding to lie under oath. The defendants' ulterior motive was to 
iulnnidate (In1 Plaintiff-.; wjfh a hryv counter-claim and Ux y.\ die lawsuit to go away. The 
defendants' willful act was using their coiinter-claim to charge Puttuck with cost overruns 
m 
relating to Hale and vice versa, The counter-cl " . . • .-... / • - . - - ^ ' ^ ' '^ • ^ -• '• '«-
a ? t S v mse there was no basis for the claim except to intimidate and harass and moreover 
it was knowingly false. If the Court sees fit plaintiffs will amend their Complaint In supply more 
fuels hut dn believe the) have eerfaiiily alleged enough facts to place defendants on notice of the 
claims against them. 
II, ! • , I'ATUTE • > '-'.-. * *> • • -: ' VTIFF^ il i ,AIMS 
Plaintiffs' claims are not barred by the statute of limitations. While there is no specific 
mention of the Plaintiffs' causes of action in the Utah Code, these; actions are encompassed by 
Hie definition i if Hie l vafeli IT1 provision of § 78-12-25(3), which states: "An action may be 
brought within four years: (3) for relief not otherwise provided by law." U.C.A. § "/X-12- 1S( \) 
|?(i()7 . • »n '""••••••*• :,.:: • • f the le.bi event necessary to 
complete the cause of action." Berenda v. langford, l< \ 4 e 2d 4 x 50 (I Mah 1996) (citing Myers 
v. McDonald, <>*S P.AI S I, ttu (Utah KM I). 
Plaintiffs argue that the last event necessary to complete the their causes of action was 
when Defendant Peter Gendron gave his deposit! . : c ,*, , ; . \ ; . .. ;: *\
 ti,. ,, ->.,;n ^, 
^ known that Mr. Gendron lied and gave perjured testimony. 
The plaintiffs had no evidence, and could not have had evidence, of the falsity of his earlier 
testimony mini diirt iL/aaitl di position 11 w.is < ulamilv iml rippdienl in June of 2000 as the 
defendants claim. It would be nearly impossible for Plaintiffs5 to know that Mr. Gendron had 
lied, had he not given nearly identical testimony in (he two ilillnnuf ejuses I lie plaintiffs did nut 
know the counter-claim against Hale was the exact same counter-claim that was filed against 
Puttuck until Mr. Gendron's depositioiI in November of 2003, one year AW, ; . 
c!)s • . " . . ' ': *' ••• 5 . iffs could have had a cause of action was November 5, 2003, 
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and their complaint was filed March 12, 2007 thus leaving them well within the statue of 
limitations of four years. 
Plaintiffs also argue that it was really at the Charis trial in June 2006 that they should 
have known about their cause of action against the Defendants. It was at this time that Plaintiffs 
knew he was lying because the earlier Puttuck I counter-claim deposition testimony that was 
nearly identical to Charis was addressed on cross-examination. Before this trail cross-exam all 
the Plaintiffs knew was that Peter Gendron had testified falsely at some point. At trial the Peter 
Gendron held to his November 2003 testimony, thus necessarily proving his counter-claim 
against the plaintiff in Puttuck I to be false. Under this argument, plaintiffs did not know, and 
could not have known of the perjury until June 2006, leaving them again, well within the four-
year statute of limitations. 
E. CONCLUSION 
"While the pleadings are valuable for assuring that the issues to be tried are clearly 
framed.. .they must also be looked to in light of their even more fundamental purpose of 
liberalizing both pleading and procedure to the end that the parties are afforded the privilege of 
presenting whatever legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their dispute" Jones, Waldo 
Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1996). What parties are entitled to is 
notice of the issues raised and an opportunity to meet them. When this is accomplished, that is all 
that is required. Id. 
Plaintiffs urge the court to DENY Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. The Motion should be 
defeated because of the movants' fatal error, alleging plaintiffs should have know about their 
claims at the first deposition of Peter Gendron. Also, the defendants' case law authorities are 
inapplicable in the pleading stage where Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to state a claim 
for their causes of action. Plaintiffs believe that the defendants filed the exact same false 
12 
counter-claim against two separate parties, perjured themselves under oath, conspired to commit 
these acts and abused the civil process. It is highly proper for the Plaintiff to make allegations 
based on his information and belief. Accepting the factual allegations in the complaint as true, 
the court can draw from those facts that plaintiffs have presented enough evidence that the court 
must deny this motion and allow the lawsuit to proceed with discovery and toward finality. 
Further, the statue of limitations does not bar the plaintiffs' claims because the last event 
necessary to complete their cause of action occurred on November 3,2004 or alternately in the 
June 2006 trial. Plaintiffs' complaint was filed on Mar 12,2007, leaving them well within four 
years required by the statue of limitations under either scenario. 
PLAINTIFFS REQUEST TO AMEND COMPLAINT if the Court finds the need for 
more information regarding the claims asserted. 
Dated this Q day of June, 2007 
GORY & SWAPP, P.L.L.C 
F. Fay, Esq. 
llney for Plaintiffs 
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I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed via first-class U.S. mail, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document on this the 0_ day of June, 2007 to the following: 
SCOTT C. WELLING 
2064 Prospector Ave. Suite 203 
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SCOTT C. WELLING, 3420 
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P.O. Box 680715 
Park City, Utah 84068-0715 
Telephone: (435) 649-8406 
Facsimile: (435) 649-8412 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL PUTTUCK, an individual and 
PAUL PUTTUCK dba, BREAK-
THROUGH CONSTRUCTION, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PETER GENDRON, WILLIAM 
GENDRON, and Does 1 thru 5, inclusive, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS' REPLY 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO DISMISS 
Civil No. 07-0500114 
Judge: Bruce Lubeck 
Defendants, by and through counsel, submit the following memorandum of points and 
authorities in reply to Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss ("Memorandum in Opposition"). 
UNCONTESTED FACTS 
1. Plaintiff Puttuck served as general contractor on the subject project from March 
1998 until December 1998. See: Memorandum in Opposition, Statement of Additional Facts, f 
1. 
2. The complaint in Puttuck I was filed on or about February 24, 1999. See: 
Memorandum in Opposition, Statement of Facts, f 8 . 
3. The counterclaim in Hale, et ai v. Peter Gendron et al, Third District Court for 
Summit County Civil No. 02-0500739 ("Hale v. LRG") that plaintiffs claim alerted them to 
defendants' duplicity, was filed on or about February 27, 2003, also by LRG, Inc. 
4. The counterclaim in Puttuck I that plaintiffs complain of was filed on or about 
October 21, 1999, by LRG, Inc. The individual defendants in Puttuck I and Hale v. LRG did not 
file counterclaims in either of those actions. 
5. LRG, Inc. is not named as a party defendant in the present action. 
6. On February 23, 2000, Peter Gendron testified at deposition in Puttuck I that the 
basis for the $500,000 counterclaim asserted by LRG, Inc. was derived by subtracting the 
contract price for which Mr. Puttuck agreed to complete the project ($198,000) from 
construction costs incurred during his tenure as general contractor on the project ($700,000). 
See: Memorandum in Opposition, Statement of Additional Facts, % 5. 
7. Peter Gendron also stated in his deposition in Puttuck I that the time period for the 
measurement of the counterclaim damages against Paul Puttuck was from the inception of his 
services as general contractor in March 1998, up until the February 23, 2000 deposition. See: 
Memorandum in Opposition, Statement of Additional Facts, |^ 6.1 
8. General contractor John Hale, successor to Paul Puttuck, was hired on January 7, 
1999, and agreed to complete the project from that point on for a cost of $95,000. Peter Gendron 
testified at deposition that the $500,000 counterclaim in Hale v. LRG was derived by subtracting 
Hale's completion price from the $600,000 in costs incurred during Hale's tenure. See: 
Memorandum in Opposition, Statement of Additional Facts, f 9. 
The log home project was not completed for issuance of a certificate of occupancy until August 2000. 
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ARGUMENT 
In responding to the points raised by the Memorandum in Opposition, the section 
headings therein are reiterated below. 
"A. Movant's Fatal Error,55 
The essence of plaintiffs' claims in the present action ("Puttuck II") is that the $500,000 
damage counterclaim asserted against the general contractor in the separate lawsuit of Hale v. 
LRG, had previously been raised in the counterclaim against plaintiffs in Puttuck I, despite 
defendants' knowledge that mismanagement by contractor Hale caused those damages, not 
Puttuck. Explicit in plaintiffs' liability theory is that the total loss allegedly incurred on the log 
home project from mismanagement by all general contractors did not exceed $500,000. 
Plaintiffs in Puttuck II claim that this attribution of damages is a misuse of the legal system and 
is based on false declarations. 
Although the damages amounts in the respective counterclaims against Puttuck and Hale 
are both $500,000, it is evident on the face of plaintiffs' complaint, as well as the deposition 
testimony plaintiffs have now introduced to support that pleading, that those losses were distinct 
from one another, having occurred during different time periods, under different contractors, 
having been calculated by reference to separate cost overruns. 
In Puttuck I, Peter Gendron's deposition testimony explaining how the counterclaim 
against Puttuck was calculated could have only encompassed the period from March 1998 to 
February 2000 when he testified at that deposition. It is undisputed that the basis for the 
$500,000 counterclaim asserted against Puttuck's successor, John Hale, occurred after January 7, 
1999, when Hale took over as general contractor. This was identified as a separate loss by Peter 
Gendron in his subsequent deposition testimony on November 3, 2003, in Hale v. LRG, i.e., that 
3 
$600,000 in costs were incurred during Hale's subsequent tenure when he was under contract to 
bring the project in for $95,000, hence the additional half million dollars in cost overruns due to 
Hale's breach of contract. See: Memorandum in Opposition, Statement of Additional Facts, % 9, 
10. 
In an implausible perspective on the relevant time periods and events, however, plaintiffs 
feign lack of knowledge of defendants' duplicity until Gendron's deposition testimony in 
November, 2003 in Hale v. LRG, Notwithstanding Gendron's deposition testimony in Puttuck I 
that the damages from Puttuck's mismanagement were a continuing injury, plaintiffs declare in 
their Memorandum in Opposition: "Plaintiffs could not have known that he was lying at this 
time." See: Id. at 3, f 1. Regardless, plaintiffs resolutely denied the counterclaim in Puttuck I 
and thereafter purportedly paid Mr. Fay a considerable amount to defend against it. See: 
Plaintiffs' Answer to Defendants' Counterclaim, attached as Exhibit "A", f<[ 
4,5,6,8,9,10,13,14,15,18,19,20,23,24,25,28,29 and 30. 
It is quite clear then, that plaintiffs believed that counterclaim lacked probable cause 
when first they saw it. It was certainly within plaintiffs' during the course of Puttuck I to 
discover whether the allegations of the counterclaim were completely groundless to support such 
improper litigation claims as are now raised in Puttuck II, but they chose to settle the case in 
June 2000 without pursuing defendants' purported abuse of the legal system. 
Arguably, by declaring they did not have the "slightest inkling" that LRG had 
misrepresented which contractor was responsible for the cost overruns until Gendron's testimony 
three and a half years later in Hale v. LRG, plaintiffs acknowledge that LRG did have probable 
cause for its mismanagement counterclaim in Puttuck I when it was filed. See: Memorandum in 
Opposition at 3, 1 2. If so, the entire foundation of plaintiffs' present lawsuit is eviscerated, 
4 
beyond rejuvenation by any amendment of their charging allegations, and should be dismissed 
outright. 
"B. Defendants" Case Law Authorities Are Inapplicable/9 
It is true that several of the cases cited in defendants' Memorandum in Support to 
Dismiss ("Memorandum in Support") were appeals from summary judgment rulings below. 
However, plaintiffs' focus on the difference between the standards for evaluating a motion for 
summary judgment and a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is irrelevant, as those cases were 
cited for the law pertaining to defendants' various causes of action, to wit: Oprian v. Goldrich 
(settlement of a lawsuit does not qualify as a favorable termination for malicious prosecution 
purposes); Winter v. Northwest Pipeline Corp. (civil claims for perjury and obstruction of justice 
not recognized by Utah law); Lackner v. LaCroix (termination of lawsuit other than on the merits 
not a favorable termination for malicious prosecution purposes); Broadbent v. Board of Ed. (no 
private action for obstruction of justice and perjury in Utah); Nicholson v. Lucas (probable cause 
necessary to support allegations of complaint); Bell v. Bell (explanation of concepts underlying 
abuse of process claim); Berenda v. Langford (statute of limitations period commences upon 
occurrence of last event necessary to constitute claim). 
Thus, plaintiffs' argument that the cases cited in the Memorandum in Support as being 
"wholly inapplicable to defendants' Motion to Dismiss" is specious, apparently advanced for the 
sole purpose of diverting the Court's attention from the principles enunciated in those cases. 
Likewise misleading is the objection to other precedent cited in the Memorandum in 
Support that the standard of proof in cases that are tried is different from those decided on a 
motion to dismiss. That precedent was also cited for the legal principles enunciated, to wit: 
Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon (statement of elements of claim for civil conspiracy); Sheldon 
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Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker (qualification of definition of probable cause); US. v. Medina 
Estrada (statement of elements of criminal perjury); U.S. v. Ellis (incorrect approximation of a 
material fact not perjury); Hatch v. Davis and Kool v. Lee (discussion of elements of abuse of 
process claim); Templeton Feed & Grain v. Ralston-Purina Co. (example of overt act not 
integral to proceeding to support abuse of process claim). 
Finally, plaintiffs assert that defendants' alter ego argument is not dispositive of the issue 
of personal liability without further proof. However, as it became manifest repeatedly in the 
various lawsuits filed against Peter Gendron and William Gendron by plaintiffs' counsel, Mr. 
Fay, including Puttuck I and Hale v. Gendron, it is uncontroverted that LRG, Inc., was an active 
corporation at all material times in Puttuck I. Not only does the finding of that fact in Hale v. 
Gendron constitute res judicata as to the issue of defendants' status as officers or directors of a 
corporate entity, it is most disingenuous that the matter is being contested in the present action. 
"C. Plaintiffs Plead Sufficient Facts to State a Claim." 
Notwithstanding plaintiffs' dissertation on the concept of notice pleading and the criteria 
for determining a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), plaintiffs are still obliged to allege facts 
sufficient to satisfy the elements of the various causes of action they assert. The elements of 
wrongful use of civil proceedings, abuse of process and civil conspiracy are well defined by 
Utah's common law. If facts supporting each of the components of those claims are not set out 
in plaintiffs' complaint, there is no prima facie statement of those claims to which defendants 
need respond. If not forthcoming, those causes must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. 
"1. Outcome of Puttuck I Qualifies as a Favorable Termination." 
In their Memorandum in Support, defendants cite to the well-established precedent that 
the termination of a lawsuit for reasons other than on the merits, including by settlement, does 
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not qualify as a favorable outcome to support a claim for wrongful use of civil proceedings. As 
plaintiffs do not take issue with that legal principle, nor challenge the authority cited by 
defendants, but merely reiterate that Puttuck I was settled, it must be presumed that plaintiffs 
concede that the First Cause of Action cannot withstand defendants' Motion to Dismiss under 
any facts that can be alleged. 
"2. A Civil Right of Action for Perjury Does Exist." 
Utah's appellate courts have repeatedly said that there is no private right of action for 
perjury or obstruction of justice. See: Memorandum in Support at 5 § LB. Plaintiffs' reading of 
the recently enacted criminal statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-8-510.5, is well off the mark in 
challenging that position. That statute addresses the crime of tampering with evidence, not false 
statement under oath, and merely specifies the various types of official proceedings in which the 
tampering crime may be committed. In no possible stretch of construction could this statute be 
taken as the affirmative act of the Utah state legislature to create a private cause of action for 
perjury or obstruction of justice that Utah's courts have deemed essential to recognizing such 
claims in civil litigation. See: Memorandum in Support, at 6 § LB. 
"3. Facts Alleged Support a Civii Conspiracy Claim." 
While plaintiffs recite the elements of civil conspiracy, they do not respond to 
defendants' critique that the Fifth Cause of Action does not allege that defendants knew that a 
subsequent contractor was truly responsible for the project mismanagement damages. Nor do 
plaintiffs explain the absence of any factual allegation that there was a meeting of the minds 
between Peter Gendron and William Gendron prior to the filing of the purportedly false 
counterclaim or the purportedly false deposition testimony. Plaintiffs merely reiterate that 
William Gendron "ratified" those overt acts by failing to repudiate them at a subsequent time. 
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Ratification is diametrically opposed to the concept of conspiracy, which is the formulation of an 
objective between two or more persons precedent to the act of carrying out the conspiracy plan. 
Here, plaintiffs connect William Gendron with a conspiracy only by his acts or omissions 
following the commission of the unlawful, overt act of false testimony by Peter Gendron. That is 
not a conspiracy under Utah law unless the "[subsequent acts...clearly indicate the prior 
collusive combination..."Dill v. Rader, 583 P.2d 496, 499 (1978 OK), cited in Israel Pagan 
Estate v. Cannon, 1989 UT App. 57, 746 P.2d 785, footnote 9 (emphasis added). On the face of 
plaintiffs' pleading of the Fifth Cause there is no allegation of prior collusion by William or 
Peter Gendron. For that failure alone the Fifth Cause must be dismissed. 
Another glaring problem: Plaintiffs' attempt to connect William Gendron with any 
conspiracy is undermined by the fact that Mr. Gendron was never named as a party defendant in 
Puttuck I. It is uncontroverted that the purported false $500,000 counterclaim in Puttuck I was 
filed and prosecuted by LRG, Inc. See: Answer and Counterclaim of Defendant LRG, Inc., 
pertinent portions attached as Exhibit "B". Therefore, plaintiffs' conspiracy claim must 
necessarily include that corporation, but LRG, Inc. is not named as a party defendant herein, an 
omission which should be fatal to plaintiffs' conspiracy claim.2 
"4. Plaintiffs9 Abuse of Process Claim Alleges Sufficient Facts." 
Plaintiffs urge that defendants abused the litigation privilege by the overt acts of filing a 
false counterclaim and giving false testimony about the basis for that counterclaim, for the 
improper purpose of intimidating plaintiffs and forcing them to incur substantial attorney fees, in 
order to dissuade them from prosecuting their legitimate claims in Puttuck I. This argument, 
however, misses the essence of an abuse of process claim, which is the use of the legal system to 
2
 This omission is propitious, avoiding the insolvable problem of prosecuting an action for conspiracy where the 
overt acts were committed by a corporation through its officers and directors. That is one conspirator, where is the 
other? 
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compel the other party to act or refrain from acting in a matter external to the lawsuit itself. 
McLaren v. Bolden, 2003 CA App. Dist. 2 | 50; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 682, cmt. b 
(1977). 
There is no abuse of process where an action is filed to intimidate and embarrass the 
defendant, knowing there is no entitlement to recover the full amount of damages sought. If the 
process is nonetheless used for the purpose for which it is intended (prosecution of a 
counterclaim for project mismanagement), there is no action for abuse of process. Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, supra. Defendants' attempt to frustrate or diffuse plaintiffs' ability to pursue 
legitimate claims in a lawsuit by means a groundless counterclaim and false deposition testimony 
are matters properly redressed in the context of the Puttuck I litigation itself, through the powers 
of the court to impose sanctions, award attorney fees, dismiss or limit the counterclaim, or any 
other variety of remedies. The improper litigation tactics ascribed to defendants were integral to 
the Puttuck I lawsuit itself and therefore, are not cognizable as acts "not proper in the regular 
prosecution of the proceedings" to satisfy the 2nd element of abuse of process. Hatch v. Davis, 
2004 UT App 375,102 P.3d 774, fflI35,36. 
"D. Statute of Limitations Does Not Bar Plaintiffs5 Claims." 
For the same reasons stated in the preceding section, it is quite clear that plaintiffs 
believed ("knew") the $500,000 counterclaim in Puttuck I was without merit at the time it was 
filed on October 21, 1999 and certainly not later than Peter Gendron's deposition testimony on 
February 23, 2000. Even that latest date still puts the filing of Puttuck II years beyond the four-
year statute of limitations which is applicable to all five causes of action asserted therein. 
Plaintiffs have offered no plausible excuse for not bringing this action within the limitation 
period, and are inescapably barred from seeking redress for any of those claims. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is manifest that plaintiffs wish to have it both ways in excusing their failure to address 
defendants' purported wrongdoing in Puttuck I: claiming complete lack of knowledge of 
defendants' dishonesty, all the while denying responsibility for defendants' losses in any regard, 
a legal position ultimately vindicated by their favorable settlement of the case. This outcome 
belies plaintiffs' claim of ignorance of defendants' false accusations. 
As plaintiffs have failed to aver facts or advance argument that would enable them to 
escape the consequences of their failure to set out the elements of those of their claims that are 
recognized in civil law, nor to act upon their grievances prior to the dismissal of Puttuck I or 
within the limitation period thereafter, none of the causes of action in the complaint can survive 
the defenses raised in defendants' Motion to Dismiss. 
DATED this £ ^ d a y of June, 2007. 
Scott C. Welling, Attorney for/ftefendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this T^O^^ day of June, 2007, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss was mailed by U.S. 
mail, first-class postage prepaid, to counsel as follows: 
John F. Fay, Esq. 
GREGORY & SWAPP 
2975 W. Executive Pkwy., Ste. 300 
Lehi, UT 84043 
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EXHIBIT A 
JOHN F. FAY, Esq. USB No. 5691 
Legal Counsel 
P.O. Box 68-1454 
Park City, UT 84068-1454 
T,l, 435.658.244. Q R 1 G I N A L 
Counsel for Plaintiffs 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY - STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL PUTTUCK, an individual and 
PAUL PUTTUCK dba, BREAKTHROUGH 
CONSTRUCTION, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PETER GENDRON, LRG, Inc., GENDRON, 
LIM & COMPANY, and KENNETH 
McINTOSH, and Does 1 thru 20, inclusive, 
Defendants. ] 
) PLAINTIFFS' ANSWER TO DEFENDANTS' 
) COUNTER CLAIM. 
) Civil No.: 99-0600212 
) JUDGE: PAT BRIAN 
COMES NOW PLAINTIFFS/ COUNTER CLAIM DEFENDANTS and answer Defendants' 
counter claim as follows: 
1- Based upon Plaintiffs information and beliefs, Plaintiffs admit to the allegations under 
Point 1. 
2- Plaintiffs admit to the allegations under Points 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, & 7. 
3- The allegations under Point 8, are unintelii5ible and thus, Plaintiffs would need to speculate 
as to their meaning and accordingly, based upon such confusion must deny these allegations 
4- Plaintiffs deny the allegations of Point 9 in that he/it did not breach the agreement between 
the parties. 
5- Plaintiffs deny all of the allegations under Point 10. 
6- As to Point 11, Plaintiffs deny that he/it did not devote sufficient time to supervise the 
construction work. Plaintiffs admit, that on occasion, Puttuck's absence from the job 
unnecessarily delayed construction. On those occasions, however, Puttuck's absence from 
the job site was because he was attending to other duties Jobs and responsibilities under the 
home construction agreement. 
7- As concerns Point 12, Plaintiffs/Counter Claim Defendants incorporate their responses to 
Points 1 through 11 of the counter claim. 
8- Plaintiffs deny they breached their agreement with LRG as alleged under Point 13. 
9- Plaintiffs deny they breached their agreement with LRG as alleged under Point 14 and 
consequently, deny LRG suffered any damages. 
10- Plaintiffs deny they breached their agreement with LRG as alleged under Point 15 and 
consequently, deny LRG is entitled to a judgment in any amount. 
11- As concerns Point 16, Plaintiffs/Counter Claim Defendants incorporate their responses to 
Points 1 through 15 of the counterclaim. 
12- Plaintiffs admit to the allegations of Point 17. 
13- As concerns Point 18, Plaintiffs deny he/it breached the agreement between the parties. 
Plaintiffs deny he/it breached any implied covenants of good faith and fair dealings and thus, 
deny LRG was prevented from realizing the benefits of their bargain. 
14- As concerns Point 19, Plaintiffs deny any breach of good faith and fair dealings and thus, 
deny LRG has been damaged in any amount. 
15- Plaintiffs deny they breached their agreement with LRG as alleged under Point 20 and 
consequently, deny LRG is entitled to a judgment in any amount. 
16- As concerns Point 21, Plaintiffs/Counter Claim Defendants incorporate their responses to 
Points 1 through 20 of the counter claim. 
17- As concerns Point 22, Plaintiffs admit he/it acted as a general contractor on the job when 
Counter Claimants did not interfere with such action. Plaintiff admits that under the law a 
fiduciary relationship with LRG may be found but only if it is also found that LRG was 
Plaintiffs' fiduciary. 
18- Plaintiffs deny he/it failed to meet their duties under the agreement and accordingly, deny 
he/it breached any fiduciary duties as alleged under Point 23. 
19- As concerns Point 24, Plaintiffs deny an) breach of fiduciary duties and thus, deny 
LRG has been damaged in any amount. 
20- Plaintiffs deny they breached any fiduciary duties owed LRG as alleged under Point 25 and 
consequently, deny LRG is entitled to a judgment in any amount. 
21- As concerns Point 26, Plaintiffs/Counter Claim Defendants incorporate their responses to 
Points 1 through 25 of the counter claim. 
22- Plaintiffs admit to the allegations under Point 27. 
23- As concerns Point 28, Plaintiffs deny he/it failed to perform under the terms of their 
agreement with LRG, accordingly, Plaintiffs deny he/it accepted any payments which make 
it unjust for Puttuck to retain the benefits of those payments. 
24- As concerns, Points 29 & 30, Plaintiffs deny an unjust enrichment and thus deny LRG has 
been damaged in any amount. 
25- Plaintiffs deny any unjust enrichment and accordingly deny LRG is entitled to a judgment in 
any amount as alleged under Point 31. 
26- As concerns Point 32, Plaintiffs/Counter Claim Defendants incorporate their responses to 
Points 1 through 30 of the counter claim. 
27- Plaintiffs admit to the allegations of Points 33. 
28- Plaintiffs deny any breach of any duties of due care as alleged under Point 34. 
29- As concerns Point 35, Plaintiffs deny any negligence and thus, deny LRG has been damaged 
in any amount. 
30- Plainti! fs deny any negligence and accordingly, deny LRG is entitled to a judgment in any 
amount as alleged under Point 36. 
A l I I K 1 M A I IN I D i l i L l f N S I S : 
In defense of LRG1 s countei clan i 1, Plaintii fs/C( nu \U T CI; rim D e l endants ass* M 1 th< : t o 11 < ) • " z i n g 
affirmative defenses: 
1 The counter claim fails to state facts sufficient to state any cause of action; 
2 - I ) e 1 e n d a 11.1 s 11 a v < i i a i I e d I < :> 111 i t i g a t e 111 e i r d a i i I a g e s; 
3 i Ml o f D e f e n d a n t s ' c l a i m s arc h a n c d b \ i i ' e n . .a rher b i c a c h o f ilk' ,. MvaniLiu-n contract; 
4 Defendants' beach oi the construction con;... ; 
Defendants under the construction contract; 
5 ! f Defendants suffered any damages, it suffered them due to their/its' own negligence and 
•; n ^-f-heir'its servants, employees, agents and representatives and not. that of Plaintiffs; 
i Defendants suffered ;my damages, it suffered them due :>» die negligence of third parties 
over whkh PLim;flV had no control; 
7 - ; < - > ; • • •• - J ' j 
8 Defendants1 claims are harrcd In their fraud a<d dc- c.i <>! Piainutis under the consliiktioii 
contract; 
9- Defendants' claims are barred by the doctrine of promissory esiopplc: 
10- Defendants* claims are barred by the doctrine of contractual novation: and, 
11- Defei idai its' clain is ai e bai red b> the docti ii le of accoi d am 1 satisfaction. 
PRAYER: 
Plaintiffs/Counter Claim Defendant rva-- :, : M^VI.K: ' e/an^t defendants;Coimn r ( 'ar^antsas 
follows: 
• n.a ( iiunter C l a i m a n t s take noth ing under t he i r c o u n t e r c l a i m ; 
• Il 'hat said counter claim be disn lissed wit:! i pi e judice; 
* That Counter claimants take nothing by way . . >it\ ••*, ;. costs ;iiid/i in I ccs under JUI> I il thiiir 
causes of action under this counter claim; 
I'*T all CTO iter C!a'm Defendants costs and attorney's fees incurred in defending against this 
counter claim; and, 
• :-\>r all other further relief as this court deems legally just and fair. 
U.ilcd: 02, November, 1999 _ _ 
JOHN F. FAY, Esq-
**AJwCon.iitrCto2 
EXHIBIT B 
No.. 
Alexander H. Walker III (5157) 
Attorney at Law 
57 West 200 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1632 
Telephone (801) 363-0100 
Attorney ior hefoniliiniii 
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OCT 2 J S99 
™
nd
««rt0l Court 
»ummtt< 
STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL PUTTUCK, an individual and 
PAUL PUTTUCK dba BREAKTHROUGH 
CONSTRUCTION, 
Plaintifife, 
vs. 
PETER GENDRON, LRG, INC., 
GENDRON LIM & COMPANY, and 
KENNETH B. McINTOSH, and Does 1 
through 20, inclusive. 
Defendants. 
ANSWER AND COUNTER-
CLAIM OF DEFENDANT 
LRG, INC. 
Civil No. 99-0600212 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
Defendants LRG, Inc., Peter Gendron, Gendron Lim & Company and 
Kenneth Mcintosh, by and through their counsel of record, hereby respond and assert 
FHIST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Answering the individual numbered paragraphs of the Complaint for 
damages* Defendants responds as follows: 
1. Answering the allegations ccmtained in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the 
Complaint! Defendants admit the same, 
2, Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph 2 of the 
Complaint, Defendants state that they axe without stiffielent iftformatioii or belief 
regarding the accuracy of these allegations^ and on that basis, denies the same and 
each of them. 
8, Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 3 and each sub-
paragraph thereunder, defendants admit the same with the exception of the last 
semtenea of the third subparagraph. Defendants specifically deny the defendant 
Mcintosh is the authorized agent of defendant Gesndxon and deny that defendant 
Mclntoch sign amy agreement on behalf of defendant Gendron. 
4L Answering the allegations contained in paragraphs 4^  5 and 6 of 
the Complaint^ Defendants state that they are without sufficient inforaiation or 
knowledge to form a basis as to the truth of the allegations contained therein, and on 
that basis* demy the same, and each of them, 
6, Answering the aUegations contained in parai^raph 7 and each sub-
paragraph thereunder, Defendants admit the first two subparagraphs under 
paragnsipli 7. lieiendants deny that any of them breached amy contract or eoomiitted 
any torta to Park City, Summit County, Stata of Utah* Defendants also deny that 
plaintiff has suffered any damages* Defendants id&o deny that defendant Gendrun 
does business in Park City, Summit County* Utah. Defendants adroit the last three 
subparagraphs under paragraph 7, To the extent any allegation in paragraph 7, or 
any subparagraph thereunder, Is not otherwise answered above, defendants deny any 
such nmanBwered allegation-
6, Answering the allegations contained In paragraph 8 of the 
Complaint, Defendants deny that defendants Gondron and defendant Mcintosh 
entered into the agreement Defendant admit that defendant LEG entered into a 
contract with plaintiffs, Pefendantedeny the remaining allegations contained in 
paragraph 8 to the extent they allege terms which are inconsistent with the eon tract 
between LRGt Inc. and plaintiffs* 
7. Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 9 of the 
Complaint* Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraph 9 to the extent 
they allege terras which are inconsistent with the terms of the contract between 
plaintiffs and LEG, Inc. 
8* Answering the allegations contained in paragraphs 10t 11, 12 and 
13 of the Complain^ Defendants deny the same and each of them* 
3 
9* Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 14 of the 
Complaint* Defendants admit that plaintiff filed a lien against the property m 
question. Defendants deny that the statements contained in the lien are true, 
Defendants deny that plain iff has been damuigecl* Defendants admit that pladntiif 
forward notice tfifais lien, With regard to the other allegation contained in paragrmph 
14, defendants state that they are without sufficient information or knowledge to form 
a basis m to the troth of the aUegations contained therein, and on that !basl% deny the 
same, and eacM erf them. 
10. Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 15 of the 
Complaint, Defendants admit the same* 
11* Answering the attegatlens contained in paragraph 16 of the 
Complaint^ Defendants state that they are without sufficient information or knowledge 
to form a basis m to the truth of the allegations contained therein, and on that basis, 
deny the samef and each of them* 
12, Answering the aEegatlons contained in paragraph If of the 
Complaint* Defendants deny the same^ and each of them* 
18 Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 18 of the 
Complaint^ Defendants reincorporate their responses to the allegations contained In 
paragraphs 1 through 17 of the Complaint 
4 
14. Answering the aiegations contained in paragraphs 19 through 24 
of the Ckimplalut, Defendants deny the same, and each of them, 
15. Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 25 of the 
Complaint* Defendants relacorporate their responses to the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 1 through 17 of the Complaint. 
16. Answering the allegations contained in paragraphs 26 through SO 
of the Complaint, Defeadaats deny the same* and each of them* 
17* With regard to the prayer for relief* Defendants demy that plaintiffs 
are entitled to the relief sought therein. 
18 Defendants deny any allegations contained in the Complaint to 
which no response was made above, 
SECOND APFIBMATJ1VE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs have failed to mitigate their damages, 
THIED AFFIRMATTVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs daims are barred by their own breach of contract and/or tortious 
conduct 
A A*} 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Any damages plaintiffs have sustained are the result of the actions of 
third partlee over which Defendants have no control. Accordingly, plaintiffs are not 
entitled to recover their damages, if any, from Defendants. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Any damages plaintiffs have sustained are the result of plaintiffs' 
conduct Accordingly, plaintiffs are not entitled to recover their damages, if any, from 
Defendants. 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' claims for damages are barred by the doctrine of unclean 
hands. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant LRG prays that plaintiffs take nothing under 
their Complaint and that Defendants be awarded their costs and reasonable attorneys 
fees in connection with defending this matter. 
COUNTERCLAIM 
For its causes of action against plaintiffs, Defendant LRG, Inc. alleges as 
follows: 
1* LRG, Inc. is a Washington corporation with places of business in 
California and Arizona. 
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2, Based upon information and belief, LRCJ alleges that Paul Pattaek 
is an iadiv.idu.al residing in Summit County, State of Utah* and is engaged in the 
contraction business tinder the name Breakthrough Construction, 
3. On or about March 18, 1998, Puttuck entered into an agreement 
with LEG in coimedtion with the contraction of a home located at 3758 Sunridge 
Drive, Park City, Utah* Pnrsnant to the terms of the agreement between the parties, 
Puttuck agreed to provide general contractor services in connection with the 
contraction of the home in question, 
4* Pursuant to the terms of the aontmct^ Piittuck was obligated to 
fully execute the work described in the contract Puttuck also accepted the 
relationship of trust and confidence established by the agreement between the parties 
and agreed to cooperate with the engineer on the construction of the home and exercise 
his skill and judgment in furthering the interests of LRG, 
5* Pursuant to the terms of the agreement* Puttuck also agreed to 
furnish sufficient business administration and supervision of the construction of the 
home in question, agreed to furnish at all times an adequate supply of workers and 
materials on the contraction of the home* and to perform the work on the construction 
of the home in an expeditious and economical manner consistent with LRG's interests. 
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6. Also pursuant to the terms of the contract between the parties, 
Pntteck agreed to siitetamtially complete the entire work on the constradion of the 
home no later than June 15,1998, 
7% Under the terms of the agreement between the parties, the parties 
agreed thai Putttick would be entitled to a craitiactor% fee equal to the sum of a $1,500 
starting bonus, plus 10% of all sttb-cxmtract amounts on Hie home in question during 
the time Puttack acted as general contractor, plus $85 per hour for all honrs Pnttmck 
actually worked on the home, plus a $2*000 payment when the home was finished on 
time* Pnrsnant to the terms of the agreement, Pnttuck agreed that the entire fee to 
which he was due would not exceed $198,000. 
8* A1BO» pursuant to the teens of the agreement, Pnttnck agreed that 
all costs inclined by URGr which would canse 10% of all of the subcontract amounts on 
the eoiiBtnietioii of the home in qnestfon to exceed $198,000 would be paid by Pnttnck 
0. After the parties entered into the agreement regarding the 
construction of the home in question, Puttuek breached that agreement Pnttuck*s 
breaches of the agreement between the parties-include, but are not limited to the 
following i^nmstances: 
a, Ftittuck did not folly eremite the work described in the 
agreement between the parties* 
8 
b. Puttodk did not cooperate with the engineer on the constniction 
project. 
a Puttaek did not esterase Ms skill and judgment in fttrtheriog 
the interests of LRG in connection with the contraction of the home, 
dL Puttuek failed to provide sufficient business administration 
and supervision of the constanietion project 
e* Puttuck failed to supply an adequate supply of workers and 
materials and failed to perform Ms work in an expeditions and economical manner 
consistent with l#RG*s interests. 
t Pnttack failed to substantially complete the eonatmctipn of the 
home in question on or before June 15,1998* Indeed, the home faun not been completed 
as of the date of this counterclaim* 
g. Ten percent (10%) of ihe costs of the obstruction of the home 
exceed the amount of $198*000 and Puttaek has failed to pay LBG for all applieable 
costs* 
10. Rather than perform hie sendees in a manner consistent with 
LRG's interests in contracting the home, Puttuck often acted in a manner which 
hindered and delayed the construction of the home* For example, Puttuck expended 
an inordinate amount of time and incurred inordinate costs in connection with the 
installation of natural gas regulator in the home. Puttuck unnecessarily and 
9 
wni^ eaBoiitably contested the nqphmamt of governmental inspectors far the installation 
of a particular sized natural gas regulator, Puttuck*s unreasonable position in this 
regard uimeces&arily delayed the contraction of the home* 
1L Further, Puttuck failed to devote sufficient time to superdse the 
construction work and his absence from the project site often delayed the wiMtraction 
of the home* 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Contract) 
12* Etefendaiit URG, Inc. and Coimteitiainiant LEG, Imc* reinoorpoiatas 
the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 11 above as though more ftilfy set 
forth herein. 
IS, Puttuck has breached his agreement with LRG in at least the 
following ways: 
a. Puttuck did not fully a&ecute the work described in the 
agreement between the parties* 
b* Puttuck did not cooperate with the engineer on the construction 
project 
a Puttack did not exercise his skill and judgment in ftirthertag 
the interests of LB6 in connection with the coastriictlon of the home. 
d. Puttuck failed to provide sufficient business administration 
and supervision of the construction project, 
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e» Puttoek failed to supply an adequate supply of workers and 
materials and failed to perform Ms work in an expeditions and economieal maimer 
consistent with LRG's interests* 
t Putfcuck failed to substantially complete the eonstruciiozi of the 
home in question on or before Jwm 15,1S98, Indeed, the home has not been completed 
as of the date of this eoitntercMnL 
g. Ten percent (10%) of the costs of the eonstraetton of the home 
exceed the amount of $198,000 and Puttuek has failed to pay LRO for all applicable 
costs. 
14, As a result of Pnttodk*s breach of contrad^ IMG has been damaged 
in an amount to be proven at trial, butt in an amount not less than approximately 
$500,000. 
15* As a result of Pnttnclfs breach of contract, LRG is entitled to a 
judgment against Puttaek in an amount to be proven at trial, but In an amount not 
less than approximately $500,000, pins LBG*s costs and attorneys fees* pins post 
judgment interest on the entire amount of the judgment at the maximum rate* 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Faii^ Dealing) 
16* Defendant IMG$ Inc. and Coimterelahnant IMBf Inc. reincorporates 
the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 15 above m thongh more fully set 
forth herein, 
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17, At the time LEG and Puttuck entered into their contract, it was 
impliedly understood by both LRG and Puttuek that in order for LEG to perform its 
duties under the terms of the agreement* Puttuck was required to be honest, to act in 
good faith and deal Mrly with LRG and was to eompletely refrain from doing anything 
tihat would prove&t LRG from realizing the benefit of itebai^sin wider the terms of the 
agreement 
18* Puteuek's actions in connection with bis breaches of the agreement 
between the parties constitute a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
implied in all contracts and the breach of that covenant by Puttuck prevented LRG 
from realising the benefits of the contract 
19. As a result of Puttuck*s bread* of the covenant of good feith and fair 
dealing* LRG has been damaged in an amoimt to be proven at trial, but in an amount 
not lees than approximately $500,000, 
20. As a result of Puttuchfs breach of the owenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, LEG is entitled to a judgment against Puttuck in an amount to be proven at 
trial, but in an amount mot less than approximately $500,000^ plus LBG*e costs and 
reasonable attorneys fees, plus post judgment interest at the maximum legal rate on 
the entire amount of the judgment. 
THIRD CAUSE OF A O T 0 N 
(Breach of Fiduciary Duty) 
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21* Defendant LRG, Inc. and Cbiintettiaimant LRG, Inc. reincorporates 
the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 20 abwo as though more Mly get 
forth herein* 
22* Acting as the general contractor for LRG on the c^nstmction of the 
home in question, Puttuck had fMuciaiy duties of care and loyally to LRG in 
connection with his services as the general contractor* 
23* lite delays in the construction of the home caused by Puttuck and 
Putiuck*s failures to meet his duties under the terms of the agreement between the 
parties constitute a breach of PuttucFs fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to LRG* 
24. As a result of Puttuek*s breach of fiduciary duty, LRG has been 
damaged in an amount to be proven at trial* but in an amon&t not less than 
approximately $500,000, 
25. As a result of Puttuck*s breach of his fiduciary duties, LRG is 
entitled to a judgment against Puttuck in an amount to be proven at trial, but in an 
amount noit less than appimimatefy $500,000, plus LRG*s costs and reasonable 
attorneys fees, plus post judgment interest at the maximum legal rate on the entire 
amount of the judgment 
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FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Unjtis t E n richment) 
26* Defendant LfiG, Inc. and Ctorateixiaimant LEG,, Inc. reinairpofatee 
the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 25 above m though more MJy set 
forth herein* 
27. Pursuant to the terms of the agreement between the parties, LRG 
has made payments to Puttuck. 
28* Because Puttuck has failed to perform as agreed punuant to the 
terms of the agreement between the parties, Puttuck accepted payments from LEG 
under eircmmstaiieeB which make it unjust to allow Puttuck to retain the benefit of 
those payments* 
29* As a result of his actions and the payment of LRG* Pnttack has 
been imjmatly enriched in the amount to be proYen at trial. 
30. As a result of Puttackfe unjust enrichment LRG has been damaged 
in an amount to be proven at trial. 
31. As a result of Pnttnckfs tinjutafc enrichment, LRG is entitled to a 
judgment against Puttuek In an amount to be proven at trial, plus LRG*s costs and 
reasonable attorneys fees* plus post judgment interest at the majtimiim legal rate on 
the entire amount of the judgment 
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FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Negligence) 
32. Defendant LRG, Inc. and Connterclaimant LRG, Inc. reincorporates 
the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 31 above as though more fully set 
forth herein. 
33. As the general contractor for the construction of the home in 
question, Puttuck owed LRG general duties of care. 
34. Puttuckte actions in connection with the construction of the home 
constitute a breach of his duty of care to LRG. 
35. As a result of Puttuck*s negligence, LRG has been damaged in an 
amount to be proven at trial, but in an amount not less than approximately $500,000. 
36. As a result of Puttuck's negligence, LRG is entitled to a judgment 
against Puttuck in an amount to be proven at trial, but in an amount not less than 
approximately $500,000, plus LRG's costs and reasonable attorneys fees, plus post 
judgment interest at the maximum legal rate on the entire amount of the judgment 
WHEREFORE, LRG prays for judgment on its counterclaim against 
Puttuck as follows: 
A. On Counterclaimant LRG's First Cause of Action, for judgment 
against Puttuck in an amount to be proven at trial, but in an amount not less than 
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approcdmatefy $500,000, phis LRG*s costs and attorneys feas, pins post judgment 
interest on the entire amount of the judgment at the maximum rate. 
B. On CtounteMsJmant IMJB Second Cause of Action, for a judgment 
against Ftttfatck in an amount to be proven at trial, but in an amount not lass than 
appfcmnmtety $500,000, pins LRG*s costs and reasonable attorneys fees, pins poet 
judgment interest at the masdbtnum legal rate on the entire amount of the judgment 
C. On Ctoimtei^laimant ISO's Third Cause of Action, for a judgment 
against Pottnck in mi amount to be proven at trial, plus LRG's costs, pins poet 
judgment Interest at the maximum legal rate on the entire amount of the judgment 
D. On CfetiBteixlaimant LRG*s Fourth Cause of Actons for a judgment 
against Puttuek in an amount to be proven at trial, but in an amount not less than 
approximately $500,000, plus LEG*s costs and reasonable attorneys fees, pins post 
judgment interest at the maximum legal rate on the entire amount of the judgment 
E. On CSounterelaimant LRG's Fifth Cause of Action, for a judgment 
against Puttaek in an amount to be proven at trial, but in an amount not less than 
approximately $500,000, plus LRG*s ooste, plus post judgment interest at the 
msjdmiim legal rate on the entire amount of the judgment 
16 
F. For such other and farther relief as the Court deems just and 
equitable under the circumstances. 
DATED this 19th day of October, 1999. 
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CERTIFICATE QE SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, to John F. 
Fay, Attorney for the Plainti^, at P.O. Box 68-1454, Park City, Utah 84068-1454, on 
Match Or, 1999/alrae and correct copy of the ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM OF 
DEFENDANT IJIG, INC. filed with the Court 
^^S^* 
Walker III 
for Defendants 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL PUTTUCK and PAUL PUTTUCK 
dba BREAK-THROUGH CONSTRUCTION, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PETER GENDRON, WILLIAM GENDRON 
and DOES 1-15, 
Defendants. 
RULING and ORDER 
Case No. 070500114 
Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DATE: August 1, 2007 
The above matter came before the court on July 30, 2007, 
for oral argument on defendants' motion to dismiss* Plaintiffs 
were present through John F. Fay and defendants were present 
through Scott C. Welling. 
Defendants filed this motion on May 15, 2007. Plaintiffs 
filed an opposition response on June 11, 2007, Defendants filed a 
reply and request to submit on June 26, 2007» 
Oral argument was held and the court took the issues under 
advisement. Before the hearing the court carefully considered the 
memoranda and other materials submitted by the parties* Since 
taking the issues under advisement, the court has further 
considered the law and facts relating to the issues. Now being 
fully advised, the court renders the following Ruling and Order, 
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff filed a complaint March 12, 2007. It alleged in 
summary that plaintiffs sued defendants in 1999 for bad faith 
breach of contract on a project in Deer Valley, Summit County, 
State of Utah* A counter-claim was filed by defendants. In 
discovery defendant Peter Gendron testified plaintiffs did 
substandard work. That lawsuit settled in plaintiffs' favor. 
Later in 2002 John Hale and his company Charis Construction sued 
defendants over the same project. A counter-claim was filed by 
defendants in that case also. In discovery and at trial in the 
Hale v Gendron case Peter Gendron testified plaintiffs did 
substandard work. William Gendron was aware of the testimony of 
Peter Gendron in both cases. A jury in the Hale v. Gendron case 
assessed damages against defendants and against plaintiffs on 
defendants' counter-claim* 
Plaintiffs claim in the first cause of action for Wrongful 
Use of Civil Proceedings that defendants falsely counter-claimed 
against plaintiffs for $500,000 in each of the two cases, and 
such false claims were without any justifiable basis. The 
counterclaims were to intimidate plaintiffs and injure 
plaintiffs' reputation, not to secure any proper adjudication, 
Plaintiffs prevailed. The counter-claims were in bad faith and 
malicious and caused damages to plaintiffs by their loss of 
attorney fees and damages and punitive damages should be awarded. 
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In the second cause of action plaintiffs allege civil 
perjury, asserting Peter Gendron falsely testified about the 
counter-claims and William Gendron knew of the falsity as well 
and was the construction manager. Plaintiffs suffered loss and 
the action was wilful and punitive damages are sought. 
As a third cause of action for Obstruction of Justice in the 
Hale v. Gendron lawsuit plaintiffs claim Peter Gendron testified 
as to the mismanagement of Mcintosh and Hale and Charis and that 
was the cause of defendants' loss on their counterclaim. Peter 
Gendron also testified the same $500,000 loss was due to 
Puttuck' s earlier mismanagement on the project. William Gendron 
testified falsely and William Gendron approved by silence the 
false testimony and obstruction and plaintiffs have suffered 
damages and the actions of defendants were wilful resulting in a 
claim for punitive damages. 
The fourth cause of action for Abuse of Process alleges 
similarly that the counter-claims were to injure plaintiffs' 
reputation and intimidate them and not to recover any legitimate 
losses* Damages and punitive damages are sought. 
Civil Conspiracy is alleged in the fifth cause of action in 
that the defendants agreed to falsely commit the first four 
claims herein and this caused damages and was wilful resulting in 
the justification for a claim of punitive damages. 
Plaintiffs seek recovery of all attorney fees and costs paid 
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in the 1999 Puttuck v Gendron lawsuit, punitive damages, and 
attorney fees. 
This motion followed. 
ARGUMENTS 
Defendants argue that all the causes of action arise from 
the building of a "spec" home in Summit County* Defendants move 
to dismiss under URCP, Rule 12(b)(6), the statute of limitations 
in UCA 78-12-25 (3), and because defendants are not personally 
liable as directors of a corporation. 
The outcome of the prior cases must be terminated in favor 
of the person against whom it was brought for the tort of 
malicious prosecution to be viable. The termination must reflect 
on the merits, not some procedural basis. The first Puttuck 
(Puttuck I) litigation was ended by settlement which has not been 
identified as to what plaintiffs received nor as to what claims 
were satisfied. To be favorable to plaintiffs, the termination 
must reflect the opinion of someone that the previous action 
lacked merit* If settlement were able to be re-opened to a claim 
of malicious prosecution settlements would be chilled. 
As to the alleged claims for perjury and obstruction, any 
remedy plaintiffs have in the first Puttuck litigation would have 
been by motion for Rule 11 sanctions. There is no private right 
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of action even though the conduct, if true as alleged, may be in 
violation of a criminal statute. 
As to civil conspiracy, the allegations must show a 
combination of persons, an object to be accomplished, a meeting 
of the minds on that object or course of action, an overt act, 
and damages. The evidence must be clear and convincing* 
Plaintiff claims William Gendron refused to reject or disavow 
Peter Gendron's false testimony. The allegation of perjury is 
merely plaintiffs' belief and no specifics are alleged, just that 
the testimony was false. The law does not hold one accountable 
for making counter-claims that are not in fact proven, only for 
claims that not legally tenable or that do not have any basis in 
fact. Otherwise, any complaint or counter-claim that did not 
prevail could be subject to such claims as plaintiffs bring and 
the process would never end. The testimony alleged must be 
wilfully false, not merely mistaken or wrong. Plaintiff has 
alleged no facts, other than the general overall "falsity" of 
Peter Gendron's testimony that could possibly support a perjury 
allegation* Merely overestimating or inflating claims of damages 
erroneously, or the like, do not qualify as perjury that can be 
proven. Moreover, as to William Gendron the claim that he failed 
to disavow testimony is insufficient to show a conspiracy. 
Plaintiffs have not alleged that William Gendron knew of any of 
any alleged falsity, that the Gendrons agreed to anything, or any 
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other element of civil conspiracy. 
As to abuse of process, plaintiff must show an ulterior 
motive and a willful act in use of the process that is not proper 
in the regular conduct of the proceeding. Plaintiffs do not 
allege any ulterior motive. The litigation must be undertaken 
for a purpose external to the lawsuit* The counter-claims here 
must have been undertaken for purposes apart from the litigation, 
something which the court could not otherwise order- At best for 
plaintiffs they have alleged the counter-claims were undertaken 
to damage the reputation of plaintiffs. Even if the case v/as weak 
for defendants in their counter-claim, there must be an ulterior 
motive. If there was false testimony it could have and should 
have been evident at the time and remedies were available-
impeachment, seeking of sanctions, criminal prosecution, or 
others. Instead, plaintiffs settled the case and now bring these 
claims. 
The statute of limitations bars all claims under the "catch 
all" provision of UCA 78-12-25 (3), which bars claims after four 
years. Here, any tort action accrues when all its elements come 
into being. The claimed "favorable termination" was at 
settlement, June 2000, when the dismissal was entered. 
As to the abuse of process claims from the filing of 
counter-claims those were served in October 1999 on plaintiffs 
and he was aware at that time of the counter claims of the 
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defendants in that case. The deposition of Peter Gendron was in 
June 2000. The claims of plaintiffs that the false counter-claim 
in the Hale v. Gendron litigation is merely proof, it is not the 
date when the cause of action arose. The claims that Hale and 
Puttuck mismanaged the project have not been alleged by 
plaintiffs herein to show that defendants counter-claimed against 
these two (Hale and Puttuck) for the same conduct. Even if the 
Hale litigation is considered, the counter-claim in that case was 
served February 27, 2003, more than four years before this 
complaint* The cause of action certainly, at the very latest, 
accrued then* 
Defendants are further protected by the corporate shield* 
LRG, Inc. is a Washington corporation. LRG was the contracting 
party with plaintiffs and Hale* The corporate identity is only 
disregarded where the corporation is the alter ego of the 
directors and the observance of the corporate form would work a 
fraud, Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts that would justify 
disregarding the corporate form* Nor could plaintiffs prove 
such* Moreover, the issue was litigated in Hale v. Gendron and 
decided in defendants' favor by the granting of a directed 
verdict by the court. LRG was named as a party in both the first 
Puttr-.k litigation and the Hale litigation. 
in opposition plaintiffs state as additional facts that 
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Puttuck was hired to work for defendants from March to December 
1998 when he was fired. Plaintiff sued for breach of contract and 
other relief and defendants filed a counter-claim and Peter 
Gendron testified concerning defendants' claims and how the 
damages were calculated. These damages for delay and such were 
from the beginning of work in March 1998 until completion in 
February 2000* Plaintiffs obtained a settlement* Hale was then 
hired, as Charis Construction, in February 1999 and he also sued 
for breach and other relief, Defendants also counter-claimed for 
the same amount, $500,000, and Peter Gendron testified at 
deposition that again the losses were due to mismanagement and 
plaintiffs claim his testimony overlapped as to time of damages-* 
that is, Puttuck's mismanagement allegedly went beyond 
termination in December 1998 and Hale's mismanagement was before 
his employ in February 1999. 
Plaintiffs claim they could not have known Peter Gendron was 
lying during the first deposition and only after resolution could 
plaintiffs have known. Only after the June 2006 jury trial could 
plaintiffs know the counter-claims were false. 
Plaintiffs claim the standard has been met by the complaint, 
If there is any doubt about whether a claim could be proven the 
court must decide in favor of the plaintiff and give the non~ 
movant a chance to prove the facts alleged, Peter Gendron is 
claimed to have presented the same counter-claim against two 
-8-
separate plaintiffs, and one must have been untrue. 
The settlement in favor of plaintiffs in the first Puttuck 
litigation was a favorable termination. The counter-claim was 
dismissed and defendants took nothing. 
Plaintiffs assert, by reliance on the Open Courts provision 
of the Utah Constitution, that there is a right to seek redress 
for civil perjury. 
As to the conspiracy, plaintiffs have alleged sufficient 
facts to merit recovery* Plaintiffs need to prove the facts by 
clear and convincing evidence, but that standard makes no sense 
at the pleading stage* William Gendron is claimed to have 
ratified the false testimony by doing nothing. 
The abuse of process claim has been properly pleaded and 
there was no proper factual basis for the claims of the Gendrons. 
The statute of limitations does not bar the claims as the 
last event completing the causes of action was not more than four 
years before the filing of the complaint* The earliest possible 
"last event" was November 2003 at Peter Gendron's deposition, and 
that is within the four year limitation. 
If the court believes it necessary plaintiffs seek 
permission to amend their complaint, 
i .a reply defendants re-state uncontested facts, repeating 
many of the facts set forth below. Defendants emphasize that the 
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counter-claim in Hale v„ Gendron was filed in February 2003, and 
that should have alerted plaintiffs to the claims of defendants 
even before the deposition. In the first Puttuck litigation Peter 
Gendron testified the damages he calculated were the difference 
between what Puttuck claimed he could do the job for ($198,000) 
and what defendants actually expended ($700,000), or $500,000. 
Hale was then hired and agreed to do the job from that point 
forward for $95,000. During Hale's tenure another $600,000 was 
expended, and that results in the $500,000 counter-claim against 
Hale* In fact the counter claim in Hale v, Gendron stated 
$300,000 was sought, not $500,000* 
Defendants assert that the losses defendants claimed were 
independent from each other, based on different times and 
expenditures* The basis of the Hale counter-claim was for Hale's 
conduct, not Puttuck's. Plaintiffs could have fully investigated 
the first counter-claim for its alleged falsity, but settled the 
case without pursuing defendants' claimed mis-use of the legal 
system. By admitting and asserting that they did not know of the 
falsity plaintiffs admit in essence that the first counter-claim 
was valid and colorable* 
Plaintiffs must still allege facts that, if proven, would 
satisfy the elements of the claim asserted. If the facts are not 
alleged the cause must be dismissed. 
It is not a conspiracy for one person to know another did 
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something and fail to correct it. Further, in the first Puttuck 
litigation William Gendron was not named and LRG, Inc. was named 
as a defendant. LRG is not named as a defendant in this case. 
The abuse of process claim fails as the litigation in the 
first Puttuck case was designed to resolve the claims and there 
is no possible facts that could be proven to show an external 
motive. 
Plaintiffs in fact "knew" or should have known, that the 
first counter-claim was false. Plaintiffs vigorously defended it 
and Peter Gendron was deposed in February 2000, and if false 
plaintiffs "knew" at that point* 
DISCUSSION 
This complaint is extra-ordinarily troubling for the court. 
Perhaps it is the court's first hand knowledge of the Hale v. 
Gendron case that was tried to a jury with the undersigned judge 
presiding. It was an eight day trial that was, frankly, torturous 
and demanding and difficult, for both the court and the jury. 
The court heard the testimony of the parties and their ongoing 
many year disputes over a single project. It must end and in 
this court it ends here and now. 
Plaintiffs entire theory is replete with nothing but 
dangers. If plaintiffs' complaint is allowed to proceed then 
every time a party remotely prevails in a case, that prevailing 
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party may then not sue for damages and attorney fees claiming the 
losing party should not have even defended or counter-claimed. 
Plaintiffs' complaint is more complex than that, but that would 
be the result in this case. Most interestingly, in the Hale v 
Gendron case, the defendants clearly prevailed on their counter-
claim more effectively than Hale prevailed on his claims and a 
jury accepted the testimony of Peter Gendron to some extent. 
Neither party obtained the verdict they asked for and the jury 
obviously did not think much of either party's evidence. Hale 
recovered a mere $20,000 on his claim for breach and claim for 
multi-thousands. LRG prevailed for a greater amount, 
approximately $50,000 against Hale and approximately $74,000 
against Mcintosh. Hale v. Gendron, docket no. 020500738, 
Under plaintiffs' basic theory of litigation if this case 
were allowed to go forward, and defendants filed even an answer 
and denied the allegations, and a jury then found in favor of 
plaintiffs, plaintiffs could then sue defendants again for 
"lying" in their answer and defending without merit. On the 
other hand, if this case went forward and defendants prevailed at 
a jury trial, convincing the jury that plaintiffs have no case, 
presumably defendants could and would then file another lawsuit 
claiming this complaint was in bad faith, without merit, an abuse 
of process, and defendants would be entitled to damages in the 
form of fees and such, including bad faith punitive damages. 
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Hale sought punitive damages in the prior litigation, just as 
plaintiffs do here, and there is simply no basis for it. 
The parties dispute and did dispute all aspects of a 
building project. That project is done, sold and finished. All 
parties, including Puttuck, Hale, and the Gendrons and LRG, blame 
the other for its many failings and lack of profit* However, 
this is and should not be one's life work, it is litigation. The 
project is over and litigation concerning that project is over 
insofar as this court has any say in the matter, and this court 
does have some say for now. 
Normally on a motion to dismiss the court is very much in 
favor of trying things on the merits and allowing the parties to 
present their facts and case to a fact finder. Here, however, 
these claims are just not merited and fail on many, many levels 
as outlined by defendants. In addition, as noted, there simply 
must be an end to things. The courts have enough to do without 
re-hashing old disputes. This case, if allowed to go forward, 
would again unavoidably be a trial over the original building 
disputes. Plaintiffs would be required to attempt to prove what 
they claimed in Puttuck I and in the Hale-that is, that LRG or 
defendants breached their contract, Defendants would be required 
to attempt to prove the validity of their counter-claims (which 
they already did in Hale to the at least partial satisfaction of 
a jury}, and then the parties would attempt to prove the 
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invalidity in total of the other side's presentations, This 
complaint in reality is simply another effort to prove the 
position of plaintiffs in the building dispute. It will not 
happen here. 
As to the first claim of wrongful use of the civil process 
defendant is correct* This settlement did not result in a 
favorable termination under the law but was the result of a 
settlement. No independent decision maker determined the 
counter-claim of defendant had no merit. 
The second claim for civil perjury is not sustainable as 
there is no private right for such an action. Further, as noted, 
to allow it in this or any other case would be to invite endless 
and endless litigation- Whoever prevailed in the previous 
proceeding could always claim the other side lied in the former 
litigation, that caused the prevailing party loss in terms of 
attorney fees and time away from work and so on. Then, the 
process would repeat, despite who may have prevailed in the 
second law suit, and on and on forever. A colorable claim, even 
if totally rejected, is not necessarily a lie or in bad faith. 
This complaint is, in the court's view, as weak and unjustified 
as the court has ever seen, Yet, the court does not for one 
moment believe the claims are perjurious or even ones that merit 
Rule 11 sanctions. They are simply and completely without merit 
but that does not qualify them as perjurious. 
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The third claim is for obstruction of justice. That too 
relies on the same bases. To claim there was only an ulterior 
motive of damaging reputation, when a jury found merit in the 
counter-claim and awarded damages in the Hale v. Gendron 
litigation is just incredible to this court. Even if the jury in 
Hale had rejected defendants' counter-claim in total that would 
not amount to any showing of lack of merit. The only way this 
claim could possibly prevail would be for plaintiffs to again try 
the building dispute issues to a jury, demonstrate the 
counterclaim had absolutely no merit (another jury has determined 
otherwise), and prove the counter-claims were only for purposes 
of intimidation. It cannot be done, those facts cannot be 
proven, and the facts alleged, even if proven, do not demonstrate 
a possible cause of action* 
The fourth cause of action is the same. It relies, again, 
on plaintiffs' simple attempt to relitigate the building dispute. 
The counter-claim was directly related to the building issues, 
claiming defendants had not breached the contract but plaintiff 
Puttuck and plaintiff Hale at various times had breached the 
contract and caused damages due to mismanagement. The counter-
claims did not seek the same amount of damages, they did not rely 
on the same alleged mis-management, There was opportunity to 
litigate that issue but plaintiffs settled the first Puttuck 
litigation and lost the second litigation in a jury trial as to 
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their claim of breach of contract. To now claim that in fact 
they should have won because defendants lied again does nothing 
but invite great mischief into our already burdened system, 
The fourth cause of action also fails, One cannot conspire 
with oneself* The claim, even if proven, that William Gendron 
knew of the falsity of Peter Gendron's testimony and did nothing 
does not amount to a conspiracy. 
In addition, all claims rest in the beginning on the claimed 
fact that the counter-claim in the first Puttuck litigation was 
knowingly false* Plaintiffs replied to it, defended it, examined 
it, and then settled the matter. Whenever, in a claimed 
situation where the other party is "lying," one "knows" of that 
lie is obviously problematic. There are differing degrees of 
^knowing" of course* For purposes of filing independent lawsuits 
over the defendants' claimed lies in their counter-claim, the 
court concludes the cause of action arose when the counter-claim 
was filed by the Gendrons in February 2000, not at the jury trial 
in June 2006 or at the deposition in February 2003* Plaintiffs 
attitude and feeling about Gendron's claims could not have 
changed from the time the first counter-claim was filed, It is 
highly unlikely plaintiffs felt, at the time of receiving the 
counter-claim, that it had great merit but only much later did 
they determine it did not have merit, It was either known to be 
false from the first time it was alleged or it was not* The 
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claims of mismanagement were no doubt rejected in the mind of 
plaintiffs, and if they were not (settlement indicates perhaps 
they were considered to have some merit) that very fact indicates 
the counter-claim was not wholly false and without merit. These 
claims in this complaint are wholly without merit and are barred 
by the statute of limitations. 
In addition, in the Hale litigation, the court ruled that 
LRG was the sole party and the corporate veil had not been shown 
to work a fraud* Despite that ruling, where current counsel was 
counsel for Hale, these claims against the Gendrons individually 
are brought. The court ruled, at least in the Hale matter, that 
LRG was the sole party from whom Hale could recover. The Hale 
litigation is part and parcel of these claims- If the Gendrons 
were held to not be personally liable in that case this court has 
great difficulty how plaintiffs can now assert in fact they are 
individually liable for conduct that occurred in that same 
litigation and related litigation. 
Again, this court sat through an eight day jury trial where 
the testimony was detailed and often petty. The jury largely 
rejected fully the large claims of damages of both parties, Hale 
and LRG, operated by the Gendrons• The building dispute was 
almost rather "childish" in that both parties blamed the other 
for many, many failings in an expensive Deer Valley spec home 
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building. The testimony was largely of the "he said/' uNo, I 
didn't" variety, The jury toiled and was exasperated with the 
case and spoke with its verdict. Those disputes are really the 
same as existed in Puttuck I, which was settled after plaintiffs 
would have had to evaluate the counter-claims- Those claims of 
"who was lying'7 will not be litigated again and again in the 
guise of this claim of falsity by the defendants* 
These claims are all subject to the above failings and all 
are without merit and must be dismissed* 
The motion to dismiss is GRANTED. 
This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and no other 
order is required* 
DATED this i day of /T-Jtf • 2007. 
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